"Can Uber Ever Deliver? Part Eighteen: Lyft’s IPO Prospectus Tells Investors That It Has No Idea How Ridesharing Could Ever Be Profitable"
From naked capitalism:
By Hubert Horan, who has 40 years of experience in the
management and regulation of transportation companies (primarily
airlines). Horan has no financial links with any urban car service
industry competitors, investors or regulators, or any firms that work on
behalf of industry participants
Can Silicon Valley investors create $125-150 billion in ridesharing market value out of thin air?
This series, since the first Naked Capitalism post in 2016, has
focused on Uber as the dominant and strategically pioneering ridesharing
company, and as the only source of public data that could support
independent analysis of ridesharing economics.
Last Friday, March 1st, Lyft issued its Form S-1, also known as a
prospectus[1], significantly expanding our base of objective data about
ridesharing. This post will analyze Lyft’s key claims. Reports
indicate that Lyft is pursuing an IPO value of $20-25 billion, while
Uber may be pursuing as much as $125 billion from its upcoming IPO.
Uber claimed that the “ridesharing” industry it had pioneered had
substantially superior economics based on major technological
innovations that explained its disruption of the traditional taxi/urban
car service industry. This series presented evidence showing that those
claims were nonsense and that ridesharing companies were actually less
efficient than the traditional companies they were driving out of
business.
It is important to understand Uber and the other privately-owned
ridesharing companies since their impacts extend far beyond urban
transport. One of the central themes of this series is that they have
(and will continue to) significantly reduce overall economic welfare,
and represent a major attack on the idea that the actions of consumers
and investors in competitive markets can allocate capital to more
productive uses.
The critical characteristic of ridesharing companies (such as US
based Uber and Lyft, or Asian based Didi, Grab or Ola) has nothing to do
with smartphone apps or competitive advantage or operational
efficiency. It is the fact that they are backed by billions in cash from
venture capitalists who have been willing to subsidize years of massive
losses. Instead of consumers choosing the most efficient car service,
those subsidies led them to choose the company that didn’t charge them
for the actual cost of the service, and provided far more capacity than
could be economically justified. Instead of funding the companies with
the strongest sustainable competitive advantage, those subsidies led
investors to fund the companies with the artificially inflated growth
rates that suggested a path to quasi-monopoly market dominance.
Under private ownership, the claims that the ridesharing companies
had created unprecedented levels of economic value ($70 billion for
Uber, $15 billion for Lyft) had never been subject to any broad-based
analyst or investor scrutiny. This series has argued that the
unprecedented accomplishment of ridesharing is that its entire valuation
was manufactured out of thin air. The valuation of other large Silicon
Valley based companies (Amazon, Facebook) may be seriously inflated, but
they had clearly established legitimate economic foundations, including
powerful product and operational innovations, profits and strong cash
flow.
This series has documented that Uber has no economic foundation,
aside from its predatory use of billions in subsidies. None of its
claimed technological innovations allowed it to produce car service at
lower cost than incumbents, or create sustainable advantages over future
competitors. It would still require billions in new efficiencies to
reach operational breakeven, and billions more to economically justify
the funding its investors provided. [2]
Lyft’s IPO kicks off the endgame of the “ridesharing” corporate value creation process
As discussed in Part Seventeen of this series [3], both Uber and Lyft
filed preliminary, confidential prospectus data with the Securities and
Exchange Commission in December, kicking off a race as to who would go
public first. Travis Kalanick did not feel Uber was ready to face full
capital market scrutiny, triggering a rebellion of Board members who
impatient for actual returns on their investment. Kalanick was replaced
by Dara Khosrowshahi in late 2017, who committed to take Uber public in
the fourth quarter of 2019. Lyft wanted to go public first, to avoid the
expected glut of IPOs this year (including Pinterest, Slack, Postmates
and Airbnb) and to minimize direct comparisons with Uber. When word
leaked that Lyft was targeting a first quarter IPO, Uber accelerated its
filing plans but Lyft won the race.
The public release of Lyft’s S-1 filing will be followed (apparently
starting the week of March 18th) with a series of investor roadshows.
Based on investor feedback, Lyft and its lead investment bankers (JP
Morgan, Credit Suisse and Jefferies) will set final prices and terms,
and the date for the actual IPO.
Last Friday was the first time investors ever had the chance to
review actual Lyft financial results. In the next few weeks they will
have to decide whether they want to risk real money on the chance that
Lyft’s value will continue to appreciate above the IPO price. If
investors line up to buy Lyft stock at the company’s hoped-for $20-25
billion valuation, then the efforts to create ridesharing value out of
thin air have succeeded, and it will make it much easier to Uber to
achieve a strong valuation. Significant investor resistance to Lyft’s
valuation objectives could cause serious problems for both companies,
and could possibly burst the widespread public perceptions about
ridesharing.
Four key questions potential Lyft IPO investors will want the S-1 to answer
- Does the prospectus provide data showing that Lyft have a clear path
to convert its current losses into ongoing, growing profits? Is there
data showing exactly which factors (e.g. the ability to raise prices,
the ability to capture market share, the ability to increase operational
efficiency due to scale economics or new innovations) are likely to
drive years of profit improvement?
- Is there data showing that aggregate demand for ridesharing is
likely to grow strongly for many years? What might drive future demand
growth (expansion into untapped markets, the ability to continually
lower prices, capturing demand currently using other transport modes)?
- If Lyft could achieve sustainable profitability in its core
ridesharing market, is there evidence showing how it could leverage its
existing infrastructure and rapidly build profitable positions in other
markets?
- As Uber will always be larger, is there evidence showing that both a
primary and secondary competitor can profitably coexist without ongoing
destructive market share battles?
Lyft’s prospectus doesn’t answer any of these questions
Lyft’s prospectus provides absolute no data demonstrating that it has
the ability to profitably raise prices over time, increase operational
efficiency or win significantly greater market share. It cites “growing
the rider base” as the first plank of its future growth strategy, but
provides no data showing what it thinks its current share of the market
is, no estimates of future aggregate market growth, no evidence of what
might drive that growth, and no explanation of what its future growth
potential might be. Lyft makes no attempt to lay out a possible path to
future profitability, or even a timeline as to when breakeven might be
achieved....MUCH MORE