Sunday, November 30, 2025

"What China will dominate next"

From The Economist, November 27: 

The country’s high-speed innovation holds lessons for the world  

THOSE WHO worry about how to cope with China’s leadership in technology—and there are plenty of them—think hard about electric vehicles (EVs), solar panels and open-source artificial intelligence. For such people, we have some bad news. This week we report how China is rapidly pressing ahead in two other frontier technologies, autonomous vehicles and new drugs. As these industries spread around the world, they will exemplify the power of Chinese innovation.

China’s progress in each of these important areas has been staggering. A robotaxi revolution is gathering pace, which could reshape transport, logistics and everyday urban life. The country’s autonomous taxis, constructed for a third of the cost of Waymo’s in America, are racking up millions of kilometres of driving and are forging partnerships in Europe and the Middle East. In medicine, meanwhile, China has turned itself from a copycat maker of generics into the world’s second-largest developer of new drugs, including those tackling cancer. Western rivals are licensing its firms’ wares. The day when a pharma giant emerges from China no longer seems so remote.

The rise of both industries says much about how Chinese innovation works. A deep pool of talent, a broad manufacturing base and huge scale combine to propel it rapidly up the value chain. The production of robotaxis has piggybacked on mass ev manufacturing and a dominance in the supply of lidars and the other sensors needed for self-driving; scale has also helped bring down costs. Armies of patients enlisted in clinical trials and profits from generic drugmaking have speeded up pharma innovation.

A more surprising ingredient of China’s success is its nimble and permissive regulators. As in other industries, local governments have offered firms cheap credit and other help. But it is agile rulemaking that has really turbo-charged progress. Soon after political leaders set out their ambition for China to become a “biotechnology superpower” in 2016, the country implemented a number of reforms. The drug regulator’s workforce quadrupled between 2015 and 2018, and a backlog of 20,000 new drug applications was cleared in just two years. The time taken to secure approval for human trials shrank from 501 days to 87. Last year firms in the country ran a third of the world’s clinical trials.

Likewise, China was early to experiment with robotaxis. Local officials, keen to attract talent and investment, approved pilots at a rapid clip and installed sensors and other digital infrastructure to help guide self-driving vehicles; trials have run in over 50 cities. Many have experimented, too, with laws on liabilities and guidelines for testing. Though accidents have sometimes caused a hiatus, pilot schemes have helped engineers and policymakers understand the new technology.

Cut-throat competition at home imposes harsh conditions on individual companies, but the survivors are conditioned into becoming hypercompetitive export champions. China’s robotaxi operators compete with each other and with cheap human-driven taxis in an economy gripped by deflation. New technologies receive subsidies that ultimately come out of the pockets of its underpaid people. Many lossmaking enterprises will not survive the resulting price wars. But those that do will look overseas to make money.

A new wave of Chinese low-cost innovation will therefore wash around the world. It will do so in different ways. China’s cheap medicines could bring benefits, and particularly to the developing world. But for its companies America’s lucrative market, which is the source of 70% of global pharma profits, is the juiciest prize. And China’s importance for the pipelines of Western drugmakers means that the relationship could even be symbiotic. Robotaxis, by contrast, are likely to follow the more usual path for China’s tech exports. They are blocked by America, which has its own industry and acute security concerns, but will probably gain a foothold in other places, where domestic efforts at autonomy lag far behind.

How should the rest of the world respond? The competition risks hollowing out Western economies. Where there is evidence of Chinese dumping and subsidies, counter-measures against Chinese exports are justified and necessary. Where there are security risks action is justified, too. The data collected by robotaxis could pose a surveillance threat; Chinese pharma has suffered corruption scandals. Yet knee-jerk protectionism in the name of security or safety would be a mistake. Blocking or limiting the fruits of Chinese innovation would deprive consumers of the benefits of cheaper and better drugs and transport at a time when voters worry about affordability....

....MUCH MORE 

This article was part of a four piece feature: 

"What Canada’s Largest Art Heist Reveals about the Art World’s Shady Side"

From The Walrus, October 24:

The stolen masterpieces have never turned up—and nobody’s really looking for them

By all accounts, the biggest art heist in Canadian history should’ve been even bigger. Just past midnight on September 4, 1972—fifty years ago, this month—a man in a ski mask and climbing spurs accessed the roof of the Montreal Museum of Fine Arts by scaling a nearby tree. He then extended a ladder to two similarly masked robbers below. From atop the building, the trio entered the gallery by rappelling with rope through a broken skylight. Once inside, they bound and gagged the security guards at gunpoint and began ransacking the building—cracking frames, shattering vitrines—with the apparent intention of stealing everything of value. The plan, it appears, was to descend and ascend, grinch-like, through the ceiling, during what likely would have been an all-night operation. 

But thirty minutes into the break-in, one of the men tripped an alarm, forcing the gang to hustle out the side door with whatever they could carry: thirty-nine items, mainly jewellery and figurines, and eighteen canvasses, including paintings attributed to Gustave Courbet, Eugène Delacroix, Jan Davidsz de Heem, Thomas Gainsborough, and Peter Paul Rubens. The most valuable piece the men took was Landscape with Cottages, a work of dark pastoralism credited to Rembrandt, master of the Dutch Golden Age. The museum initially reported that the entire haul was worth $2 million.

Perhaps more valuable still was the bounty the thieves left behind: paintings by Pablo Picasso, El Greco, Francisco Goya, and Pierre-Auguste Renoir, as well as an additional Rembrandt, all of which had been stacked haphazardly on the gallery floor. The heist was ambitious but clearly not as much as its participants had intended it to be. 

However, if the crime was scaled down during the operation itself, it has been only further diminished in the public imagination. Compare it to the 1990 robbery at the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum, in Boston. That theft has been fictionalized in eight novels, analysed in three television documentaries, name-checked on the Showtime series Shameless, parodied on The Simpsons, and picked over by conspiracy theorists with a level of fervour normally reserved for the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Clearly, America’s largest art heist still looms large in popular culture.

