From ZeroHedge, July 5, 2015:
More Sellside Reactions To The Greek Referendum
Today, Greeks sent a resounding message to Brussels, Frankfurt, and Berlin that they are not willing to acquiesce to further humiliation at the hands of creditors and that, even if it means braving the economic abyss in the short-term, the country is determined to salvage a better tomorrow from what, after today's referendum, are the smoldering ashes of Greece's second bailout program.
Now, a stunned sellside — which had, over the past three months, very carefully tweaked their base cases to reflect the growing risk of Grexit — is scrambling to explain to nervous clients what happens next.
Having heard from JPM earlier, we bring you the latest from Barclays, Deutsche Bank, and RBC.
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From Barclays:
A “no” vote means EMU exit, most likely
We argue that an EMU exit would become the more likely scenario, even if Greece remaining in the euro area cannot be ruled out. Agreeing on a programme with the current Greek government would be extremely difficult for EA leaders, given the Greek rejection of the last deal offered. EA leaders accepting all Greek proposals would be a difficult sell at home, especially at the Bundestag or in Spain ahead of the general elections.
How will the crisis play out? The bank liquidity crisis is likely to turn into a solvency crisis once the ECB shuts down ELA, probably no later than 20 July (when a EUR4.2bn payment to the ECB becomes due). Fiscal problems would become more acute; the government may be forced to issue IOUs, which effectively become a parallel currency to the euro. A new currency by the central bank of Greece is likely to eventually become necessary to inject both liquidity and recapitalise banks. At this stage, we would expect IOUs to be converted into the new Greek drachma (NGD).
The NGD would likely depreciate significantly and hence many local companies (clearly those in the non-tradable sector) and households would need to default on their foreign currency debt, now including euro-denominated liabilities. Many of the domestic contracts that are now denominated in euros would also become unviable and need to be restructured. Non-performing loans would surge because of: 1) the negative balance sheet effects for firms and households; and 2) the local currency needed to pay euro debts would increase with the devaluation, exceeding the increase in local currency revenue. Likewise, the government would also be forced to default on its euro-denominated liabilities.
Redenomination away from the euro would also cause massive transfers between agents, adding to the above-mentioned transfers between debtors and creditors. A majority of households with local accounts and savings will suffer substantial losses while cash rich agents with accounts abroad will be the big winners and could take advantage of the chaos to seize capital and production capacities. Given the weak state of the government, these redistributions would likely benefit the already oversized unofficial sector....MORE
