Monday, April 6, 2026

Chinese Robotics: A Look At Unitree And Its Upcoming IPO

Following on April 5's "Inside China’s robotics revolution". 

We have no interest in IPOs as vehicles to invest/speculate/gamble with, but do pore over  offering documents to glean whatever insight might be publicly proffered. 

From Irene Zhang at ChinaTalk substack, April 2:

Unitree Goes Public 

robotics diffusion, AGI for the real world, and US-China entanglement 

In 2017, Hangzhou-based robotics firm Unitree 宇树科技 launched its first quadruped, Laikago. Laika was the name of the Soviet space dog onboard Sputnik 2, and the American English pronunciation of “go” is similar to that of the Chinese word for dogs, 狗 gǒu. Unitree’s battery-powered tribute to Laika wasn’t fuzzy, but walked on four feet and navigated through basic obstacles.

Unitree founder Wang Xingxing 王兴兴 has long held faith in the potential of robotic canines. Since 2020, when Unitree started gaining media attention, he has insisted in multiple interviews that humans are drawn to four-legged creatures and will have a natural fondness for their artificial counterparts.

Fast forward to 2026, and Unitree has just filed for a $610-million IPO on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The company is a household name in China after its humanoid robots performed dances at the CCTV Spring Festival Gala for two consecutive years and counting. Through their IPO disclosures (investor prospectus and response letter to the Shanghai Stock Exchange’s inquiries), we get some answers to important questions about the development of embodied AI.

  • How is Unitree profitable?

  • Where is diffusion happening inside China, aside from dancing on TV?

  • Are Chinese robotics companies content to lead in hardware and applications, or do they also see themselves as pursuing some kind of generalized “frontier”?

  • And finally, what does this all mean for US-China dynamics in robotics?

***video***

What’s the money maker?
One of the most notable things about Unitree is the fact that it actually makes money. Unprofitability is a near-universal challenge because AI robotics, despite massive advances in the past few years, is still an early-stage technology. Mass adoption has not yet arrived; pathways out of bottlenecks like data are uncertain; and important safety standards have not caught up. Even shipping products consistently can be a challenge for some companies in the space, let alone manufacturing at scale and booking reliable customers.

This context is why observers have found Unitree’s ability to turn a profit remarkable. Not only has the company’s net profit been positive since 2024, but from 2024 to 2025, its net profit grew by 204.29%. A look at its growth, broken down by product category, reveals the most significant source of this revenue explosion: humanoids.

....MUCH MORE 

Previously:

January 29, 2026 - "Gartner Predicts Fewer Than 20 Companies Will Scale Humanoid Robots for Manufacturing and Supply Chain to Production Stage by 2028"

So it looks like 2027 will be a very important year for Unitree, Tesla and the other 90 wannabe players. We shall see.

Here's Gartner's Hype Cycle for emerging technologies. Humanoids are bottom left and tagged by Gartner with an expected ten years to the Plateau of Productivity:

https://emt.gartnerweb.com/ngw/globalassets/en/newsroom/images/graphs/2025-emerging-tech-hype-cycle.png 

Of course that also implies we are quite a ways from the Trough of Disillusionment as well.

And of course, your mileage may vary: 

September 13, 2022 - Gartner Outlines Six Trends Driving Near-Term Adoption of Metaverse Technologies  

There are many, many more. If interested use the search blog box, upper left.

"The Math That Explains Why Bell Curves Are Everywhere"

From Quanta, March 16:

The central limit theorem started as a bar trick for 18th-century gamblers. Now scientists rely on it every day.  

No matter where you look, a bell curve is close by.

Place a measuring cup in your backyard every time it rains and note the height of the water when it stops: Your data will conform to a bell curve. Record 100 people’s guesses at the number of jelly beans in a jar, and they’ll follow a bell curve. Measure enough women’s heights, men’s weights, SAT scores, marathon times — you’ll always get the same smooth, rounded hump that tapers at the edges.

Why does the bell curve pop up in so many datasets?

The answer boils down to the central limit theorem, a mathematical truth so powerful that it often strikes newcomers as impossible, like a magic trick of nature. “The central limit theorem is pretty amazing because it is so unintuitive and surprising,” said Daniela Witten (opens a new tab), a biostatistician at the University of Washington. Through it, the most random, unimaginable chaos can lead to striking predictability.

It’s now a pillar on which much of modern empirical science rests. Almost every time a scientist uses measurements to infer something about the world, the central limit theorem is buried somewhere in the methods. Without it, it would be hard for science to say anything, with any confidence, about anything.

“I don’t think the field of statistics would exist without the central limit theorem,” said Larry Wasserman (opens a new tab), a statistician at Carnegie Mellon University. “It’s everything.”

Purity From Vice

Perhaps it shouldn’t come as a surprise that the push to find regularity in randomness came from the study of gambling.

In the coffeehouses of early-18th-century London, Abraham de Moivre’s mathematical talents were obvious. Many of his contemporaries, including Isaac Newton and Edmond Halley, recognized his brilliance. De Moivre was a fellow of the Royal Society, but he was also a refugee, a Frenchman who had fled his home country as a young man in the face of anti-Protestant persecution. As a foreigner, he couldn’t secure the kind of steady academic post that would befit his talent. So to help pay his bills, he became a consultant to gamblers who sought a mathematical edge.

Flipping a coin, rolling a die, and drawing a card from a deck are random actions, with every outcome equally likely. What de Moivre realized is that when you combine many random actions, the result follows a reliable pattern.

Flip a coin 100 times and count how often it comes up heads. It’ll be somewhere around 50, but not very precisely. Play this game 10 times, and you may get 10 different counts.

Now imagine playing the game 1 million times. The bulk of the outcomes will be close to 50. You’ll almost never get under 10 heads or over 90. If you make a graph of how many times you see each number between zero and 100, you’ll see that classic bell shape, with 50 at the center. The more times you play the game, the smoother and clearer the bell will become.

De Moivre figured out the exact shape of this bell, which came to be called the normal distribution. It told him, without his having to actually play the game, how likely different outcomes were. For instance, the probability of getting between 45 and 55 heads is about 68%.

De Moivre marveled with religious devotion at the “steadfast order of the universe” that eventually overcame any and all deviations from the bell. “In process of time,” he wrote, “these irregularities will bear no proportion to the recurrency of that order which naturally results from original design.”

He used these insights to sustain a meager life in London, writing a book called The Doctrine of Chances that became a gambler’s bible, and holding informal office hours at the famed Old Slaughter’s Coffee House. But even de Moivre didn’t realize the full scope of his discovery. Only when Pierre-Simon Laplace ran with the idea in 1810, decades after de Moivre’s death, was its full reach uncovered.

Let’s take an example slightly more complex than coin flips: dice rolls. Every roll of a die has six equally likely outcomes. If you repeatedly roll the die and tally the results, you’ll get a chart that looks flat — you’re bound to see about as many rolls of 1 as you do 2 or 4 or 6....

....MUCH MORE 

"Traders Overwhelmed by Iran News Are Turning to AI for Help"

Bunch of lightweights. 

Back in the day the old-timers didn't need much more in the toolbox than a rock and a stick.

Some months they didn't even use the rock for weeks at a stretch.

From Bloomberg, March 19:

As Maxence Visseau spent the first few days of the Iran war trying to make sense of what the conflict would mean for markets, he put artificial intelligence at the heart of his investment process.

