I'm not sure why Stanford keeps Francis "the end of history..." around and that goes double for Paul Ehrlich* but it's their money and their reputation and since Stanford has a lot of each I suppose they can afford to squander a bit.
From Modern Diplomacy, July 23, 2025:
Fukuyama’s triumphalist “end of history” now reads as a cautionary tale, as we reach the limits of the democratic-neoliberal order and confront the return of geopolitics in an increasingly unstable, multipolar world.
In his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama put forward one of the most challenging and enduring hypotheses in the International Relations corpus. A puzzle seemingly naïve and optimistic in the face of the unshakable aura of a serious and Realist tradition—already scarred by the three major conflict of the 20th century—yet annoyingly pertinent, as the unexpected fall of the Soviet Union and the ascendancy of the Western liberal democratic order seemed to herald the natural Long Peace after humanity’s most violent moment.
When the end of accumulated chaos after the Cold War brought with it the newfound certainty about the conclusion of enduring human struggle, it also planted the expectation of its return.
For the proponents of Fukuyama’s hypothesis, this counterfactual unipolar moment could be seen as a linear progression, sustained by the triad of democracy, trade, and interdependence. For others, it signaled a reminder of our captivity to history and a prelude to the eventual end of the current world order. However, the return of history does not mean its strict repetition. While optimistic views tend to deny the possibility of the emergence of new threats and strongly believe that international relations are conducive to peace and tranquility, pessimistic views suggest the return to a period similar to that of Europe between the World Wars.
Today’s so-called “return to power politics” does not resemble a German-style rise to systemic confrontation, but rather marks a shift away from the U.S.-led Western status quo. The international system, as constructed after the Second World War, has become almost unrecognizable today, owing to the rise of emerging powers, the historic transfer of relative wealth and economic influence from West to East, increasing globalization, transnational forces, and the narrowing gap in power differentials between states.
The failure of the “end of history” thesis stems from two key assumptions: (1) the necessity of a globally adopted democratic order, and (2) the universal acceptance of liberalism as the foundation for human theodicy:
Failure of the Democratic Order
For Fukuyama’s hypothesis to hold, democracy and liberalism would have needed to spread universally, to every country. Yet, this convergence has not occurred. Some states, like China, have embraced aspects of economic liberalism without adopting democratic governance, showing that the liberal-democratic pairing is neither natural nor inevitable.
Even where liberal democracy has spread, it has not consistently demonstrated its superiority. In recent decades, some authoritarian regimes have outperformed democracies in areas such as economic development, social cohesion, and crisis management, challenging the assumption that liberal democracy is the most effective or desirable model. This performance gap has become particularly evident in response to social crises. The COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, exposed how certain authoritarian systems could act more decisively and effectively in times of global emergency. As the world grapples with increasing transnational crises—climate change, resource competition, pandemics, cyber threats, migration—resilience and adaptability may matter more than regime type alone.
Failure of the Liberal Ideal
The “end of history” rationale implies the need for a common ground in defining what is good or evil—a kind of universal theodicy. First, in relation to the democratic-liberal system, the hypothesis that “democracies do not go to war with one another” requires that all inter-state relations be dyadic and democratic. Empirical evidence shows that democracies frequently engage in conflict with non-democracies. U.S. interventions in Iraq, Kuwait, and elsewhere serve as clear examples that being democratic does not guarantee pacifism. This suggests that unless every state becomes democratic, the conditions necessary to prevent war remain unfulfilled. Second, the notion of a political theodicy—the belief that liberalism represents a universally accepted moral endpoint—presumes a consensus beyond foundational political disagreements. It assumes a shared framework for determining the lesser evil in decision-making, balancing what is disagreeable with what is disastrous. But political judgment is inherently shaped by context, trade-offs, and power struggles that are deeply specific to each society. Envisioning a politics free of conflict or power is as unrealistic as expecting global unity under one religion or moral code.
Failure of the Western Neo-Liberal Democratic Order
The exportation of democracy and regime change in authoritarian countries has only strengthened nationalist tendencies and fueled resentment toward Western intervention. For example, framed as democracy promotion, the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, instead of fostering peace, fueled anti-Western sentiment, destabilized regions, and reinforced norms of self-determination and sovereignty. In response, countries like Russia and China have increasingly advocated for non-intervention, emphasizing national sovereignty. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the rise of global nationalist movements further demonstrated the backlash against foreign interference.
In parallel, transnational organizations, once key pillars for maintaining peace, have expanded their memberships but gradually lost relevance in interventions and peace settlements as the Global South rises in power, undermining their legitimacy. Many international organizations, along with the states backing them, have seen their credibility and legitimacy eroded. These organizations now often serve symbolic roles in conflict management, lacking a firm commitment to the rule of law and undermining the normative principles they once upheld. In Northern countries, the widening decision-making powers of these institutions over national governments have triggered political and social instability within liberal states (e.g., the European Union). As a result, national identity and sovereignty have once again become dominant political and social values. The growing extremes in political regimes and the lack of political stability have further fractured the international order, with far-right and far-left parties complicating internal stability and hindering international cooperation....
Related December 30-"US-Indonesia minerals deal points to new global trade era"
December 17 - Great Powers: "What if everyone loses?"
When is science not science? When it's done by Paul -Population Bomb- Ehrlich.
"In ten years all important animal life in the sea will be extinct. Large areas of coastline will have to be evacuated because of the stench of dead fish." Paul Ehrlich, Earth Day 1970The guy would be an embarrassment a third rate college much less to Stanford of all places.
"I would take even money that England will not exist in the year 2000." (1969)
"Before 1985, mankind will enter a genuine age of scarcity . . . in which the accessible supplies of many key minerals will be facing depletion." (1976)
See also: the spectacularly wrong and wrong-headed forecasts made by Paul Ehrlich for which he has been rewarded with an endowed chair at Stanford-definitely a mark against Stanford.And fully intended to gather some of his wrong-beyond-wrong predictions.
I forgot.
I'll get around to a full post on his doom-mongering but for now here are a couple of his comments on India:
In the book's 1971 edition, the latter prediction was removed, green revolution and all that.
The World Bank estimates India's population was 511 million in January 1968.
India is feeding 700 million more people than when Ehrlich wrote his 200 mil. line.
Meet M.S. Swaminathan and his students.
There are many, many more examples but for now, you get the point.
"Commodities: 'The Case for Human Ingenuity'":
“When you buy commodities, you’re selling human ingenuity.”
Dylan Grice on why investing in commodities for the long run is a bad idea (SocGen Cross Asset Research, December 2010)
