"China’s Economy: Cassandra vs. Pollyanna"—George Magnus
From the China Books Review, January 25:
Some analysts are performing an autopsy on the Chinese economy. Others say it has never had more potential for growth. Who will win in this cage fight of the economists?
The untimely passing
of Li Keqiang at age 68, in late October, marked the end of an era of
reform in China’s economy. Li was associated with that reform, but
delivered next to nothing to achieve it. Instead, he was sidelined as
Premier by Xi Jinping, and as a result a deeply troubled economy has
emerged, along with a malaise that is hanging over society and business.
This leaves us asking: what has gone wrong in China? And what, if
anything, can be done to put it right?
Throughout his career, Li was a leading advocate of economic reform,
favoring less regulatory red tape, restrictions on the role of the
government and greater use of market mechanisms. Prominent among
extensive reform proposals,
unveiled at the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November
2013, was the elevation of the role of markets in China from having a
“fundamental” to a “decisive” role in the allocation of resources.
Those reforms never saw the light of day. Following the Chinese
financial crisis of 2015-16 (in which the stock market tumbled, the yuan
came under significant pressure and China lost about $800 billion from
its international reserves), they were extinguished in the wake of an
increasingly state-centric and Party-oriented governance. The delayed
Third Plenum of the 20th Congress, expected later this year, could
illuminate the Party’s thinking about how it will address the nation’s
mounting economic headwinds — but there is no flag-carrier for liberal
reform anymore.
A deeply troubled economy has emerged, along with a malaise that is hanging over society and business.
It is against this backdrop that a debate over who killed the Chinese economy has raged in Foreign Affairs. Adam Posen, of the Peterson Institute, argued
that during the last few years, Xi Jinping’s Zero-Covid policies and
reversion to state control have stymied the confidence of private firms
and entrepreneurs, undermining the dynamism of China’s economy.
Responding, Zongyuan Zoe Liu of the Council for Foreign Relations, and
Michael Pettis of Peking University, argued that China’s economic
problems pre-dated Covid and Xi by a considerable margin. Xi inherited a
systemically flawed economic development model when he came to power,
they posit, along with stunted population growth and low productivity;
his failure was to exacerbate this by becoming reliant on
centralization, keeping the old dysfunctional model on the road.
These alternative versions of what went wrong are, in some ways,
mutually supportive. All analysts agree on the principal flaws and
problems in China’s economy, which I outlined in my book Red Flags
(2019). These include: excessive levels of debt in local government,
state enterprises and real estate; under-consumption; over-investment
and misallocation of capital; the consequences ofrapid aging
in demographics; weakness in productivity growth; a more controlling and
repressive governance; the subjugation of private firms and
entrepreneurs; and, most recently, commercial and business decoupling,
now rebranded as de-risking.
Yet the rival diagnoses of China’s weakening economy carry profoundly
different policy implications. If, as Posen argues, China’s economic
problems are attributable to recent policy errors made by Xi Jinping
(notably state intrusion into day-to-day commerce), then the treatment
is simple: Xi should simply back off, re-set, and encourage private
firms and entrepreneurs. Yet Posen is not optimistic that the autocrat
who caused China to catch “long economic Covid,” as he terms it, can
cure the disease.
Pettis retorts that this gets the causality backwards: the shift towards
greater control and repression is the result, not the cause, of China’s
faltering economy. While China was ripe for economic reform in the
mid-2000s, powerful constituencies and beneficiaries in its political
institutions persisted with a state model that gave rise to capital
misallocation, inefficiency and imbalances. Managing these systemic
problems, while trying to keep the political model intact, necessitated a
strengthening of the role of Party and government at the expense of
households and private firms. Pettis thinks Posen’s solution — to reduce
government intrusion — might have a marginal effect, but China’s model
really needs a total overhaul, involving extensive political as well as
economic reform. The chances of this happening on Xi’s watch are
essentially zero....
Sunset of the Economists Two decades ago, China’s reformist economists walked the halls of power and dictated policy. Now, they have been side-lined in favor of a new priority: national security. What happened?