RAND Corporation: Postwar U.S. Strategy Toward Russia (full 3.4mb download site)
From The RAND Corporation, February 9, 2024:
The Day After Postwar U.S. Strategy Toward Russia
While it might not come soon, eventually there will be an end to the Russia-Ukraine war. What then?
Preparing for the Aftermath No matter when the hot phase of the current war ends, Russia will remain a threat both to Ukraine and to the interests of the United States and its allies. How, then, should the United States deal with Russia after the war? How should postwar considerations affect wartime policy?
Answers to these questions matter immensely. Decisions made in the
immediate aftermath of wars can have significant long-term consequences.
The settlements that ended the First and Second World Wars reshaped
nations, societies, and the international order in ways that are still
felt today. RAND analysis has found that policymakers' assumptions about
the trajectory of major wars — such as how long such wars will last and
what postwar environments will be — often prove wrong, complicating the
planning for their aftermath.
Although the Russia-Ukraine war is not (as of this writing in late
2023) a great power conflict like World War I and World War II, it pits
one major power against a large neighboring state that is supported by
another major power, the United States, and its allies. Whenever the
conflict ends, the way that the United States approaches its
relationship with Russia will affect U.S. interests in Europe and,
likely, around the globe. Given these stakes, U.S. strategists need to
plan for the postwar period now. The first step is to identify possible
U.S. policy approaches and assess their likely impact.
Imagining Possible Futures Planning for after the war is fraught with significant uncertainty: Strategists do not know the conflict's trajectory, when the fighting will stop, or how the international environment will change as a result. Given this uncertainty, the implications of U.S. strategic choices must be explored in different contexts.
Myriad contexts can be imagined. To make analysis feasible, RAND researchers constructed two ideal-type postwar worlds — a combination of the outcome of the war and nature of the international environment when it ends.
As detailed in Box 1, one of these worlds is modestly less favorable
from the U.S. perspective (World A) and the other modestly more
favorable (World B). The research focused on these moderate variations
rather than extremely negative or very positive ones.
Box 1. Two Postwar Worlds
World A: After the Less Favorable War
War outcomes
The conflict ends after a long war of attrition
China provides lethal aid to Russia
The war ends in a weak ceasefire
Ukraine suffers modest territorial setbacks
Strategic setting in the immediate aftermath of the war
Russia is primarily imperialist and also security-motivated
Russia is weakened by the war but poised to rearm
Russia-China relations are very close
Ukraine is focused on territorial reconquest
Ukraine is economically devastated
NATO is divided over wartime policy toward Russia and Ukraine
The U.S. shift to the Indo-Pacific region is limited by the war in Europe
There are U.S.-China tensions because of Beijing's support for Moscow
Global economic fragmentation occurs because of sanctions and counter-sanctions
World B: After the More Favorable War
War outcomes
The war ends soon
China does not provide Russia with lethal aid
The war ends in a robust ceasefire
Ukraine makes modest territorial gains
Strategic setting in the immediate aftermath of the war
Russia is primarily security-motivated
Russia is severely weakened by the war and its defense industry is struggling
Russia-China relations are somewhat strained
Ukraine is focused on economic recovery
Ukraine's economy is significantly harmed by the war
NATO maintains unity on wartime policy toward Russia and Ukraine
The U.S. shift to the Indo-Pacific region is not significantly limited by the war in Europe
The war does not have a major impact on U.S.-China tensions
Russia is much less economically integrated with the West
Researchers then assessed how two ideal-type U.S. strategies — a hardline approach and a less hardline approach — would perform in these two worlds (see Box 2).
If the United States adopts the hardline strategy, it would seek to
punish, deter, and weaken Russia by sustaining many elements of wartime
strategy, such as sanctions and enhanced U.S. force posture in Europe.
If the United States chooses the less hardline strategy, it would be
open to negotiations and more-restrained political and military policies
aimed at stabilizing relations with Russia....
RAND: "Truth Decay Is Putting U.S. National Security at Risk" This is pretty funny. The following essay expounds on the fact that there is a lack of trust in the country and somehow manages to avoid mentioning the lies of government agencies and the lies of the media for the last seven or eight years.