Large-language models enabled Visseau, the founder of investment firm Arkevium, to cut the time he spent on research by about 80%. He used Anthropic’s Claude to stress-test multiple scenarios in parallel, compare historical precedents and map out potential ripple effects across asset classes. 

“I was up for almost 48 hours straight, monitoring the interceptions in the United Arab Emirates while simultaneously running scenarios and preparing for the market open,” said Visseau, who’s based in Dubai and specializes in macro trading strategies. “That’s precisely the kind of moment where AI becomes indispensable.”

While Visseau said the technology isn’t a reliable substitute for human judgment, he views the time-saving benefits of AI as increasingly essential for navigating markets whipsawed by a war that has upended energy supplies and left at least 4,000 dead. Interviews with investors and strategists across the globe suggest the conflict has led AI tools to become more entrenched in workflows, even as several flagged pitfalls including sloppy prompts and inaccurate results.

“We are witnessing history — the first major conflict where AI is being used to fight and where traders rely on AI to map out the war in ways that have never been done before,” said Nick Twidale, chief market analyst at AT Global Markets in Sydney and who’s a 25-year veteran of trading markets.

One of the advantages of using AI tools such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT, Google’s Gemini and China’s DeepSeek is a dramatic improvement in time management.

Jian Shi Cortesi says where she previously may have spent half an hour reading different sources to catch up on the news, now the Zurich-based fund manager at GAM Investment Management can get a summary of the latest developments in the war in seconds. Gathering information about a particular company takes a day or less, down from multiple days previously.

“In the past, it’s like digging a hole with a shovel. Now you’re digging dirt with these massive excavators,” Cortesi said. “The speed has probably increased by five times.”

Another is being able to mine history near instantaneously for insights and context on what may happen next, especially given the volatility in markets. Brent crude surged as much as 11% to top $119 a barrel on Thursday on concern over the risk of escalating tit-for-tat attacks on key energy facilities in the Middle East, before giving up most of its gains. It last traded at $108.

Deep Search

Anna Wu, a cross asset strategist at Van Eck Associates Corp. in Sydney, used ChatGPT and Claude to go back 100 years to track every war-driven oil breakout, and find out what asset classes outperformed in each occurrence. To improve the utility of the answers, she asked AI to cross reference with other data points such as the median inflation and global economic growth.

“It definitely has brought in more efficiency,” Wu said. “A lot of the historical analysis right now has become a lot less time-consuming because before it would be me searching to the end of Google.”

For Gustavo Pessoa, artificial intelligence tools provide instant access to information that previously might have been hard to get, at a time when calculating the impact of the virtual closure of the Strait of Hormuz is becoming more essential to investing.

“We use it for everything — from understanding the types of ships to analyzing the elasticity of oil demand to prices and even estimating how many barrels will be needed to stabilize flows,” said Pessoa, who’s a founding partner at Sao Paulo–based hedge fund Legacy Capital Gestora de Recursos Ltda.

AI is not perfect, nor is it a replacement for human experience and decision-making. The technology has made mistakes in everything from gaming development to news content representation. A Bank of England policymaker warned that AI adoption in trading may amplify market shocks and herd-like behavior....

....MUCH MORE 

Capital Markets: "Cease-Fire Hopes Blunt US Ultimatum"

From Marc to Market:

The US deadline on Tehran for re-opening the Strait of Hormuz has subtly shifted until tomorrow. The holiday-thinned market initially bought dollars and oil and took risk off in response to the continued attacks and the escalation of US rhetoric. However, negotiations, apparently led by Pakistan, Egypt, and Türkiye for a 45-day cease fire, have captured the imagination of market participants, even though the negotiators themselves do not appear optimistic.

In quiet turnover, the dollar has given up its early gains, and as the North American session is about. to begin, the greenback is lower against all the G10 currencies and emerging market currencies. US index futures are trading firmer and May WTI is off around 1% but is still near $110. It still seems binary. If the hopes are dashed, risk will come off as the conflict could dramatically escalate....

....MUCH MORE  

Sunday, April 5, 2026

Bill Gates: "The next generation of electricity is almost here"

From Mr. Gates' GatesNotes blog, March 23: 

I’m in Texas this week to talk about the remarkable breakthroughs fueling our zero-emission future.

Greetings from the Lone Star State! I’m in Texas this week for the Breakthrough Energy Ventures Investors Summit. This is one of the best places in the world to see the future of energy, and I can’t wait to see how much progress has been made since my last visit.

There’s a lot on the agenda this week, but I’m especially excited to talk about electricity breakthroughs. By 2050, the world will need nearly three times as much power as we use today—and if we’re going to decarbonize the economy, we’ll have to electrify a lot of things that currently use fossil fuels. That means we need to deliver a huge amount of energy in a clean, reliable, and affordable way.

If you’re an electricity nerd like me, this is an exciting moment. Earlier this month, TerraPower—the next-generation nuclear power company I created in 2008—received federal approval to start building the nuclear reactor at its Kemmerer, Wyoming plant. Wind and solar are reportedly generating more electricity than fossil fuels in the EU for the first time. We’re seeing a clear shift as the world’s electricity system is becoming more diverse, more innovative, and more dynamic than ever before.

Here are three of the coolest technologies people will be talking about this week:

Geothermal. Geothermal power has been around for more than a century, but new approaches are unlocking greater potential for the technology. Most geothermal power plants today are located near the boundary between two tectonic plates, where you don’t have to drill as deep to find usable heat that can be pumped to the surface to turn a turbine and generate electricity.

Fervo wants to make geothermal an option in more places by both digging deeper (up to a mind-blowing 15,000 ft below the surface) and extending their wells horizontally at their deepest point. The results so far are super promising: Their pilot project has been consistently generating electricity since 2023, and their Cape Station plant in Utah will come online this year.

Fusion. Fusion is the reaction that powers the sun and stars, and it has the potential to be a virtually unlimited source of clean, safe electricity. Once the technology is fully commercialized within the next decade, it can be built anywhere, scaled up, and used to make huge amounts of electricity with no carbon emissions and minimal waste.

The question right now is how we get there. It seems likely that the first commercial fusion plants will use magnetic fields to harness the reaction to generate electricity. There are two different approaches to this: the tokamak, a donut-shaped machine that is easier to build but harder to keep stable, and the stellarator, a twist-shaped machine that is harder to build but easier to keep stable. (An unstable reaction can damage the machine but poses no risk to safety.) Commonwealth Fusion Systems is on track to turn on their SPARC tokamak next year, and Type One Energy is making great progress with their Infinity One stellarator. Marathon Fusion, Xcimer, and Zap Energy aren’t quite as far along with their approaches, but I’m optimistic about what they’re doing.

Geologic hydrogen. Hydrogen shows great promise as an energy source, and the discovery of geologic hydrogen is one of the biggest energy surprises of the past decade. Although it’s the earliest stage technology on this list, I’m excited about its potential. Geologic hydrogen is a zero-emission power source that is continuously generated underground by the Earth itself. Bourakébougou, a village in Mali, is powered by the small hydrogen field it sits on top of, and researchers have found deposits in the U.S., France, and other places.

This is an unusual technology to talk about because it’s hard to predict a timeline....

....MUCH MORE including video. 