As for the Canadian equivalent, in a 2019 magazine feature—arguably the most comprehensive reconstruction of the incident—arts-and-culture writer Chris Hampton notes that the robbery happened at the same time as Canada’s hockey summit series against the Soviet Union. “One is remembered in volumes,” he writes in Canadian Art. “The other, barely at all.” He reports that in 1972, the Montreal police put two detectives on the case. But, after a year, they basically gave up....

....MUCH MORE 

Reminder: We believe AI is a bubble and have made the decision to ride the bubble. (bubblelicious since July 1, 2023)

Not one of these bubble-come-lately types, no siree. 

June 18, 2024: Nvidia's Financial Dominance (NVDA) 

For the last year we have been referring to the AI phenomena as a bubble, perhaps not so much in financial terms but rather in terms of the psychology, the speculative frenzy. It's true in Nvidia's case, the stock could be cut in half and still be discounting the future with a 2-3% discount factor i.e. 33 to 50 times free cash flow.

However! Despite this we have been pitching a "Ride the Bubble" approach to the stock for over a year (we have an almost full decade with this one but it was in the last thirteen months that we thought it bubblelicious). Here's a July 1, 2023 post:

....So, we are faced with the decision whether-or-not to play a dangerous little game, riding the bubble knowing full well it is a bubble, or retiring to the sidelines.
For now one of our favorite economists with one of our favorite stories.

Here's the version hosted at MIT: 

By PETER TEMIN AND HANS-JOACHIM VOTH
This paper presents a case study of a well-informed investor in the South Sea bubble. We argue that Hoare’s Bank, a fledgling West End London bank, knew that a bubble was in progress and nonetheless invested in the stock: it was profitable to “ride the bubble.” Using a unique dataset on daily trades, we show that this sophisticated investor was not constrained by such institutional factors as restrictions on short sales or agency problems...

The two most important parts of the paper "II. Hoare’s Trading Performance" and "III. Causes of Success" are definitely worth a couple minutes....

***** 

....We'll have more on the big stories, autonomous vehicles, agentic AI and humanoid robots later today.

Mr. Huang believes they are each trillion dollar+ addressable markets.
*We reiterated the ride the bubble pitch a few more times, despite some trepidation. 
note: stock prices should be divided by 10 to adjust for the most recent stock split.

January 19, 2024 at $594.91 "AI: Lessons From The South Sea Bubble". 

February 6, 2024:

Nvidia Collapses (gives back half yesterday's gains) plus Isaac Newton and Daniel Defoe do a drive by (NVDA)

The stock is down $11.87, so a little less than half yesterday's up-move. $681.45 last after trading as low as $663.00 (down $30.31 and almost the entire Monday $31.72 up-move.) Unfortunately there is a gap on the chart at $660 so it didn't completely fill. Nervous-making....

By-the-bye, that $660 ($66, new style) is the "cut in half" number.

March 6, 2024:

Earlier this morning the stock got to $889.68 and we are still pitching the "ride the bubble" approach—up $220 since the last mention, Feb. 6—but that could change anywhere between today and the end of the NVDA GTC conference (Mar. 21)....

If interested in some of our history with the big dog there are links embedded in January 2024's "Nvidia expands its reach in China’s electric vehicle sector" (NVD 

As reiterated in January 7 2025's:
"Everything (retail) Nvidia Announced at CES 2025"
Reminder: We believe AI is a bubble and have made the decision to ride the bubble.... 

Finally, as Adam Smith put it in his book on the 'sixties bull market, The Money Game:

“Now you know and I know that one day the orchestra will stop playing and the
wind will rattle through the broken window panes, and the anticipation of this
freezes us. All of these kids but one will be broke, and that one will be the multi-
millionaire, the Arthur Rock of the new generation. There is always one, and
maybe we will find him.”

—As seen in February 2024's "JPMorgan's Jamie Dimon On The Business Case For AI: "This Is Not Hype" (JPM)

Not being in government, I don't have the authoritarian type of authority so I tend toward Burkeian humble and lovable

"All which a man without authority can give--
His unbiased opinion, his honest advice, and his best reasons."

—Edmund Burke (1791)*

Power Politics For Outsiders, March 2023 (and elsewhere)
*Potential downside: Burke was described by Edward Gibbon (he of The...Decline and Fall...) as:
"The most eloquent and rational madman that I ever knew". 

"The Burden of Betting on the Bubble"

From The Milken Institute Review, November 11:

Before every financial bubble bursts, wise as well as unwise prophets issue warnings, sometimes years in advance. (Timing is part of the problem, as we’ll see later.)

Yet seldom has there been so much agreement, and so many signs, that securities markets and the U.S. economy are in a bubble that may soon peak:

  • The hedge fund manager Michael Burry, featured in Michael Lewis’s book The Big Short for his winning bets on the 2008 housing market crash, has taken short positions (through options) in some of the highest-flying AI companies.
  • The big AI corporations are so interlocked through a network of 11-figure investments that trouble in one could easily cascade through others and the wider economy.
  • The disparity between affluent shareholders and the rest of the population has been growing steadily – just as in the Roaring Twenties, when soaring stock prices of the day’s high-tech corporations such as RCA encouraged indifference to structural economic weakness, notably severely depressed farm income. That period ended in the Great Depression.
  • Despite the recent truce with China, Donald Trump’s tariff drive recalls the infamous beggar-thy-neighbor Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which deepened the Great Depression.
  • The explosion of day trading and rise of meme-driven mass speculation, along with regulators’ seeming difference to letting unsophisticated small investors join the volatile world of private equity, raises warning signs about Main Street investors betting their farms on speculative ventures.
  • Donald Trump and his family’s embrace of cryptocurrencies creating dangerous conflicts of interest in public policy, which when combined with increasing integration of cryptocurrencies with the banking system, is inherently destabilizing
  • Alarm bells are ringing over bad loans at regional banks, including Zions Bank, Western Alliance and Jefferies.
  • Bankruptcies are spreading in the auto-supply sector, with problems not limited to embattled First Brands. 
  • Major technology firms, including Amazon and Microsoft, which in the past have always seemed to be hiring, have announced tens of thousands of layoffs.

