From Geopolitical Monitor, April 16:
Kra Canal: The Impossible Dream of Southeast Asia Shipping
The idea of the Kra Canal has been a topic of discussion for centuries, as the promise of an alternative route between the Andaman Sea and Gulf of Thailand could revolutionize shipping and reshape regional geopolitics. While the project has never come to fruition, its potential impact keeps it in strategic conversations, particularly in light of China’s expanding influence in Southeast Asia and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As of now, Thailand has opted for a different path, but debates over the canal’s feasibility and geopolitical consequences remain very much alive.
Historical Background
The concept of the Kra Canal dates back to 1677 when Thai King Narai commissioned French engineer de Lamar to survey the Kra Isthmus for a possible canal. At the time, the idea was not to connect the Gulf of Thailand with the Andaman Sea but rather to establish a navigable waterway between Songkhla and Marid (now Myanmar). De Lamar’s assessment concluded that the mountainous terrain, dense jungles, and the technological limitations of the era rendered the project unfeasible. The immense effort required to dig through the isthmus using 17th-century engineering methods made construction virtually impossible, leading to its abandonment.
In the 19th century, as European colonial powers expanded their influence in Southeast Asia, the concept of the Kra Canal resurfaced. The British, who controlled key maritime trade routes through Singapore and the Strait of Malacca, viewed any alternative shipping channel with suspicion. They feared that a canal through Thailand would weaken Singapore’s strategic importance and threaten British dominance in regional trade. Meanwhile, France, eager to strengthen its presence in Indochina, saw the canal as a way to establish a stronger foothold in the region and counterbalance British influence. However, the Siamese government, wary of foreign intervention and territorial disputes, strategically resisted both British and French involvement. By carefully balancing diplomatic relations with European powers while preserving its sovereignty, Siam managed to prevent any progress on the canal during this period.
Kra Canal in the Contemporary Context
The Kra Canal attracted renewed interest in 1972 when an American firm, Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton (TAMS), proposed a 102-km-long canal connecting Satun to Songkhla. This proposal was driven by the need for an alternative shipping route to alleviate congestion in the Malacca Strait and provide a more direct maritime passage between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The plan involvedadvanced engineering techniques of the time, envisioning a deep-water canal capable of handling large cargo vessels and oil tankers. However, with a projected cost of $5.6 billion and a projected 10–12 year construction period, the Thai government ultimately rejected the plan. Concerns included the massive financial burden, environmental impact, and the risk of regional instability, particularly stemming from foreign influence and internal security challenges.
More recently, China has become increasingly interested in reviving the project as part of its Maritime Silk Road initiative, a key component of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2015, an MoU was signed between private entities from China and Thailand to explore the feasibility of the canal, highlighting its potential to reshape trade routes and reduce reliance on the Malacca Strait. However, both governments quickly distanced themselves from the agreement, likely due to political sensitivities and opposition from regional players like Singapore and India. The canal never progressed beyond preliminary discussions. As of 2025, Thailand has instead opted to prioritize a $28 billion land bridge project—an overland transport corridor designed to facilitate cargo movement between the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea. This alternative aims to achieve similar economic benefits without the political and environmental challenges posed by a canal, making it a more viable and strategically balanced solution.
Geopolitical Stakes
Why the Kra Canal Matters
If constructed, the Kra Canal would provide a strategic alternative to the Strait of Malacca, reducing shipping distances by approximately 1,200 nautical miles. This shortcut would save fuel costs, cut transit times, and ease congestion in the Strait of Malacca, which currently handles nearly 94,000 vessel passages annually. As global trade continues to expand, particularly in energy and container shipping, the demand for efficient and secure maritime routes is higher than ever. The canal would create an additional passage, reducing bottlenecks and alleviating concerns about over-reliance on a single trade route.
China, as the world’s largest trading nation, would stand to benefit immensely by reducing its reliance on the Malacca Strait for energy imports and trade. Currently, approximately 80% of China’s oil imports pass through the Malacca Strait, making it a critical vulnerability in times of geopolitical tensions. Diversifying maritime routes through the Kra Canal could enhance China’s energy security, providing an alternative supply chain for crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from the Middle East and Africa.
China-US Competition
For China, the Kra Canal would address its “Malacca dilemma“—the vulnerability of its maritime trade routes to potential blockades by rival naval forces, particularly the United States. A hypothetical China-controlled canal would enhance Beijing’s control over its supply chain and maritime security, while boosting its geopolitical influence in the region. Notably, the canal would enable China to establish a stronger presence in the Indian Ocean, allowing the PLA Navy greater operational flexibility and enhancing its ability to protect critical sea lanes.
The United States and its allies, particularly Singapore and India, oppose the canal’s construction owing in large part to these geopolitical considerations. A China-dominated Kra Canal could reduce Singapore’s significance as a shipping hub, potentially diminishing its economic and strategic value. Singapore, which benefits heavily from transshipment fees and trade facilitation, would likely experience economic losses if traffic were diverted to a new canal. India, which has growing concerns over China’s increasing influence in the Indian Ocean, sees the Kra Canal as another strategic asset that could strengthen China’s maritime footprint near its sphere of influence....
....MUCH MORE
You can see how this project ties in with China's naval base across the Gulf of Thailand on Cambodia's west coast at Ream:
From April 22's "RAND: "The Gulf of Thailand May Be the Next U.S.-China Flashpoint":
In fact the Kra canal project would allow China's navy a much more direct route to their only other overseas base on the route into the Suez Canal.
February 2024 - "Red Sea Rivalries"
The most amazing thing that has been pointed out over the last couple months is that China's base on Djibouti's Gulf of Aden coast, at the approaches to the Bab al-Mandab chokepoint into the Red Sea, gives them the perfect location to monitor Houthi action and American reaction:
—China Officially Sets Up Its First Overseas Base in Djibouti, The Diplomat
From Phenomenal World, February 15....