We have dozens, nay, scores of posts on Mr. Gates and energy and Breakthrough Energy Ventures. On Breakthrough and its billionaire backers;

https://climateerinvest.blogspot.com/search?q=breakthrough+energy+ventures 

And on Bill and nuclear: 

Bill Gates Goes To Wyoming Coal Country, Breaks Ground On A Nuke Plant, Plays Poker With The Locals

On geologic hydrogen:

Want To Be A Hydrogen Tycoon? Maybe Prospect For Ophiolite And Chromite Ore

"There's hydrogen in them thar hills" 

https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5ae11809f93fd4f365d1d2c3/1542637113588-D3TOKWUJPXZZUSZ0XGJI/Ballad+of+Buster+Scruggs+%282%29.JPG?format=1500w

Grizzled prospector intently looking for hydrogen.

just kidding, that's Tom Waits in the Coen brothers film “The Ballad of Buster Scruggs.

On the tribulations of dealing with stuff vs. dealing with software. May 2019: 
Bezos, Andreessen and Gates Looking For Cobalt In Canada

Not them personally, can you imagine? Tramping around northern Saskatchewan?

Jeff: Bill, does this rock look blue to you?
Bill: I can't see it, let me get my glasses.
Marc: Guys, have I told you all the things I've wanted to tweet since I quit Twitter?
Jeff and Bill: Oh Gawd
No, it's a company they're invested in....

"Inside China’s robotics revolution"

From The Guardian, March 19:

How close are we to the sci-fi vision of autonomous humanoid robots? I visited 11 companies in five Chinese cities to find out  

Chen Liang, the founder of Guchi Robotics, an automation company headquartered in Shanghai, is a tall, heavy-set man in his mid-40s with square-rimmed glasses. His everyday manner is calm and understated, but when he is in his element – up close with the technology he builds, or in business meetings discussing the imminent replacement of human workers by robots – he wears an exuberant smile that brings to mind an intern on his first day at his dream job. Guchi makes the machines that install wheels, dashboards and windows for many of the top Chinese car brands, including BYD and Nio. He took the name from the Chinese word guzhi, “steadfast intelligence”, though the fact that it sounded like an Italian luxury brand was not entirely unwelcome.

For the better part of two decades, Chen has tried to solve what, to him, is an engineering problem: how to eliminate – or, in his view, liberate – as many workers in car factories as technologically possible. Late last year, I visited him at Guchi headquarters on the western outskirts of Shanghai. Next to the head office are several warehouses where Guchi’s engineers tinker with robots to fit the specifications of their customers. Chen, an engineer by training, founded Guchi in 2019 with the aim of tackling the hardest automation task in the car factory: “final assembly”, the last leg of production, when all the composite pieces – the dashboard, windows, wheels and seat cushions – come together. At present, his robots can mount wheels, dashboards and windows on to a car without any human intervention, but 80% of the final assembly, he estimates, has yet to be automated. That is what Chen has set his sights on.

As in much of the world, AI has become part of everyday life in China. But what most excites Chinese politicians and industrialists are the strides being made in the field of robotics, which, when combined with advances in AI, could revolutionise the world of work. The technology behind China’s current robotics boom is deep learning, the mathematical engine behind large language models such as ChatGPT, which learn by discerning patterns from huge datasets. Many researchers believe that machines can learn to navigate the physical world the way ChatGPT learned to navigate language: not by following rules, but by absorbing enough data for something like human dexterity to emerge. The aim, for many technologists, is the development of humanoid robots capable of performing factory labour – work that employs hundreds of millions of people worldwide.

The resources being pumped into achieving this goal are staggering. In 2025, China announced a £100bn fund for strategic technologies including quantum computing, clean energy and robotics. Major cities have invested their own resources into robotics projects, too. There are now roughly 140 Chinese firms hoping to build humanoids. Some of the frontrunners made their debut in February, at the lunar new year festival gala, a state-choreographed spectacle loosely comparable to the Super Bowl in terms of bombast and national significance. Hundreds of millions watched as robots performed comedy sketches and martial arts routines. The speed of progress has been startling. Last year, the robots were doing a synchronised cheerleading routine. This year, they did cartwheels and parkour. The intended message was clear: the robots are coming, and China will be the nation building them.

A world in which AI-powered humanoid robots are produced at scale still seems to belong in the realm of science fiction. Late last year, I visited 11 robotics companies in China across five cities to try to grasp just how close we are to the robot future. I met many ambitious entrepreneurs, who were operating in an environment so deeply integrated with municipal governments that the distinction between private and public was losing its meaning. All of them were engaged, in different ways, in the race to build and commercialise robots capable of replacing human workers – and some of them already have eager western buyers. 

Inside one of the Guchi Robotics warehouses, a team of employees from General Motors was testing Guchi’s wheel-installation machines ahead of a shipment to Canada. The hull of a white GM truck occupied a raised platform at the centre of the room. The truck, surrounded by four large robotic arms and a jungle of wires, sat inside a yellow safety enclosure made of steel bars. I watched on the sidelines as a bearded GM engineer tinkered with a control panel outside the steel cage.

The engineer, an American man whom I’ll call Jack, worked in GM’s “manufacturing optimisation” division. “To be grim, anything that eliminates people from the production line is basically my job,” Jack told me. General Motors sets job-reduction targets for his division each year, he said, which requires eliminating a set number of factory workers across all plants in North America. His team chose Guchi over a German-based competitor – itself 95% owned by a Chinese company – because the other couldn’t offer a moving assembly line, Jack explained. The purchase of the Guchi machines, he said, would eliminate 12 assembly operators on the line at a single factory. (General Motors did not confirm the job-reduction targets, but a spokesperson said it implements technology to help improve safety, efficiency and quality, “particularly for physically demanding or repetitive tasks.”)

An irony of the Trump administration’s mission to revive industrial production within the US is that much of the machinery required to make America great again comes from the country that motivated America’s industrial revival in the first place. China now accounts for more than half of the world’s new factory robot installations annually. Chen thinks Chinese and American engineers are comparable in skill and talent. “The difference is really just cost and speed, and how many people you can throw at a problem – we might have 1,000 who can do this work, and they might have 100,” he said.

Chen and I walked to the end of the warehouse, where we now had a frontal view of the GM truck. After watching Jack work for a bit, Chen pointed me to the robotic arms on each side of the car body: “You see those? This is the screwdriving robot. Even if manufacturing does come back to North America, they won’t be putting workers on the line to fasten screws any more. They’ll use robots.”

I wasn’t so sure. Wasn’t one reason that Americans elected Trump because they wanted their blue-collar jobs back? Chen thought this was pure illusion. The world had changed, and so had young people. Chen told me to think about China, where factory culture is deeply ingrained but young Chinese are increasingly reluctant to tolerate the drudgery. “It’s just how people are wired now.” If even Chinese people aren’t willing to do factory work any more, Chen was saying, why would Americans?


One week after my visit to Guchi HQ, I met Chen in north-west Beijing, where the city’s top universities are located. He had invited me to a meeting at the head office of Galbot, one of China’s most hyped humanoid robotics startups. One of its wheeled humanoids appeared in a skit at this year’s lunar new year jamboree, where it handed a male actor a bottle of water from a shelf and folded laundry. Since its founding in 2023, Galbot has pursued a less showy strategy than many of its competitors: building robots that can perform mundane tasks such as picking up items and setting them down elsewhere safely and reliably. The founder, Wang He, told a Chinese reporter recently that their robots are already deployed in several Chinese car factories, though videos appear to show them in highly controlled settings.