Each of these straws in the wind may be less than dire news, yet together they suggest alarming weaknesses in the economy. The most convincing source of alarm may be the celebrated expert on bubbles, Yale economist and Nobel Laureate Robert Shiller. In a recent market forecast he noted that “history offers a cautionary tale: past technology booms produced only a handful of long-term winners.”

Shiller’s forecasting record is reassuring – or daunting, depending on your perspective.  His book, Irrational Exuberance, whose title was borrowed from Alan Greenspan’s 1996 warning of a market collapse to come, was released with timing rare in the publishing industry, at the very peak of equities markets in March 2000. Not coincidentally, the $37 million, eight-story high Nasdaq sign in New York’s Times Square, commemorating the new dominance of tech stocks in the equities firmament, had been completed the previous month.

he four-year gap between Greenspan’s warning and the bursting of the bubble points to the difficulty of profiting from the eventual pop. It’s analogous to the challenge that blackjack gamblers faced in the days when skilled play based on statistical insight, if undetected by Las Vegas casino security, could win against the house. In practice, this meant casino surveillance would let a team executing carefully choreographed deception accumulate significant earnings. The so-called MIT blackjack team of the ’80s and ’90s was thus a meticulously trained theatrical troupe as well as a gang with formidable memory for hands played.

If the odds are against you, you will eventually go broke. But what if the odds are slightly on your side as in the case of the MIT gang? It is still essential to have a bankroll large enough to withstand losses until your advantage kicks in. Skilled individual bettors without those resources risk going broke, even without facing today’s ubiquitous casino countermeasures.

One poster child for this risk is the hedge fund manager Michael Berger....

....MUCH MORE 

Very related:


Markets, Risk and Gambler's Ruin

From the Wall Street Journal:

Old Pros Size Up the Game

Thorp and Pimco's Gross Open Up on Dangers
Of Over-Betting, How to Play the Bond Market...MORE

From 2011:

Dreamtime Finance (and the Kelly Criterion)

I've been meaning to write about Kelly for a couple years and keep forgetting. Today I forget no more.
In probability theory the Kelly Criterion is a bet sizing technique used when the player has a quantifiable edge.
(When there is no edge the optimal bet size is $0.00)

The criterion will deliver the fastest growth rate balanced by reduced risk of ruin.
You can grow your pile faster but you increase the risk of ending up broke should you, for example bet 100% of your net worth in a situation where you have anything less than a 100% chance of winning.

The criterion says bet roughly your advantage as a percentage of your current bankroll divided by the variance of the game/market/sports book etc..
Variance is the standard deviation of the game squared. In blackjack the s.d. is 1.15 so the square is 1.3225.

As blackjack is played in the U.S. the most a card counter can hope for is a 1/2% to 1% average advantage with much of that average accruing from the fact that you can get up from a negative table.
Divide by 1.3225 and you've got your bet size.

It's a tough way to grind out a living but hopefully this exercise will stop you from pulling a Leeson, betting all of Barings money and destroying the 233 year old bank....

....MUCH MORE 

And:
 
From 2012: 
 
From 2014:
 
From 2021: 

In casino gambling it is the ultimate idle fantasy that one will find a game where the house miscalculate the payouts and offers up a positive expectation game to the customer. I found one once, a side bet in blackjack that was set up with a ~3% advantage to the player. Unfortunately the two limiting factors, a) number of resolved hands per hour—around 60 at a full table and b) a maximum bet limit of $25 dollars on the side bet meant that your expected win rate was $25 x 60 x 3% = $45 dollars per hour. Not exactly a get rich quick scheme but an amusing way to pass a couple hours.

I think of that evening when I see people talk about someone or something being on the wrong side of the market and attempt to calculate the odds the house is giving up and the optimal bet sizing to accelerate the accumulation of loot while minimizing the risk of gamblers ruin (the Kelly Criterion, see after the jump).

And then I wake up from my reverie.

From Neue Zürcher Zeitung's The Market.ch.... 

And some of the math:

Finally, another rule of life:

Cassandra's (Not so) Golden Rules About Investing (And Not Investing)
#21. NEVER double-down (except when you have material non-public information and deep pockets) or if you're Ed Thorp, or if you're playing at The Martingale Room. 

Don't double down, double up.

 

"Ex-MI6 Chief Richard Moore: Spying Is an ‘Arms Race’"

From Bloomberg, November 14:

The longtime intelligence officer talks about managing China, the psychology of Putin, and why spies shouldn’t expect recognition. 

For nearly 40 years, Richard Moore was a career spy in Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service — better known as MI6 — unable to tell anyone but his closest friends and family what he did for a living. When he was appointed chief of the agency in 2020, that changed: The name of the person in the top role is the only one made public.

Moore stepped down at the end of September, and this conversation is one of his first interviews since: a look back at the world in which he began his intelligence career and the one we live in today.

In office, Moore was known — as all MI6 chiefs are — as ‘C’, the role Ian Fleming turned into James Bond’s boss ‘M.’ And perhaps those long-honed skills in being unobtrusive are still intact: When he arrived at Bloomberg’s London office for our interview, he slipped past the small welcoming party and collected his badge without us even spotting him. It might have been the flat cap and overcoat — or maybe it’s just how he’s operated for decades: discreet, unassuming, in the shadows.

Until six weeks ago, your daily work involved reading highly classified intelligence. Could I start with the here and now? What you see as you look around the world, and most of us might not.

I think we’re in an extraordinarily contested international environment. I don’t think in 38 years of being an intelligence officer and a diplomat I’ve seen it less well ordered.

