Sunday, January 15, 2023

"Can Washington Fight on Two Fronts?"

Definitely not militarily.

In addition to draining the STRATEGIC petroleum reserve of 193 million barrels (President Xi giggles) to its lowest level since 1983, with no plan to refill the reserve, the U.S. Military-Industrial Complex has run out of many weapons including things as basic as artillery shells. Here's how bad it is:

"When it comes to Russia’s war against Ukraine, if we were still in Afghanistan, it would have,
I think, made much more complicated the support that we’ve been able to give and that others
have been able to give Ukraine to resist and push back against the Russian aggression."

—Secretary of State Antony Blinken, press conference December 22, 2022

And Secretary of the Navy Del Toro as relayed by Defense One, January 11, 2023:

....The secretary was asked to respond to comments made at the conference by Adm. Daryl Caudle, commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command. Caudle, the reporter said, worried that “the Navy might get to the point where it has to make the decision whether it needs to arm itself or arm Ukraine, and has the Navy gotten to that point yet?”

Del Toro replied, “With regards to deliveries of weapons systems for the fight in Ukraine…Yeah, that's always a concern for us. And we monitor that very, very closely. I wouldn't say we're quite there yet, but if the conflict does go on for another six months, for another year, it certainly continues to stress the supply chain in ways that are challenging.”....

And diplomatically?

From China-US Focus, January 12, 2023:

Can Washington Fight on Two Fronts?

The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden had two diplomatic priorities in 2022: coping with the Russia-Ukraine conflict and pressing ahead with strategic competition with China. Diplomatic maneuvering on these two fronts will likely continue in 2023.

Meddling in conflict
Shortly after the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out, the U.S. declared it would provide the latter with weapons and military equipment — portable anti-tank and air-defense missiles such as Javelins and Stingers, large-caliber howitzers, high mobility artillery rocket systems, armored vehicles and precision guided weapons and munitions. These have continuously flowed into Ukraine. In addition, the U.S. has provided Ukraine with considerable intelligence and military training support, including the “lend-lease” program Biden signed in May, which greatly simplified the procedure for the U.S. to provide military aid and other “necessary resources” to Ukraine. Beyond that, Washington has actively promoted allies’ various offers of support for Ukraine. Those from the European Union have amounted to nearly 50 billion euros.

It is only such massive support by the U.S. that has made it possible for Ukraine to successfully fend off Russia’s first wave of military offensives, gradually reverse the battlefield situation and drag the conflict into a stage of seesaw battle and exhaustion, which is the last thing Russia wanted to see. The U.S. goal has also turned from helping Ukraine fend off Russian military offensives to weakening Russia as much as possible. The Russia-Ukraine conflict is increasingly taking on the clear characteristics of a proxy war.

To pressure Russia, the U.S. and its European allies have mainly adopted two means. One is imposing intensive economic sanctions — the speed, scope and forcefulness of which are unprecedented in the post-Cold War era. The sanctions have mainly taken the form of a financial onslaught, including the freezing of assets, cutting off fundraising channels and blocking financial transactions. This has been supplemented by measures such as control over trade in high technology, terminating significant projects and cutting off personnel exchanges.

Washington has tried to deal a heavy blow to Russia’s economic foundation and its military and financial capacity for sustaining the war through moves in finance, energy and technology. It hopes this will cause Moscow to shrink back.

The second means of attacking Russia is isolating it as much as possible diplomatically and weakening its international status and reputation. The U.S. has taken advantage of such occasions as NATO meetings and U.S.-EU and G7 summits to coordinate positions on Russia. It has tried to get the UN to pass corresponding resolutions to create an international united front against Russia. The U.S. also attempted to kick Russia out of the G20 and, after an abortive attempt, boycotted the G20 meeting because of Russia’s attendance.

Despite the unprecedented economic sanctions and diplomatic suppression by the U.S. and its allies, the outcomes have fallen short. The Russian economy has withstood the tsunami-like Western sanctions. Although Russia’s GDP shrank by 3 percent in 2022, its economy has yet to collapse. With strong macro control policies, Russia has maintained stable financial order at home, and the ruble’s exchange rates against the U.S. dollar and euro both rose above levels at the end of 2022.

Diplomatically, many members of the international community have not joined in sanctions. Many countries have not voted to support UN resolutions on the conflict in Ukraine. And Washington has failed to accomplish its goal of making some countries follow its lead, revealing the limits of U.S. international influence and the reality of pluralism in international politics.

As the conflict in prolonged and sanctions backfire, dissatisfaction within the U.S. and West generally is rising, testing the sustainability of support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. More important, Western sanctions and suppression have not changed Russia’s determination. The conflict is not only settling into a long-term status but also shows a risk of further escalation and getting out of control.

Suppression of China 
The Biden administration’s containment and suppression of China relied mostly on “three cards” in 2022: the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Taiwan and sci-tech.....