Galbot’s “pick-and-place” robots might seem a lot dumber than their backflipping rivals, but a crucial difference is that the robot acrobats operate according to pre-programmed instructions: they are feats of motion control and balance, but they do not go off-script. The kind of technology being developed at Galbot is what roboticists call a vision-language-action model (VLA), which aims to allow machines to operate in unfamiliar and fluid environments, just as humans do. For now, Galbot’s robots cannot reliably do what, for humans, would be trivial tasks – say, washing the dishes – but Wang, has told Chinese reporters he aims to have 10,000 robots handling basic retail and factory work in three years. (Some AI pioneers, such as Yann LeCun, are extremely sceptical that the current paradigm of deep learning will deliver the results companies such as Galbot hope for.)....

....MUCH MORE 

"Robert Trivers, who died on March 12, 2026, was arguably the most important evolutionary theorist since Darwin."

From Rober Lynch's The Laughing Ape substack, March 19:

Remembering Robert Trivers 

Robert Trivers, who died on March 12, 2026, was arguably the most important evolutionary theorist since Darwin. He had a rare gift for seeing through the messy clutter of life and revealing the underlying logic beneath it. E. O. Wilson called him “one of the most influential and consistently correct theoretical evolutionary biologists of our time.” Steven Pinker described him as “one of the great thinkers in the history of Western thought.”

I was Robert’s graduate student at Rutgers from 2006 to 2014. Long before I knew him personally, however, he had already established himself as one of the most original and insightful scientists of the twentieth century. In an astonishing series of papers in the early 1970s, he changed forever our understanding of evolution and social behavior.

The first, published while he was still a graduate student at Harvard, confronted one of the deepest problems in evolutionary theory: how can natural selection favor cooperation between non-relatives? In The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism Trivers proposed that cooperation could evolve when the same individuals interacted repeatedly, making it advantageous to help those who were likely to help in return while avoiding cheaters who took benefits without reciprocating — i.e.“you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours.” The paper offered an elegant solution to the problem of how natural selection can “police the system” and has had enormous implications for human psychology, including our sense of justice, with parallels in other mammals such as capuchins and dogs. The next year in 1972, Trivers published his most cited paper, Parental Investment and Sexual Selection. Here he offered a unified explanation for something that had puzzled biologists since Darwin. Writing perhaps the most famous sentence in all of evolutionary biology—“What governs the operation of sexual selection is the relative parental investment of the sexes in their offspring”—Trivers threw down the gauntlet and revealed a deceptively simple principle that reorganized the field. From that insight flowed one of the most powerful and falsifiable ideas in modern science: the sex that invests more in offspring will tend to be choosier about mates, while the sex that invests less will compete more intensely for access to them.

Two years later, in 1974, Robert once again gave birth to an entirely new field of study with Parent-Offspring Conflict. In it, he built on William Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness to show that parents and children have divergent genetic interests. Because a parent is equally related to all of its offspring, while each offspring is related to itself more than to its siblings, conflict is built into the family from the beginning. With that insight, Trivers revealed that some of the most intimate and emotionally charged features of life—begging, weaning, sibling rivalry, tantrums, parental favoritism, even the distribution of love and attention within families—all could be understood as the product of natural selection acting on family members with conflicting evolutionary interests. In other papers, Trivers made wide-ranging predictions about the conditions under which parents should produce or invest more in sons than daughters, how female mate choice can favor male traits that benefit daughters, why insect colonies are structured by conflicts over sex ratios, reproduction, and control, and how self-deception may have evolved as a way of more effectively deceiving others.

Each of these papers spawned entirely new research fields, and many have dedicated their careers to unpacking and testing the implications of his ideas. As Harvard biologist David Haig put it, “I don’t know of any comparable set of papers. Most of my career has been based on exploring the implications of one of them.” Indeed, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that his ideas gave birth to the field of evolutionary psychology and the whole line of popular Darwinian books from Richard Dawkins and Robert Wright to David Buss and Steven Pinker....

....MUCH MORE 

The Easter Parade, Berlin 1949

Originally posted Thursday, March 20, 2008.

Ag Stocks and The Berlin Airlift (AG; MOS; MON; POT)

Last night in "Commodities Comeuppance" I said my best guess was that the ag stocks would be up today. When POT and MOS opened down I was reminded of a vignette from the Berlin Airlift.

We're coming up on the 60th anniversary of the Soviet blockade that June.
During the summer the two million people that the Brits and Americans were trying to feed could get by with two tons of coal per day (over the course of the airlift 80% of the weight hauled was coal) but as the blockade went on, it was apparent that the Sov's. intended to starve the city and it became imperative that an efficient method of delivering coal be found.

During winter the absolute minimum requirement was 3100 tons of coal per day. The little C-47's could haul around three tons per flight. The first week of the airlift, deliveries averaged 90 tons per day. The second week, 1000 tons/day.

It was decided to experiment with a low-speed, low-level drop of coal onto an empty field, the idea being that if it worked, B-29 Superfortress' with a 105 mph stall speed and 22-25 ton capacity would solve the problem.

On the appointed day the senior commanders went to the field, the plane came over, low and slow, dropped the coal, packed 100 pounds to a bag, the bags landed, exploded open, the coal was pulverized and a great black cloud of coal dust covered everyone watching.

One of the Generals, I forget if it was LeMay, Tunner or Smith, said "Doesn't work" and that was that.

When I saw the ag stocks open this morning I thought
"Doesn't work".

The logistics geniuses figured out what needed to be done, took 300 of the 400 10-ton capacity C-54's in the U.S. fleet, developed flight rules so efficient that the Germans called it "die Luftbrücke" (Air Bridge) and on Easter Sunday 1949 in a move to crush the Soviet's spirit, they decided to show off with the "Easter Parade".

In the 1440 minutes of that day, they flew 1398 flights into Berlin delivering 12,940 tons of coal.
The Soviets gave up the blockade the next month, two million people didn't starve or be forced to live under Moscow masters and thousands of kids remembered the candy bars the pilots would tie to handkerchief parachutes and drop as they came into Tempelhof.




39 British and 31 American airmen were killed in crashes during the airlift:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bb/InschriftLuftbruckendenkmal.JPG
Berlin Airlift Monument in Berlin-Tempelhof with inscription
"Sie gaben ihr Leben für die Freiheit Berlins im Dienste der Luftbrücke 1948/49"
"They lost their lives for the freedom of Berlin in service for the Berlin Airlift 1948/49"

 

Yup Sonny


Yup Sonny

Saturday, April 4, 2026

Sunrise in Jerusalem

From Daily Roman Updates

"A Shakeup Is Coming for the Nation-State"

As we've seen—most recently with Israel's Mossad in Iran and Ukraine's Operation Spiderweb in Russia—tractor-trailers and shipping containers make dandy places to hide your weapons of war. Also handy for transporting same. More after the jump.... 

—December 10, 2025 - "How China Built a Network of Ports Encircling the Globe"

From the New Atlantis, Spring 2026: 

Essay

For centuries, holding vast territory has been the basis of state security. Drones and AI are about to make it a vulnerability. 