There’s just an extraordinary number of loose ends on the international scene, and unfortunately, the way in which relationships have broken down between leading powers — particularly following Russian behavior in Ukraine, but also undoubtedly between Washington and Beijing — [means that] some of the tramlines that we were used to in the years after 1945 are not really there.

I certainly haven’t left the world in a better place than I found it, and I’m lucky that wasn’t in my job description.

More contested means more dangerous?

There are definitely dangers in the world, and they can suddenly loom out of the mist at you.

You mentioned the fraying relationship between Washington and Beijing. How does that play into the MI6 and CIA perception of China, that it’s the major intelligence challenge of the 21st century?

I think there’ve been issues around this relationship for some time. In particular, the rupture of normal diplomatic contact that happened during the pandemic: For a number of years, senior Chinese and senior Americans just didn’t meet.

And that’s a worrying thing. As an intelligence officer, where you can see the dangers of miscalculation, you want diplomats, leaders, to be talking more regularly. The fact that President Trump and President Xi met recently — that’s helpful. Tariffs [are] the current issue. But there are clearly any number of rub points between the US and China, and between the US’s allies and China.

Help me understand how you see China. You’ve talked about it as an “opportunity and a threat,” a combination that is quite hard for people to get their heads around. How is a government supposed to deal with a country as both opportunity and threat? 1

1 These words come from Moore’s last public speech as chief, in Istanbul in September. “In many areas of the global commons: climate change, secure AI and world trade, China has a huge and welcome role to play,” he said. “We, in the UK, want a respectful and constructive relationship with China. But China needs to stick to the established rules of engagement and non-interference that it publicly promotes.”

People often assume, understandably, we’re all about threats. But a foreign intelligence intelligence service like MI6 is there to gather intelligence on a number of global issues.

You [also] gather intelligence to enable your political leadership to seize opportunities. With China: This is a huge and powerful country, and its values and interests certainly don’t overlap always with our own.

So if you are the prime minister of Great Britain, how do you manage that relationship in a way that means you secure UK interests? For me, that means you are pretty robust at home — trying to deny, and then tackle, any behavior aimed at your own country, whether that is espionage or cyber attacks.

And does that happen all the time?

It’s pretty relentless, yeah.

So what did you think of the collapse of the recent case against two British men who were accused of spying for China? 2

2 Chinese espionage activity in Britain has come under greater scrutiny since September, when a case against two men accused of trying to gather intelligence about policy on Beijing was abandoned. Prosecutors said that China had not been legally designated a national security threat at the time of the alleged offenses. The suspects denied the allegations.

China is intent on gathering intelligence on the UK, and we have to recognize that. Ken McCallum, the director general of [domestic intelligence service] MI5, has spoken about that.

He said he was “frustrated.”

I don’t think I’ll be drawn on an individual case — that’s for the lawyers to resolve — but it’s certainly the case that they’re active in this space.

If you can’t take people to task for acting in that space, where does it leave you as a country? What are your levers?

Clearly, if you are spying for a foreign power against the United Kingdom, and you are caught, then you should expect to receive the consequences of that action.

You’ll understand also why I tend to discourage politicians from being too moralistic about the issue of spying in itself. The UK has rather effective intelligence organizations and we are actively gathering intelligence against other countries.

I think where you have to be less tolerant is the sort of hybrid warfare activity that we’re seeing from Russia: arson, attempted assassination. That crosses a very different line for me. 3

3 In 2018, UK intelligence officials worked painstakingly and at great speed to allow then-Prime Minister Theresa May to accuse Russia of being responsible for the poisoning of former KGB agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia with the nerve agent Novichok. This year, six men have been jailed for a Russian-backed arson attack on a London warehouse containing aid to Ukraine. There have also been arson attacks at properties linked to Prime Minister Keir Starmer; Russia has denied involvement.

So, on language, do you see China as an “active national security threat”?

I think, clearly, China is involved in activities which threaten our interests and we should be very robust in pushing back against those. They would expect us to do so, to be honest. Beijing respects strength in this space.

So stick to your values?

Stick to your guns.

What would you do with the plan for a new Chinese mega-embassy on the edge of the City of London? It would be the largest embassy in Europe.

Countries obviously have to have embassies. We need one in Beijing — and it’s important that we have that — so it’s right and proper that the Chinese should get their embassy. Whether it’s this one or not isn’t really for me to judge.

It’s a particularly big one. It’s going to be an enormous site.

I’m not there to justify its size or what it does. But you know, I’m sure there has to be a way through, where they get an appropriate embassy, and we are allowed to retain and develop our own excellent embassy in Beijing. 4

4 The UK has irritated China by not yet approving the proposed embassy at the former Royal Mint, near the Tower of London, a site Beijing purchased in 2018. While Prime Minister Keir Starmer has called for a diplomatic and economic reset with China, he’s under pressure — including from members of his own cabinet — to take a tougher approach....

....MUCH MORE 

Saturday, November 29, 2025

Opportunity: "Lining pipes with lab-grown diamonds can keep them squeaky clean"

From New Atlas, November 27:

Industrial pipes carrying water or chemicals invariably get gunked up as deposits accumulate on their internal surfaces. That slows flow, and slowly damages the equipment, leading to the need for periodic maintenance and higher operational costs. 

There are many ways to tackle this, including water softeners, chemical-based scale inhibitors that aim to prevent mineral buildup, and using specialized pipe materials and pipe lining. But they all come with one drawback or another. Now, researchers at Rice University in Houston, Texas, have hit upon a more effective solution to resisting scale formation: coatings made with lab-grown diamonds.

The material scientists note their chosen coating material can stay clean without regular intervention. Their work builds on previous studies which found that diamond, besides being incredibly hard and chemically stable, can also stave off bacterial growth.

To evaluate this, the team first grew diamond films through a process called microwave plasma chemical vapor deposition, or MPCVD, which you can see demonstrated in the video clip below. MPCVD is the most common method for making synthetic diamonds....

