HT up front to 
The Conversable Economist for this pull-quote:
God makes wheat, but the Chicago Board of Trade makes #2 hard red winter
 wheat. It has a lot less variance than wheat. You know what you’re 
going to get and, therefore, you don’t have to care who you’re buying it
 from....
From the Federal Reserve bank Of Minneapolis
Published June 15, 2015
In “normal” markets, 
prices adjust to equate demand and supply;  the market clears. This 
simple premise is at the core of economic thought. But  with surprising 
frequency, prices are not enough and can even be irrelevant.  These 
markets are broken in the sense that price adjustment won’t clear them, 
 and economists have long struggled to understand efficient allocation 
in such  cases.
 Alvin Roth began 
studying these “broken” markets in the 1970s.  Decades later, in 2012, 
this body of work was recognized with the Nobel prize.  By extending 
theory developed by mathematician Lloyd Shapley, his Nobel  
co-recipient, Roth had “generated a flourishing field of research and 
improved  the operation of many markets,” said the Nobel committee. “An 
outstanding example  of economic engineering.”
  Roth’s theoretical, 
empirical and  experimental research has transformed how medical 
residents find jobs, parents  find good schools for their children and 
renal patients find kidneys that save  their lives. Economics is often 
deemed impractical—too abstract from the real  world to have pragmatic 
importance. Roth’s career is solid refutation of that  notion.
 Inspired by Shapley’s 
mathematical proof with  David Gale that stable matches—those in which 
currently paired partners see no  benefit from a different match—can
 exist in theory, Roth discovered that the  mechanism used successfully 
since the 1950s to match U.S. medical residents  with hospital jobs was 
quite similar to the Gale-Shapley algorithm. This  careful analysis led 
to a 1995 invitation from doctors who had found that  the growing number
 of married couples seeking hospital posts undermined the existing 
algorithm. No longer were  matches stable. Roth helped redesign the 
algorithm, used with success ever  since. 
 Similar analysis and 
redesign have been at  the heart of Roth’s work, applied to kidney 
donations, public schools, law  student clerkships and a wide variety of
 health care labor markets. Others have  extended it into financial 
intermediation, Internet advertising auctions and  even dating services.
 He addresses many of these topics in the following  conversation, along
 with the success of experimental economics, the ubiquity of  
“repugnant” markets and the vital importance of coffee.
 
MATCHING MARKETS
Region: Perhaps we could begin with some general 
background on matching markets. In  your Nobel lecture, you said, “You 
can’t just tell Google that you are showing  up for work. They have to 
hire you.”
Roth: They do  indeed.
Region: And you continued: “Matching markets  are 
markets in which you can’t just choose what you want (even if you can  
afford it). You also have to be chosen.” 
  That suggests that prices alone don’t clear markets in  certain 
cases. Could you elaborate on which markets that applies to, and why  
prices don’t equate supply and demand in those situations?
Roth: Well, it might  be easiest to first talk about commodity markets because they are markets where  we think price does do all the work. It takes a lot of design to make  something into a commodity market....MUCH MORE