On June 13, 2025, Iran’s air defense network was largely silent in the face of an intense Israeli bombing campaign. Just before the attack, swarms of explosive quadcopter drones, launched by Israel from inside Iranian territory and acting on vast troves of intelligence sifted with the use of AI to select targets, had taken out Iran’s radar systems and numerous missile sites. Israel’s one-two punch made Iran an object lesson in how a combination of AI and drones is blazing a new trajectory for international politics.

Not long before, on June 1, Ukraine had employed a strikingly similar tactic, using cargo trucks with false inventories to smuggle drones deep into Russian territory. The drones had been trained using AI to recognize Tu-95 “Bear” bombers based on photographs taken of a decommissioned version in a Ukrainian air museum and to recognize the weakest point of the bombers, often the fuel tanks in the wings. This allowed the drones, flying first autonomously and then with human pilots, to strike Russian bombers with high precision as far away as Siberia.

In the grand scheme of geopolitics, these events were small. The conflict between Iran and Israel ended up being more like glorified shadowboxing than real war, and the Ukrainian strike on Russia did nothing to change the relentless, grinding attrition of the front line. These events are not obvious ruptures in international politics, as when nuclear fire consumed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. That moment announced with dreadful clarity that the future of war and strategy would never be the same. The use of AI coupled with drones, however, is more like Sputnik in 1957, a seemingly small event that nevertheless drastically altered the human relationship to technology.

Heidegger once remarked that the first images of Earth from the Moon shocked him because they revealed a new way of grasping the human condition, drained of direct human experience. AI-enabled drone strikes carry a similar symbolic charge: they represent war drained of direct human contact.

What does it mean for this relatively cheap and widely available technology to exist in the hands not only of sovereign states but of non-state actors, rebel groups, terrorists, and even ordinary people? It means that in fragile or conflict-prone regions such as parts of Yemen and Pakistan and elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa, small groups of motivated individuals will be able to destabilize political authority through attacks on infrastructure that is far from where those groups are operating, threatening at a whole new level the state’s capacity to control its territory and population. AI-plus-drone technology thus accelerates the fragmentation of international order by weakening the sovereign state’s grip on territory and empowering local groups as well as opaque, transnational networks capable of organized violence.

The diffusion of cheap AI drones — and thus of a relatively easy and far-reaching means of violence — will likely evince a response from sovereign states. The great powers may expand their capacities for surveillance and security and reemphasize the importance of borders. The global cosmopolitan fluidity of recent decades may yield to a renewed focus on territory and control. What emerges would not be the end of the current order but its contraction and reinvention. In this scenario, states will reassert their sovereignty not out of a sense of revanchist nostalgia but of state survival.

Perhaps none of this will occur. But machine learning software and drone hardware are powerful, and now both easily accessible. The confluence of the two, and their likely increasing deployment to inflict violence, demands a thought experiment about the future we may face.

The Rise of the Nation-State 
The ultimate, if déclassé, question in political thought is: Who rules, and how is that rule justified? Various justifications have been offered, such as faith, reason, or the will of the people, but for its implementation each ultimately relies on force. Legitimacy requires the capacity for violence. In the age of Enlightenment, the sovereign state emerged as the sole entity authorized to use violence within a defined territory. Sovereignty meant nothing without territory, just as the “rights of man” meant little without property. Hence the modern state became defined by its monopoly on legitimate force.

The origin of this concept helps to clarify AI’s potential effect on international order. In the 1500s, Europe’s religious unity under the Catholic Church collapsed from the pressures of the Protestant Reformation and rising nationalism. These in turn were enabled by a profound transformation: the spread of literacy through the printing press. Rising literacy fostered the prestige of vernacular languages, national literatures, and new interpretations of Scripture. Political identity — Italian, Spanish, English — was shaped as much by Dante, Cervantes, and Shakespeare as by any prince.

When the Thirty Years’ War, largely between Catholic and Protestant territories, ended in 1648, the new political order came to be known as “Westphalian,” named after the peace treaty. Westphalian politics was governed by the sovereign state, its political authority bounded by its territory, and its relations with other states governed by treaties backed by a balance of military and economic strength.

But Europe’s political transformation did not destroy the Catholic Church. The Church responded to the twin challenges of Protestantism and nationalism with reform and consolidation, becoming more centralized, more professionalized, and more capable of global expansion. Even as Christendom fragmented, the Church grew more coherent and purposeful. 

From Printing Press to AI Drone Strikes 
A similar transformation now confronts the modern nation-state. Like the Catholic Church in the 1500s, the nation-state has long struggled against forces of dissolution. But a technological and political upheaval may now be triggering its reassertion.

The story of the nation-state’s decline goes roughly like this. Globalized economies favor the unrestricted movement of goods, capital, and labor. The institutions and practices required for this movement conflict with national cohesion. International governance regimes — think of the United Nations and the European Union — undermine the state’s capacity to define and defend its own laws and customs. These pressures converge in the question of how to think about immigration: popular discourse may focus on borders, on the state’s sovereignty, and on individual rights, but the deeper challenge is to the legitimacy of the distinction between citizen and noncitizen. That distinction — the political distinction par excellence because of its close association with the question of who rules over whom — is now blurred by a cosmopolitan global order that prizes universality over cultural and territorial particularity.

Not only does cosmopolitanism call citizenship into question; it also gives rise to new forms of violence that challenge the territorial logic of the state. The global diffusion of media in the twentieth century made human suffering visible in unprecedented ways, creating a moral imperative to act, often without regard for the sovereignty of other states. Humanitarian intervention — often a euphemism for military invasion — became a new instrument of policy for major powers. The disjunction between state sovereignty and cosmopolitanism has reached its most radical expression in international terrorism. Transnational groups, bound not by nationality but by ideology, target civilians in pursuit of political aims.

The story has an important technological component. As we’ve seen, the Westphalian system was formed partly as a response to the effects of the printing press; now the system finds itself reshaped by the cumulative impact of nuclear weapons, mass mobility, and instantaneous communication. Nuclear arms make direct conflict between great powers intolerably dangerous, replacing conventional warfare with long strategic stalemates and seemingly irrational proxy conflicts. Air travel allows individuals to think of themselves less as nationals and more as citizens of the world. Global supply chains bind the economic life of one nation to the productive capacity of far-flung others. And the spread of telecommunications, particularly the Internet, has created a global information market, where ideas flow without much regard for borders....


....MUCH MORE

Asymmetric cost-benefit terror:

"Omniviolence Is Coming and the World Isn’t Ready"
A repost from 2019 that seems to have come true.