....MUCH MORE 

Also at New Atlas, it's pricey but bringing a pot of water to a boil in forty seconds is worth something: 

Impulse Labs extends its game-changing, ultra-fast cooktop

"Odd Lots Cohost Joe Weisenthal Has Predictions About How the AI Bubble Will Burst"

From Wired, November 18:

Much of the US economy rests on AI’s future. On this episode of The Big Interview podcast, Odd Lots cohost Joe Weisenthal breaks down why AI’s impact on finance goes beyond billion-dollar investments. 

If you read any of WIRED’s recent AI edition, you know that lots of people are spending lots of time talking about how the technology is revolutionizing pretty much everything—from coding to writing to accounting. You’ve also probably heard by now, from us or somebody else, that we might very well be in an economic bubble of AI origin, one wherein the billions and billions of dollars being funneled into the industry is creating an untenable economic scenario that could turn catastrophic.

Of course, you may also have read that I’m really sick of being asked about AI. I’m still not sick, though, of asking other people about it—especially when they’re much smarter about this stuff than I am. Enter Joe Weisenthal, the cohost of Bloomberg’s fantastic Odd Lots podcast and a former coworker of mine. Trust me: As someone who spent a year listening to Joe lose his mind in the office—loudly!—anytime the economy hiccuped, few people think more about our country’s, and our planet’s, financial circumstances than Joe does. And right now, Joe’s concerns aren’t strictly about what happens if or when that AI bubble bursts. His worries are more focused on what’s going right and wrong with the US economy writ large.

For this week’s episode of The Big Interview, Joe and I talked about weird market indicators, US competition with China, and whether or not we should all prepare for an AI economic apocalypse.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

KATIE DRUMMOND: Joe Weisenthal, welcome to The Big Interview.

JOE WEISENTHAL: Thrilled to be here. Nice to see you again.

It's been too long. We were just talking about how you and I worked together—what was that, like nine years ago?

I think you were there 2014, 2015, so maybe 10 years ago or something?

Yeah, I worked at Bloomberg. I lasted about a year.

Not bad.

Not bad. In my mid-twenties, maybe not the most conducive environment to my professional success. Let's just say that. But Joe, you were there, you were loud, you were proud, you were always very excited about the economy.

I love talking about the economy.

You would just scream and shout and hoot and holler, and I was like, who is this guy sitting across from me? And why is he so loud? But I really appreciated your enthusiasm.

Thank you.

So we always start these conversations with some very fast questions. Are you ready?

Yes.

OK. So, you wake up extremely early. What is the latest you’ve slept in this year?

This year, on a weekday, probably no later than 7:00, but that’s because of kids. You know, I’m getting a little bit soft in my old age. If I didn’t have anything, I could sleep until 8:00 or 9:00. I’ve really changed.

Wow.

There used to be times when I was waking up at 4:00 am every single day.

And you were tweeting.

I still get up early a lot, but I let myself slide a little bit now.

What’s the weirdest market indicator you actually take seriously?

We did a really good episode of our podcast about a month or two ago about cardboard boxes, which are very important. I don’t know how weird they are. I guess it’s kind of intuitive because of ecommerce, but you can really dive deeply into cardboard box volume sales, the types of cardboard boxes that are hot right now. Like are they ones that go for individual packages? Are they more of the larger grocery-oriented ones?

Cardboard boxes are top of my mind these days. I used to pay a lot of attention to Macao gambling receipts, when that was more of a measure of Chinese capital market outflows. But I think they’ve clamped down on that, and it’s not as useful as an indicator these days.

If you could ban one financial cliché from headlines forever, what would it be?

Oh, there’s so many. It’s hard to choose. “The stock market is not the economy.” People love saying it; it’s not true.

The stock market is a very important part of the economy. “Investors hate uncertainty.” Things are always uncertain. That’s never been a thing. I could go on and on, but I would say “the stock market is not the economy” is one that I’ve hated for a long time, and I would say a very timely one.

What is a chart you would get tattooed?

I really like the chart of public sector employment over the last hundred years. You know why it’s a fun chart?

I’m imagining the tattoo.

I don’t think I would actually get it tattooed. It’s just one of my favorite charts, because it’s one of the—if you see this chart and you never knew what it was, you could probably figure out what it was because there is a little spike every 10 years, and that’s additional hiring for the census collection.

So I’ve always just enjoyed this chart because if you really think about “OK, what is this indicator that always spikes right at the turn of every decade?” There’s one thing that happens in the economy every 10 years—1990, 2000, 2010—and that’s the census. You might be able to figure it out. It’s fun trivia.

If the economy were a movie, what’s the title?

I don’t know. Mind Breaker. Something like that.

I do think the story of the last several years is: How many people’s brains have been broken because things that are perceived to make sense or relationships that they had assumed to be stable, et cetera, have not held? You just see people—there are other factors, but people who are in this space, going crazier and crazier year after year because they have such a difficult time reconciling what they see on their screen.

You are seeing these people go crazy?

I think so, yeah. I don’t know if it’s outward signs of, you know, literal insanity, but I think in markets you see this sort of intense frustration.

For almost my entire career—at least the last 10 years—people have said, “Oh, tech stocks can’t go any higher.” Or, “When are we gonna rotate out of tech stocks?” Everyone is all-in on this already, and yet these trends just persist month after month. Most people pride themselves in some way on not being part of the herd. Or taking some sort of contrarian viewpoint, or finding something that everyone else doesn’t know about.

Everyone at this point has heard of Nvidia, everyone in the world. You could have made a lot of money over the last couple years just buying Nvidia. I think this phenomenon really breaks a lot of people’s brains because the industry, to some extent, is supposed to encourage people to seek out information that others don’t have. I don’t think that’s been a particularly fruitful pursuit for a while now. And I think it’s so mind-breaking.

Alright, last question. You get to have dinner with one economist living or dead, who is it?

I’d love to talk to John Maynard Keynes. He was a very interesting character. Very interesting character, hung out with all sorts of artists and dancers, and I love his writing.

