I will be referring back to this, for now it's my weekend read.
Mr. Grantham is far too pessimistic about fertilizer availability (Phosphorus and potassium [potash])
In addition this is the first time he has written at length about population and while he doesn't go as far as the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement (Après vous) he doesn't address the totalitarian policy response that is the natural outgrowth of his argument.
See also: the spectacularly wrong and wrong-headed forecasts made by Paul Ehrlich for which he has been rewarded with an endowed chair at Stanford-definitely a mark against Stanford.
Via Advisor Perspectives:
Summary
Our global
economy, reckless in its use of all resources and natural systems,
shows many of the indicators of potential failure that brought down so
many civilizations before ours. By sheer luck, though, ours has two
features that might just save our bacon: declining fertility rates and
progress in alternative energy. Our survival might well depend on doing
everything we can to encourage their progress. Vested interests,
though, defend the status quo effectively and the majority much prefers
optimistic propaganda to uncomfortable truth and wishful thinking
rather than tough action. It is likely to be a close race.
The Fall of Civilizations
The
collapse of civilizations is a gripping and resonant topic for many of
us and one that has attracted many scholars over the years. They see
many possible contributing factors to the collapse of previous
civilizations, the evidence pieced together shard by shard from
civilizations that often left few records. But some themes reoccur in
the scholars’ work: geographic locations that had misfortune in the
availability of useful animal and vegetable life, soil, water, and a
source of energy; mismanagement in the overuse and depletion of
resources, especially forests, soil, and water; the lack of a safety
margin or storage against inevitable droughts and famines;
overexpansion and costly unnecessary wars; sometimes a failure of moral
spirit as the pioneering toughness and willingness to sacrifice gave
way to softer and more cynical ways; increasing complexity of a
growing empire that became by degree too expensive in human costs and
in the use of limited resources to justify the effort, until the taxes
and other demands on ordinary citizens became unbearable, so that an
empire, pushed beyond sustainable limits, became vulnerable to even
modest shocks that could in earlier days have been easily withstood.
Probably the greatest agreement among scholars, though, is that the
failing civilizations suffered from growing hubris and overconfidence:
the belief that their capabilities after many earlier tests would always
rise to the occasion and that growing signs of weakness could be
ignored as pessimistic. After all, after 200 or even 500 years, many
other dangers had been warned of yet always they had persevered. Until
finally they did not.
The bad news is that as I
read about these varied scenarios – and I have missed listing several
– they all appear plausible and each seems to be relevant to several
earlier collapses of empires and civilizations both large and small.
Very recently, one of these scholars, William Ophuls, wrote a new
book, Immoderate Greatness2 (a quote from Gibbons’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire), with the subtitle Why Civilizations Fail.
It is a straightforward summary and synthesis of all of the ways to
fail in 70 small pages, yet with extensive notes and references. It is
written in remarkably accessible, simple language and divides the causes
of failure into six categories. Unfortunately, all six seem to apply to
us today in varying degrees, and where one factor might be
manageable – although often has not been – he makes the chances of our
managing all six seem slight. It is persuasive and needs to be read. It
takes about two hours.
William Ophuls’s
conclusion is that we will not resist the impressive list of erosive
factors and that, in fact, we are in the fairly late stages of our
current civilization’s race for the cliff edge with nothing much to
head us off. His study of history leads him to believe that
civilizations are actually hard wired to self-destruct: programmed to be
overconfident, to keep on pushing for growth until limits are
overstepped and risks accumulated to the breaking point. His offer of
good news is that after the New Dark Ages, when civilization again rears
its head, presumably with a much smaller population, we will have
acquired the good sense to be less overreaching, less hubristic, a lot
humbler about growth and our use of resources, and more determined to
live in balance with the natural energy we receive from the sun and
the heat, food, and water with which we can sustainably be provided.
I have just two comments
about our current problems. First, that there is one particular
pressure this time that seems particularly serious: aversion to bad
news. The investment business has taught me – increasingly as the years
have passed – that people, especially investors (and, I believe,
Americans), prefer good news and wishful thinking to bad news; and that
there are always vested interests to offer facile, optimistic
alternatives to the bad news. The good news is obviously an easier
sell. Good news in investing in particular is better for business; good
news on resource limitation is better for the suppliers of resources;
and good news on climate change – that it basically does not exist and
is even a hoax – is better for energy companies, among the biggest
and most profitable of all companies. Historians have pointed out the bias against the need for change: there are always clear beneficiaries of the current state of affairs but the benefits of a changed world in contrast will look vague and uncertain to the likely beneficiaries. That
is always the case. What is less common, although not unique in
history, is what we have today: the near complete control of government
by the powerful beneficiaries of the current system.
The second point is that
although I find Ophuls’s argument well-reasoned and although I must
acknowledge the strong possibility of a very negative outcome, I feel it
is too pessimistic (which, sadly, is a rare occurrence for me on this
topic). Yes, we are taking extreme risks with resource depletion and
with the environment, especially concerning climate damage and ocean
acidification. Yet I believe the case for the near certainty of our
running off the cliff misses the existence of two extraordinarily
lucky (and, one could argue, undeserved) gifts that were not available
to any prior stressed civilization. They may arrive like the U.S.
Cavalry, just in time to turn us away from the cliff edge. But at best,
as Wellington is famously paraphrased as saying about the Battle of
Waterloo, it will be a “damn closely run thing.”3 It will be the race of our lives.
Our Last Best Hopes: Declining Fertility and Improving Technology for Renewable Energy
Declining Fertility
The first
of the two incredibly fortunate factors that might enable our current
world to avoid at least partial collapse is declining fertility.
Malthus correctly analyzed the main problem of our then history (in
1800): population had always kept up with food supply, leaving even
successful societies only a few bad growing seasons away from
starvation. He predicted that this would always be the case and he was
wrong on two counts. The first is a short-term factor – only existing
for 200 or 300 years and therefore irrelevant for the longer term of
our species – and that is the increased ability to extract previously
stored energy in the form of coal and oil. This hydrocarbon interlude
will end either when that share of hydrocarbons that can be extracted
economically is used up, or more likely when the tyranny of the second
law of thermodynamics imposes its will: enough of the higher forms of
convenient compact energy like coal and oil will have been converted
into heat, waste, and especially carbon dioxide to ruin our climate
in particular and our environment in general....
MORE