From Nautil.us:

In The Future of Violence, Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum discuss a disturbing hypothetical scenario. A lone actor in Nigeria, “home to a great deal of spamming and online fraud activity,” tricks women and teenage girls into downloading malware that enables him to monitor and record their activity, for the purposes of blackmail. The real story involved a California man who the FBI eventually caught and sent to prison for six years, but if he had been elsewhere in the world he might have gotten away with it. Many countries, as Wittes and Blum note, “have neither the will nor the means to monitor cybercrime, prosecute offenders, or extradite suspects to the United States.” 
Technology is, in other words, enabling criminals to target anyone anywhere and, due to democratization, increasingly at scale. Emerging bio-, nano-, and cyber-technologies are becoming more and more accessible. The political scientist Daniel Deudney has a word for what can result: “omniviolence.” The ratio of killers to killed, or “K/K ratio,” is falling. For example, computer scientist Stuart Russell has vividly described how a small group of malicious agents might engage in omniviolence: “A very, very small quadcopter, one inch in diameter can carry a one-or two-gram shaped charge,” he says.
“You can order them from a drone manufacturer in China. You can program the code to say: ‘Here are thousands of photographs of the kinds of things I want to target.’ A one-gram shaped charge can punch a hole in nine millimeters of steel, so presumably you can also punch a hole in someone’s head. You can fit about three million of those in a semi-tractor-trailer. You can drive up I-95 with three trucks and have 10 million weapons attacking New York City. They don’t have to be very effective, only 5 or 10% of them have to find the target.” Manufacturers will be producing millions of these drones, available for purchase just as with guns now, Russell points out, “except millions of guns don’t matter unless you have a million soldiers. You need only three guys to write the program and launch.” In this scenario, the K/K ratio could be perhaps 3/1,000,000, assuming a 10-percent accuracy and only a single one-gram shaped charge per drone.
Will emerging technologies make the state system obsolete? It’s hard to see why not.
That’s completely—and horrifyingly—unprecedented. The terrorist or psychopath of the future, however, will have not just the Internet or drones—called “slaughterbots” in this video from the Future of Life Institute—but also synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and advanced AI systems at their disposal. These tools make wreaking havoc across international borders trivial, which raises the question: Will emerging technologies make the state system obsolete? It’s hard to see why not. What justifies the existence of the state, English philosopher Thomas Hobbes argued, is a “social contract.” People give up certain freedoms in exchange for state-provided security, whereby the state acts as a neutral “referee” that can intervene when people get into disputes, punish people who steal and murder, and enforce contracts signed by parties with competing interests....MORE

It gets worse.  

If interested see also 2022's "The US Navy wants swarms of thousands of small drones"  and two from 2021:

"Meet the future weapon of mass destruction, the drone swarm"
From The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.... 

"Autonomous 'Slaughterbot' Drones Reportedly Attack Libyans Using Facial Recognition Tech"

Also: 

 Islamic Terrorists Are Now Attacking With Drones In Nigeria

"Ukraine Is the First 'Hackers’ War'”

Coming to a country near you. 

The author, "Juan Chulilla, is a cofounder of Red Team Shield S.L., a company dedicated to developing defense solutions against weaponized commercial drones."

One More From Fabergé: "The Winter Egg"

I had intended to include this in the April 2 post "Some Of The Fabergé Eggs We've Looked At Over The Years" but thought that since it commanded the highest price at auction for any of the eggs, to do a stand-alone.

From Christie's, 10 November 2025:

Gifted by Emperor Nicholas II to the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna on Easter Day, 1913: the Winter Egg

Adorned with more than 4,000 diamonds, and opening to reveal wood anemones finely carved from white quartz, the Winter Egg is among the most lavish and artistically inventive of the 50 imperial eggs made by the House of Fabergé. It comes to auction in London on 2 December 

https://www.christies.com/img/LotImages/2025/CKS/2025_CKS_23334_0007_001(a_magnificent_and_highly_important_imperial_winter_egg_by_faberge_desi011403).jpg?mode=max 

....MUCH MORE, this is big-budget marketing. 

It went off as Lot #7. Here's Christie's with provenance, details and the rest of the lots:

The Winter Egg and Important Works by Fabergé from a Princely Collection

And at ARTnews, December 3, 2025:

Fabergé Egg, ‘Mona Lisa of the Decorative Arts,’ Sells for Record-Breaking $30.2 M.

A rare Fabergé egg created from crystal and adorned with diamonds sold for £22.9 million (around $30.2 million) on Tuesday at Christie’s London, where the price broke the record as the highest ever for a Fabergé egg at auction. The sale was the top billing in “The Winter Egg and Important Works by Fabergé from a Princely Collection,” whose 48 lots brought in a total of £27.8 million ($37.1 million).

The so-called Winter Egg was created for Russia’s imperial family, one of 50 such lavish creations commissioned between 1885 and the Russian Revolution in 1917. As reported in The Art Newspaper (TAN), seven are thought to have been lost, and seven remain in private hands, outside of institutions....

....MUCH MORE 

Meanwhile, at the journal Nature...

31 March 2026

Are boys really in crisis? What the science says in the age of the manosphere

Some data suggest that boys and young men are struggling with school, health and masculinity. But does talk of a male crisis further sideline women and girls?

https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-026-00968-0 

"Think Tanks Have Defeated Democracy"

The fact that think tanks and NGOs insist they are, and represent, "civil society" gives the game away, in a "The lady doth protest too much, methinks" sort of way.

From Palladium Magazine, April 2: 

As a Canadian, studying the output of American think tanks has become something of an obsession for me. For better or worse, though mostly for the better, think tanks are a foreign commodity in Canada. Sure, we have organizations like the Fraser Institute and C.D. Howe, which are our Cato Institute and Brookings Institution respectively, but they fill a narrow niche. Broadly speaking, most Canadian think tanks are little more than PO boxes with a landing page.

The austere job market for policy wonks in Canada is downstream of the country’s robust party system. Governing parties don’t need to outsource their policy development and, when they do, ideas can be supplied by ad hoc committees, commissions, and consultants that evaporate into the ether when their work is done. The parties themselves are highly member-driven. Some of my earliest memories were from the stuffy basement of our local Liberal Party headquarters where my parents volunteered. Though I barely understood what was going on, I relished the ritual of staying up past my bedtime to watch election results come in while old Anglican ladies manufactured triangular sandwiches.

American politics is a completely different beast. The framers of the U.S. Constitution had an aversion to partisan politics and so designed a system of checks and balances that grants individual elected officials enormous free agency. While transaction costs and the game theory that pulls electoral democracies towards a two party system—termed Duverger’s law—made parties an inevitability, progressive anti-patronage reforms and the move to primary elections have long since eroded the social base for thick, membership-driven political parties and the efficient party machines which excelled at delivering votes for politicians. .

Modern U.S. think tanks, and the broader nonprofit advocacy world, emerged in their place. Ostensibly nonpartisan organizations such as the Center for American Progress and the American Enterprise Institute serve as holding tanks and convening spaces for Democratic and Republican functionaries while they are in and out of power. Yet because the parties themselves contain internal factions, the establishment’s grip on power is contingent on the makeup of Congress and the stochastic process behind party nominations. Given tight staff budgets, lawmakers outsource their legislative, communications, and networking strategies to whichever policy outfit overlaps with their political philosophy and electoral base. This ideas industry allows movement conservatives to turn to the Heritage Foundation, trade unionists to the Economic Policy Institute, libertarians to the Cato Institute, and so on.

Other countries’ political parties outsource to independent think tanks too, but usually within the context of a formal parliamentary relationship. The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Germany, for instance, is an independent think tank that functions as the policy organ of the center-right Christian Democratic Union. Crucially, however, over 95% of its funding comes from the German government and they have no direct intraparty competitor. Such think tanks are thus more like adjuncts to the formal party system than genuinely independent policy actors. In contrast to the U.S. policy ecosystem, policy development is therefore far more aligned to party incentives, though at the potential cost of being overly conformist and deferential to the status quo.

Associations Without Members

In recent decades, ideological self-sorting and the consolidation of power under leadership has made Congress look and act more like a parliament. Yet without the complementary institutions that make parliaments work, it’s a tenuous equilibrium at best. The national parties, to the extent they still exist, are largely lifestyle brands attached to fundraising funnels. Unlike in actual parliamentary democracies, lawmakers have no direct obligation to vote with their party. Votes must instead be whipped through horse-trading and indirect sanctions, such as the denial of powerful committee assignments or the withdrawal of support on re-election campaigns.