Dinner, maybe one day. Well, he’s dead.

Maybe one day the AI-generated, reanimated corpse of John Maynard Keynes. Don’t put it past them.

Let’s talk about the big picture for a second. You work at Bloomberg. I know firsthand that you really care about this stuff. But you’ve said the thing that really interests you is, quote, “figuring out what’s actually happening underneath the headlines.” What’s going on underneath the headlines right now?

Look, the headlines are all about the AI build-out and how the AI build-out is represented in the market. I think probably what’s less discussed is maybe some of the crowding-out effects of this.

We had this guy on our podcast who is a real estate developer for drive-through coffee shops. So like, Starbucks, when they want a new drive-through location. In recent years, really basic electrical equipment that would be required to build a new facility has been in short supply because there’s all this physical capital that’s been going into data centers.

We all know about that, right? You hear about that all the time. But just think about that: Where were these things going to go instead? Cooling gear or heating gear or water filtration or doors or gas turbines or electrical equipment that allows any facility to hook into the power grid—all of this is in incredibly short supply right now.

So the ISM manufacturing report, that’s a monthly economic indicator. One of the things that they always ask their survey respondents is: What is in short supply right now? With the exception of maybe two months, electrical equipment has been in short supply for five straight years.

I’m not trying to dismiss it as being wasteful or anything per se. I have no opinion on that. But I do think that it’s interesting to think of some of these second-order effects of who is not able to get natural gas turbine equipment, who is not able to get electrical gear equipment because some big data center operator is just willing to pay top dollar for it in order to get these things online.

Right.

I think that’s one of the most interesting stories right now. In a market economy, the way allocation of capital goods works, of course, is price signals. And the builder of the data center is gonna pay more for that same piece of gear than someone who is building a drive-through coffee shop.

If you’re thinking about how it would be done in China, they would just say, “OK, look, right now we are prioritizing data centers for drive-through coffee shops. That is where we want to direct our resources.” We do it through the price system, which works well, but if some of these investments don’t pan out, it’s interesting to think what type of economic activity was constrained because it didn’t have access to capital goods during this incredible boom.

Other types of goods relevant to these build-outs are also in short supply. Why has supply not increased to meet the obvious increase in demand that exists?

It’s a really good question. I think there’s a couple of things. I think at the margins there has been more supply. But in times of uncertainty, building a big factory or building a new facility is very risky, right? You don’t really know how long any boom is going to last. So if there are, say, three companies that are the makers of some widget that’s very crucial in the economy and it’s costly, why not keep supply where it is and just raise your …

… jack your prices up. Right.

Then you have an order book that's consistent out to the year 2030, in some cases at top dollar. It's very difficult to get out of that equilibrium because that's very nice if you're one of the sellers in this environment.

The alternative is to build another factory, make a big bet on upfront capital outlays. So that's money going out the door, and that's uncertain, and you're expanding supply so the price is going to be softer than it otherwise would've been.

I think one of the themes across the economy for a long time is paying the price for persistent underinvestment. I think another good example of that is housing. So housing activity was pretty soft in the years after the great financial crisis. All these home builders went out of business because housing prices collapsed and so forth.

Right.

So there was just not that much new housing activity. When you look at the surge in home prices now, especially post-pandemic, part of what we're experiencing now is the price that we paid for under-investment in the 2010s.

I think you can really go across a range of industries and find this phenomenon that when the economy lies fallow and the economy is soft, investment goes down. Then when you get this boom, either across the economy like we got in 2021 or 2022, or in specific sectors like we've seen in 2024 and 2025 with data centers, you run into a supply crunch pretty quickly.

That brings me to tariffs, which have been, I think for me and probably for many people, one of the most insane, confusing, befuddling phenomena of this year, of the Trump administration.

Definitely.

Can you explain to us what is going on with the global supply chain with regards to tariffs right now?

The tariffs are not high enough to induce a massive amount of domestic investment in some area. The tariffs aren’t high enough that it makes a lot of sense to build big furniture factories in the United States, but the tariffs may be high enough that someone who had been importing them from China or Vietnam, maybe they’re looking for a supplier in India. That’s definitely happening. So the furniture still arrives.

Yes.

By and large, there aren’t massive shortages of things in the US economy right now the way people might have thought there would have been in early April. Part of it is that those early tariff levels, they all came [down]. Maybe we would’ve had more persistent actual shortages had those initial tariff rates stayed in place, but they didn’t. I think the administration saw they were unsustainable.

So then there’s this switching where, OK, we’re gonna maybe switch some vendor sources. We’re gonna move to a lower-cost country. So anyone who’s in the business of importing, maybe they can keep prices roughly stable. But there is this costly process of: OK, now we have to spend money finding a new supplier, building a new relationship with them, changing our trade routes, figuring out all these things, figuring out how they operate. But then this new supplier, they don’t know the customer as well. They may be reluctant to make long-term commitments with the customer because they don’t know what the tariff rate is gonna be.

Right.

This is a worry for suppliers, that they’re gonna make this furniture, these gardening goods, these holiday goods, and then the tariff rate is gonna go up and then the customer walks away from them. So the way I think about tariffs overall, outside of some niche areas, is not that they’ve raised the cost of specific goods dramatically, though in some cases they definitely have, it’s more that they’ve really raised the cost of doing business in the United States.

If I wanna understand what is going on with the economy right now, I'd say there's basically two things: There's this slice of the economy that's doing phenomenally well, which is anything to do with big tech and AI; then there's this economy that's sort of creaking and, I don't know, like the rest of the economy, is it in recession? It's fairly stagflationary. I would say that hiring is certainly pretty mediocre right now. We're recording this on a day that we would've gotten a jobs report had the government been open. But we're pretty sure that hiring is certainly not booming.

The cost of living is very high, so it's still a lot of price pain. I think the broad swath of the economy outside of AI is kind of creaking and tariffs are probably part of the story. I wouldn't say they're the entire story, but they've raised the cost of doing business for the entire economy, even if not directly in goods, just in the effort that companies have to do to reorient their supply chains.

I have a lot of questions for you about AI, especially in terms of the chatter about a bubble. We're in an AI bubble. It will burst at some point. There are varying degrees of hysteria around this notion. How is artificial intelligence affecting the global economy right now? Are there some examples that you can give to bring this down to earth a little bit?

I would start by saying I'm very skeptical that AI as a tool is having a significant impact on the global economy, including hiring. Now, I will caveat that a little bit. I do think it's possible that, across a range of organizations right now, there is a lot of pressure on managers to show that they're using AI, whatever that means, that they're implementing, that they're finding ways to capture value from AI in their workflows.

Everyone's doing experiments, everyone's spending money, everyone's trying to figure something out. One way that you could sort of demonstrate that you're using AI and getting value is to just cut head count. Right? And then you go back and say, “Oh, because we adopted some AI workflow, we were able to reduce hiring by 10 percent.” That doesn't mean that the AI tool actually allowed you to do the same amount of work with only 90 percent.

I mean, when I see those announcements my immediate assumption is: air cover. You did layoffs and you used AI as air cover to explain why you're eliminating 10,000 positions. I just don't see the technology being equipped to eliminate 10,000 white-collar jobs right now.

So anytime I ask about actual implementation I say, “Don't give me the stuff about how your coders are using it, because I know that's well established.” The other connection is, OK, there is this mandate or there's this impulse to spend more on AI. So you're thinking about your budgetary allocations for the year 2026. We did an episode today and our guest was talking about this, that perhaps it’s a matter of, OK, we know we're gonna spend more on AI tools and services in 2026, so that means we're gonna allocate less to hiring in 2026.

I don't think there's a lot of evidence for it. Like I said in the beginning, I think the stock market really is an important part of the economy. It's not just a scoreboard, it's an engine. It is a driver. People found companies in order to sell them to public companies or to sell into the IPO market. When stocks are up, that means IPOs are gonna be more valued. That means seed rounds will be more valued. That means more people are gonna move into this space, and that's fine.

You know, Keynes talked about that, speaking of my ideal dinner guest. So this has been understood for a very long time, that financial markets have this accelerant, that they're a force of production, so to speak, within the economy in a very real way.

I do think that the big rise that we've seen in asset prices, in stocks in particular, it's been related to technology, and AI is a big part of the economic story.

When you look at Nvidia stock, for example, which is just through the roof, when you look at how AI is a significant factor in the stock market right now, and then combine that with the fact that you are having a hard time finding tangible examples of corporate productivity being enhanced by this technology, what does that mean? What happens when those things are both happening simultaneously?

Intuitively, it's really hard to imagine that these big AI companies, whether we're talking about Nvidia or Google, that the AI premium that they're receiving, the AI activity that they're receiving, can persist forever if there aren't more clear-cut examples of companies saying, “This is a valuable thing that I want to keep paying more and more for.” One possibility is that the productivity-enhancing use cases will be found, which is certainly possible.

Well, Joe, do you use AI to enhance your productivity?

It's a good question. I certainly use it for interview prep.

Sure. Research, yeah.

But I put out the same number of podcasts as I did before. And they're probably about as good as they were before. I don't know, it's a really good question. I think many people would say that they actually use ChatGPT or [an AI tool] almost every day for something. I'm in that camp. But whether I can actually point to something and say “now I'm more productive” is really tough....

....MUCH MORE

Friday, November 28, 2025

"Robots and AI Are Already Remaking the Chinese Economy"

From the Wall Street Journal via MSN, November 24:

Sam Altman wants artificial intelligence to cure cancer. Elon Musk says AI robots will eliminate poverty.

China is focused on something more prosaic: making better washing machines.

While China’s long-term AI goals are no less ambitious than the U.S. tech titans, its near-term priority is to shore up its role as the world’s factory floor for decades to come. With exports under threat from rising costs at home and tariffs abroad, that is no longer assured.

The push can be seen across the giant country in scores of companies—fueled by billions of dollars in government and private technology development—that are transforming every step of making and exporting goods.

A clothing designer reports slashing the time it takes to make a sample by more than 70% with AI. Washing machines in China’s hinterland are being churned out under the command of an AI “factory brain.”

At one of China’s biggest ports, shipping containers whiz about on self-driving trucks with virtually no workers in sight, while the port’s scheduling is run by AI.

Executives involved in China’s efforts liken the future of factories to living organisms that can increasingly think and act for themselves, moving beyond the preprogrammed tasks at traditionally-automated factories. It could further enable the spread of “dark factories,” with operations so automated that work happens around the clock with the lights dimmed.

The advances can’t come quickly enough for Communist Party leaders, who fear China could lose its status as the world’s factory floor. Its population is shrinking, young people are avoiding factory jobs, and pushback against Chinese exports has intensified in many countries. 

At the same time, President Trump is pledging to bring home vast numbers of manufacturing jobs through tariffs on China.

AI offers a lifeline to head off those risks, by helping China make and ship more stuff faster, cheaper and with fewer workers. Although some doubts are creeping in globally about how quickly AI will transform the world, China isn’t waiting: It wants to deploy what is available today quicker than the U.S. can, locking in any advantages.

“Only by proactively embracing change can we remain invincible in this revolution,” Hu Wangming, chairman of one of China’s largest steel groups, told state media this year. Its Shanghai-listed unit Baosteel had found 125 uses for AI by the end of last year—and is planning for 1,000.....

....Huawei’s role

Alongside DeepSeek, U.S.-sanctioned technology giant Huawei is at the center of China’s efforts. The company has rolled out a family of large language models, dubbed Pangu, after a character from Chinese mythology in the creation of the world, along with other AI services factories can use to become more dynamic.