The nonprofit advocacy world helps grease the wheel of party cohesion by mobilizing activists, lobbyists, pollsters, and grassroots outreach whenever a big vote is afoot. These are what Matthew Yglesias refers to as “the groups.” While the number of such organizations may appear large and unruly, they typically derive core funding from a countable number of upstream foundations or philanthropists. 

Funders are drawn from a similar social class on both the left and right, and are close enough to Dunbar’s number within any given area to enable interpersonal forms of coordination i.e. the sorts of communicative action governed by trust, reputation, and conformity to shared norms. Yet given the insulation of funders and advocates from electoral imperatives, there is nothing to prevent them from self-organizing around the sorts of self-defeating policy platforms that make pollsters like David Shor cringe. On the contrary: without the moderating forces of intraparty bargaining within a consolidated party superstructure, ideological clichés become the only viable Schelling point around which to organize collective action....

....MUCH MORE 

Also at Palladium, March 28:

How the Kurdish Offensive in Iran Unraveled

"Among the Private Spies: ‘The name’s Steele, Christopher Steele.’"

From Vadim Nikitin at the London Review of Books, Vol. 48 No. 6 · 2 April 2026:

Unredacted: Russia, Trump and the Fight for Democracy 
by Christopher Steele.
Mariner, 336 pp., £24, October 2024, 978 0 06 337343 3

‘The name’s Steele, Christopher Steele.’ That’s the way a former MI6 operative who wrote the notorious dossier alleging collusion between Trump and Putin introduced himself at a debate at the Cambridge Union last October. ‘And as you can see, sir,’ he told the union president to giggles from the audience, ‘tonight I’ve come dressed in my usual work clothes: black dinner jacket and the signature James Bond Omega watch.’

Less than a week later, Steele was denounced as a ‘reputation-mauler for hire’ and faced the prospect of ruinous legal action over allegedly feeding an MP knowingly false claims that a British businessman was a Kremlin agent. His investigations business, Orbis, was already reeling from spending $800,000 to see off a lawsuit from the US president over the dossier, and had recently suffered a huge exodus of staff. But that evening, Steele was determined to have fun. Reminiscing about his presidency of the union as a student in the 1980s, he hammed up his status as spymaster turned democratic crusader. It was an image Steele had perfected over years of largely uncritical media interviews (down to the quip about the watch), and it’s the image he presents in Unredacted, a self-exculpatory and score-settling memoir in which he represents himself as a truth-seeker standing up to a clueless cross-Atlantic establishment.

Steele was born on a UK military base in Aden and spent time as a child at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus – the base for British reconnaissance flights over Gaza, and in the news again after being attacked during the US-Israeli war on Iran – where his father worked as a climatologist for the British army. After studying social and political sciences at Cambridge, he unsuccessfully interviewed for a newspaper job and failed the civil service exam before being recruited into the secret intelligence service. Steele joined MI6’s Russia desk in 1987, just as Gorbachev was launching perestroika. Three years later, at the age of 25, he was posted to Moscow as second secretary at the British Embassy – a Foreign Office cover. The year after that, the Soviet Union collapsed. In 1993 he returned to London.

During his next posting, in Paris, Steele’s cover was blown after a list of more than a hundred MI6 agents working in embassies around the world was leaked on the internet. This public outing put paid to his career as a field agent. After his posting to Paris ended, Steele claims to have been appointed head of the MI6 Russia desk in London. By 2009, he had resigned and founded a business intelligence consultancy called Orbis with Chris Burrows, who was also on the leaked list.

In its first few years, Orbis kept a low profile in London’s crowded field of private intelligence companies. That changed in 2016 when Steele was reportedly paid $168,000 by an American firm called Fusion GPS to investigate Donald Trump, who had recently won the Republican presidential nomination. Fusion GPS was founded by Glenn Simpson and Peter Fritsch, former reporters for the Wall Street Journal who had made their careers out of delving into Russian corruption. The project was originally commissioned by a conservative news outlet, the Washington Free Beacon, but ended up being financed by Hillary Clinton’s campaign.

The result was a collection of brief reports asserting links between Trump’s team and Russia. The dossier claimed that the ‘Russian regime has been cultivating, supporting and assisting TRUMP for at least 5 years’, and that ‘he and his inner circle have accepted a regular flow of intelligence from the Kremlin, including on his Democratic and other political rivals.’ What made the dossier infamous was its declaration that, as a result of his ‘perverted sexual acts which have been arranged/monitored by the FSB’, the Russian state security service ‘has compromised Trump through his activities in Moscow sufficiently to be able to blackmail him’. But the most damaging allegation by far concerned ‘evidence of extensive conspiracy between TRUMP’s campaign team and [the] Kremlin’ – evidence that the dossier glaringly failed to provide.

In May 2017, Robert Mueller, the former head of the FBI, was appointed special counsel to oversee the official investigation into Russia’s alleged interference in the 2016 election. After nearly two years of exhaustive research, the Mueller Report found no evidence that Trump and his team had engaged in conspiracy or co-ordination with Moscow to interfere with the outcome of the 2016 election. However, the investigation did establish that the Russian government ‘perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome’, and that Trump had tried to impede the investigation.

Neither Mueller’s investigation nor any other probe found evidence to support the dossier’s other key allegations: the existence of the so-called ‘pee tape’ of prostitutes supposedly hired by Trump to urinate on the bed Obama had used on a visit to Moscow; that Trump’s personal lawyer Michael Cohen had travelled to Prague for secret briefings with Kremlin officials and hackers; that another Trump staffer had discussed sanctions relief at a meeting with Igor Sechin, the head of Russia’s state-owned oil company, Rosneft; or that Trump had somehow been ‘cultivated’ by the Russian secret services.

Nevertheless, Steele has doggedly stood by the dossier. ‘Our 2016 Trump-Russia reporting has not been “discredited”,’ he writes in Unredacted, quoting his own statement on X. ‘In fact its main tenets continue to hold up well and almost no detail has been disproven.’ But its core assertions remain contested and unproven. Such was the amount of uncorroborated and implausible information in the dossier that many experts, including the former CIA officer Daniel Hoffman and Ben Macintyre, a journalist who has written books on Russian espionage, suspected that it was itself a product of Russian disinformation.

Why was the dossier so shoddy, and why, despite this, did it command such influence? Steele’s own apparent lack of expertise may be relevant here. He makes much of his linguistic prowess, boasting of having read Anna Karenina in the original ‘in two volumes from cover to cover’, yet he has a shakier grasp of Russian than he claims. He mentions, for instance, a chance encounter with Gorbachev he says he had while serving as a junior spy in Moscow. When asked by Gorbachev, who was on his way to a meeting with John Major, what he did for a living, he claims to have answered: ‘I follow you very closely.’ Alas, the formulation he includes in the text, ‘Я следую вас очень близко,’ is a clumsily literal translation that makes little grammatical sense. One former employee of Steele’s I spoke to described his grasp of Russian as ‘tragicomic’.

These are pedantic observations. But they underscore the fact that, for all his purported expertise, Steele possesses no academic background in Russian studies, lived there continuously for just three years of a 22-year career and, by his own admission, hasn’t visited the country since 2009. Significantly, at no point in his government service is he likely to have line-managed Russian field agents to any great extent – he would have been too junior in 1990 and too senior in 2006-9. And it is field agents, whether spies or subcontractors, who provide the critical raw information that differentiates human-led intelligence from the mass of much cheaper open-source research. Others in the business intelligence sector have cast doubt on Steele’s analytic abilities – a shortcoming that may have led him to place unjustified trust in unverified reports from his sources. ‘He’s very bad at distinguishing truth from fiction,’ one industry figure told me. ‘That’s why we didn’t hire him.’

Beyond​ the question of Steele’s competence, the structure of the business intelligence sector shares the blame for the dossier’s deficiencies. Steele frequently writes about the ‘collectors’ or ‘head agents’ whom Orbis hires to conduct its research. Such labels deliberately evoke the hard glamour of spycraft. In fact, these ‘collectors’ are simply subcontractors who, in turn, often pay their own sources for relevant information, which becomes ever more corrupted as it travels down the line. Many firms are founded by former spies, but few subcontractors are former intelligence agents, and those who claim to be are treated with suspicion. Some collectors run their own small firms, creating yet another layer of subcontractors.

At the business intelligence companies where I worked for several years, our subs tended to be bilingual ‘knowledge workers’ from think tanks and NGOs, freelance journalists, PhD students or former PhD students: in other words, those inhabiting the no man’s land between academia and the ‘real world’, between Russia and the West, between youth and adulthood, between journalism and being a gun for hire. They are often highly educated people who for one reason or another have left the paths followed by their friends and university roommates: from the Gubkin University of Oil and Gas to Gazprom, from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations to parliamentary aide or second secretary at a Russian embassy, from the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics to an oligarch-owned tech company. Since the banning of the late Alexei Navalny’s opposition network, many of his former activists, dispersed across Eastern Europe and needing to make a living, have become collectors.

What does the job mean in practice? As soon as a client’s project is taken on, often involving the investigation of a commercial rival, we start calling round the subs to see who has the relevant expertise and capacity. Usually, they receive about a fifth of the amount the company charges to the client. For routine projects, that’s between £2000 and £4000. For that sum, the sub is expected to deliver preferably verbatim commentary from between five and ten sources – known as human intelligence or HUMINT – alongside public records research, such as obtaining court filings and cadastral records.

What happens next varies from sub to sub but tends to involve the following. The sub rings up their contacts – friends, family members, former colleagues, ex or would-be lovers – and potentially offers them a cut of the fee if they or someone they know can say something about the subject of the investigation. Sometimes, the sub uses their income to keep a few people on retainer. Then it’s a race against time for the sub to secure the requisite number of source comments within the usual two to three-week deadline. Because they are generally paid per source, subs are incentivised to pass along all commentary, including things they suspect to be hearsay or even false. The most diligent compensate for shoddy content with detailed caveats. But many do not.

No subcontractor willingly reveals the identities of their primary sources to the analyst at the firm, who in turn often conceals the existence of the subcontractors to the client (though it is an open secret that business intelligence consultants do not usually conduct their own primary source work). The commentary found in business intelligence reports is thus several degrees removed from its original source, which is, in any case, unknowable to the commissioning analyst, just as it is to the client. All this makes such intelligence essentially unverifiable.

When I commissioned a sub to conduct source inquiries, I could never be entirely sure that they hadn’t at least partly made them up. The best way to guard against this is to triangulate the research from several different subs and sense-check it through extensive research in public records. In practice, however, deadlines and budgets are almost always too tight to allow such fastidiousness. It’s sometimes possible to spot signs of sloppiness or subterfuge: one sub became notorious for lifting ‘intelligence’ wholesale from Facebook walls; another would procure quotes from supposedly well-placed sources which, after some research, were more often than not found to resemble parts of articles published in local papers.

But even the most reliable subs aren’t above massaging or padding out their reports, sometimes as a consequence of unreasonable demands by clients. One of our clients once insisted on a minimum of ten sources in a highly complex and urgent report. Against the odds, my sub delivered the work, to the client’s great satisfaction. Months later, he confessed that while all the quotes were real, he had spoken to only four sources and ‘cloned’ the rest to comply with the request. I kept this information to myself.

‘The team at Orbis,’ Steele writes, ‘had acquired – and retains – reliable direct access to Russian sources, allowing us to illuminate the workings of Vladimir Putin’s autocratic and closed regime.’ In reality, for the dossier Steele relied primarily on a single sub, a Russian-American researcher called Igor Danchenko. Before joining Orbis, Danchenko had worked as a senior research analyst at the Brookings Institution, where he distinguished himself by uncovering signs of plagiarism in Putin’s university dissertation in economic science. A lawyer by training, Danchenko is an expert in Russian energy politics and came to Steele highly recommended by Fiona Hill, once Trump’s Russia adviser and now the chancellor of Durham University.

It’s surprising that I had never met Danchenko. We both come from remote Russian cities (Murmansk for me, Perm for him) and served time as researchers at Washington DC think tanks in the 2000s before stumbling into business intelligence, mainly for lack of better options. Iggy, as he is widely known, has worked with several of my former colleagues in London and the US. They praised his diligence and were horrified by the toll the dossier had taken on his life: unmasked by an anonymous blogger in 2017, he was later charged with lying about his sources to the FBI but was eventually acquitted in October 2022. The ordeal left him financially broken and all but unemployable.

Steele ‘supported me after I won’, Danchenko told me. ‘But before that, I was alone. Nobody stood by me, apart from my wife and literally two friends.’ Steele had broken off contact once the dossier was published. ‘My wife thinks that he could have found a way to pass on a small message, to say “Take care, man,” just to do a human thing,’ Danchenko said. ‘But he acted like a true spy. He broke all communication. So as not to expose anyone. And so did I.’ Danchenko spent nearly five hours talking to me on the phone. He spoke in eloquent and profanity-leavened Russian, only occasionally segueing into mildly accented English. He struck me as thoughtful and idealistic, with scabrous humour and a strong sense of personal morality. Describing himself as a ‘typical masochist’ who relishes his ability to endure pressure, Danchenko quoted Joseph Brodsky and Eduard Limonov, invoked the Russian international relations scholar Alexei Bogaturov, recited the lyrics to a song by Grazhdanskaya Oborona, the USSR’s first psychedelic punk band, and riffed on Chomsky’s notion of universal grammar. Although he is not a drinker, talking to Danchenko in the early hours I felt like I was trapped in Venedikt Yerofeyev’s alcoholic fever dream Moskva-Petushki. There was something anachronistic about him, the aura of a Soviet-era intelligent from a previous generation.

By the time Steele asked him to unearth kompromat on Trump, Danchenko had completed, on his estimate, at least a hundred reports for Orbis. Most comprised open-source research for innocuous assignments relating to risk analysis or pre-transactional due diligence, but many also involved HUMINT. Although he had little experience in such a high-profile matter, he took on the job of investigating a US presidential candidate just as he would any other assignment, and wasn’t paid a special rate for it....

....MUCH MORE 

 Long-time readers might recall our thoughts upon reading the Dossier, January 13, 2017, three days after BuzzFeed broke the story and a week before Trump's inauguration: 

More Just as importantly, after reading the schlocky, amateur, borderline retarded "35 pages" thing, how could anyone ever again justify paying Orbis Business Intelligence actual money for anything they produce?