Huawei’s engineers have been embedded with Conch Group, a giant cement producer in the city of Wuhu, around 200 miles west of Shanghai, whose cement has been used in projects such as the Three Gorges Dam and Dubai’s Burj Khalifa skyscraper.

Facing a glut of cement production in China, Conch wants a leg up on its rivals by adopting AI quickly, including in the production of clinker, a key cement ingredient made by heating limestone and other raw materials at high temperatures.

Conch and Huawei have developed AI tools for more precisely predicting clinker strength, as well as for controlling energy use at the kiln where it is made. Miles of conveyor belts in Wuhu are now being monitored by AI, helping Conch respond more efficiently when they break.

On a recent visit, workers at Conch’s sprawling clinker facility monitored the AI model as it automatically adjusted production in real time. Conch and Huawei say that with AI they are now able to predict clinker strength with more than 85% accuracy, compared with 70% through manual estimation, allowing them to adjust raw material ratios and avoid producing clinker of unsuitable strength....

....MUCH MORE 

What is happening with AI in China is exactly the path that nanotechnology followed. A vignette from a January 2019 post, "Whatever Happened to Nanotechnology? The Same Thing That Is Happening to Tech Right Now": 

a December 2010 post:
"Top Investment Trends For Futurists" (PXN; TINY)

...The reason for highlighting nano is two-fold.

1) Since Feynman coined the word there has been a misconception among investors that there would be a nano-technology "industry". This has proven not to be the case and won't be in the future. Rather nano is a tool, an approach toward problem solving.

There will be some breakthroughs that make their discoverers instantly (after 10 years of research) wealthy but the real beneficiaries will be companies like Kyocera and 3M and Siemens. They will use the technology to do what they are already doing, just better, faster, cheaper, more.

2) In spite of the fact that there will be few pure plays we are convinced that nano combined with advances in materials science and manufacturing technology is what will spur the next secular bull market....

When it becomes ubiquitous, the distinctions blur, the drive for creativity recedes, stasis, then death.
Wait what? Entropy! I meant to co-opt the physically precise  concept of entropy to metaphorically describe the trend. Not death.
No, death bad, Sand Hill Road good....

And AI?

I sometimes forget that normal people haven't been obsessing about this stuff for going on a decade. As just one example, out of hundreds of posts on NVDA, is a conclusion we reached early on, still hold, and tried to express in the introduction to a 2020 IBD story:

Investor's Business Daily on Artificial Intelligence Stocks

There is a definitional problem with the term "AI stocks [or companies]" in that AI is a tool. Much as the (over) hyped nanotechnology revolution didn't produce "nanotech stocks" but instead became incorporated into processes and procedures that give companies employing same an incremental edge rather than epochal shifts.*

However, if there is an AI "company" Nvidia would deserve the moniker as much as anyone....

Last seen in September 2024's "How Nvidia Is Building A Competitive Moat To Fend Off AI Challengers" (NVDA).

And Huawei? They are the people keeping Nvidia's Jensen Huang up at night, not the TPU folks at Google. If interested see:

"Huawei Plans Three-Year Campaign to Overtake Nvidia in AI Chips"

Chips: "Huawei lays out multi-year AI accelerator roadmap and claims it makes Earth’s mightiest clusters"

This is the one Nvidia's Jensen Huang thinks about 

As noted earlier this year:

What Huawei has accomplished is astounding and borderline terrifying. 

During the mid-to-late twenty-teens the world began to notice that the company was a serious business competitor and an extension of China's Communist Party and government.

In an attempt to assuage these concerns one of their Western honchos said:

‘At Huawei, we’re not attaching laser beams to the heads of sharks’
—Alykhan Velshi, Vice President, Corporate Affairs, Huawei Technologies Canada, Markham, Ont.
Letter to the Editor, Maclean's Magazine, published July 23, 2019

That was in one of our posts on China's security laws which require Chinese (and foreign-domiciled!!) companies to work with the authorities when asked. I'm not sure the statement did much assuaging....

From The Register, September 18: 

On the same day that fellow Chinese giant Tencent says its overseas cloud clientele doubled 

Chinese tech giant Huawei has kicked off its annual “Connect” conference by laying out a plan to deliver increasingly powerful AI processors that look to have enough power that Middle Kingdom users won’t need to try getting Nvidia parts across the border.

Huawei already offers the Ascend 910C accelerator that Chinese AI upstart DeepSeek is thought to have used to develop its impressively efficient models. At Connect today, Huawei promised four successors.

First off the rank, in the first quarter of 2026, will be the Ascend 950PR which, according to slideware shown at the conference, will boast one petaflop performance with the 8-bit floating-point (FP8) computation units used for many AI inferencing workloads. The chip will also include 2 TB/s interconnect bandwidth and 128GB of 1.6 TB/s memory. In 2026’s final quarter Huawei plans to deliver the 950DT, which will be capable of two petaflops of FP4 performance thanks to the inclusion of 144GB of 4 TB/s memory.

In 2027, Huawei plans the Ascend 960 that will include 288GB of 9.6TB/s memory. 2028 will see the debut of the Ascend 970, in which memory will speed along at 14.4 TB/s.

Those memory speeds suggest Huawei has created its own high-bandwidth memory, or sourced some from within China, and is confident enough to include it on a multi-year roadmap....

....MUCH MORE 

If interested the introduction was part of the outro from "The Secret History of China’s Most Powerful Company".

Some of our previous posts on the Chinese colossus:

While some people are bleating and tweeting into the ether about their political feelings, others are creating the technical container that will define, delineate, create, and constrict the future. Them's the ones to watch out for.
Baaaa
At the moment I don't think ASML has to worry but U.S. policymakers should be dusting off their contingency plans. They have contingency plans, right? I think they're in the same drawer as the CDC's pandemic response folder....

And many, many more. Quite an amazing story. 

And not afraid to get their hands dirty when the survival of the company was a talking point in 2021: Huawei Seeks Other Revenue Streams Including Coal Mining and Pig Farming

Also: