"Could Taiwan Survive an EMP Attack by China?"

When the second round of hubbub about China's "landing barges" (we were part of the first round of lower-volume hubbub) flew around the internet, the realization began to dawn that these were a fake-out, the magician's misdirection move. "Look at this, not at that." Here's the New York Times, April Fools day, 2025:

China’s New Barges Could Make a Tough Task Easier: Invading Taiwan
The barges, which link up to form a bridge, could give China a way to land large numbers of vehicles and troops on Taiwan, solving a major logistical problem.

That's not an invasion machine, that's an "after-invasion" machine. A couple well-placed rockets and the thing tips over, dumping whatever is on-board into the sea. So it has to land in an area that is already secured.

From The Diplomat, May 7:

China’s electromagnetic pulse weapons are an increasing concern, but Taiwan remains underprepared for the threat.

In 2017, China began fielding an array of high-powered microwave (HPM) weapons that emit electromagnetic pulses (EMP) capable of disabling electronic systems. According to a RAND report, about 90 percent of HPM-related patents globally are owned by China-affiliated organizations, indicating continued advances in the precision and power of their HPM capabilities. These HPMs can be fitted onto land vehicles, aircraft, naval vessels, and cruise missiles. 

Additionally, China’s high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) – a nuclear warhead delivered with a missile that emits waves of EMPs when detonated above a target – arsenal is set to expand as China pursues an ambitious nuclear modernization program aimed at doubling its nuclear arsenal by 2035. 

Both HPMs and HEMPs are capable of disabling or destroying electronic equipment integrated into practically every sort of critical infrastructure, placing essential services such as water purification, hospitals, telecommunications, and transportation at risk of paralysis.

These advanced weapon systems have become a critical component of China’s “informatized” warfare strategy that guides its overall warfighting doctrine, according to the Science of Military Strategy, one of the Central Military Commission’s core strategic documents. Under this strategy, China seeks to dominate the cyber and electromagnetic domain by quickly disabling essential military and civilian electronic systems. 

When paired with major advances in China’s hypersonic cruise missiles capable of delivering EMP warheads, China will soon be able to disable large parts of Taiwan’s critical infrastructure, paving the way for further conventional attacks. Facing this threat, it is important to evaluate Taiwan’s existing resilience to EMP attacks and how current preparedness measures align with China’s capabilities.

Missile Defense

Taiwan fields a range of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems capable of intercepting HEMP and missile-borne HPMs. Taiwan currently deploys three types of indigenous SAMs: the Tien Kung 2, 3, and 4 (the older Tien Kung 1 is being decommissioned). Hundreds of Tien Kung 2 and 3 missiles are stationed mainly along the west coast and outlying islands.

The exact capabilities of these SAMs are classified, and estimates are conflicting. According to Open Nuclear Network and the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, the maximum range of both the Tien Kung 2 and 3 missiles is between 70 and 160 kilometers. Regarding the maximum interception altitude for the Tien Kung 3, this is placed at 30 kilometers by the Open Nuclear Network and at 45 kilometers by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology. The Tien Kung 4, which passed initial combat tests in 2023, is being integrated into Taiwan’s SAM network at an undisclosed pace and can reportedly intercept threats up to 70 km altitude.

Additionally, Taiwan currently fields an estimated 380 PAC-3 and 200 PAC-2 air defense missiles purchased from the United States in various configurations. It is estimated that the most advanced version of the PAC-3 has a range of 70 kilometers and a maximum interception altitude of 24 kilometers. Earlier this year, Taiwan signed a $761 million deal with the U.S. for a National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) defense package set for delivery in 2030. According to a U.S. Congressional report, NASAMS is reported to have a 40 kilometer range. Its maximum interception altitude is estimated to be 15 kilometers, according to the Global Security think tank.

Few of these SAMs can intercept HEMPs across the spectrum of effective altitudes that HEMPs would likely detonate at – between 20 and 50 kilometers, according to a U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency report. Additionally,  the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a large arsenal of maneuverable missile systems attached to multiple reentry vehicles and has been developing hypersonic cruise missiles, likely capable of carrying HPMs and HEMPs, that could overwhelm and evade Taiwan’s SAMs. Therefore, SAM systems are not a definitive defensive measure against HEMPs and missile-borne HPMs, and alternative resilience-building measures should be pursued.

Hardening

Taiwan’s military standard for electromagnetic hardening requires critical systems to withstand an EMP of at least 1 gigahertz in frequency and 80 decibels in intensity. This standard is borrowed from the U.S. Department of Defense regulation MIL-STD-188-125-1. This level of EMP protection primarily defends against the ultrawideband HEMP attacks, which are of a lower frequency than HPMs. Therefore, facilities designated as “hardened” under this regulation are still likely vulnerable to these higher-frequency attacks. 

The exact extent of hardening across military facilities is classified. According to open-source intelligence, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) has recently undertaken initiatives to harden certain critical military facilities. In 2023, the MND installed defensive measures at New Taipei City’s Sanzhi Naval Base to guard it against EMP attacks, including shielded rooms made of six-sided double-layer zinc-plated steel walls built to withstand the 1 gigahertz level EMP attacks. The Sanzhi Naval Base is affiliated with the Haifeng Brigade, an anti-ship missile unit set to incorporate Harpoon anti-ship missiles from the U.S. into their force, making it a critical unit for repelling a PLA amphibious assault. The Heng Shan Military Command Center, the Air Force Combatant Command, Chiashan Air Force Base, and the Shizishan facility at Chihhang Air Base are also reported to have installed EMP protection measures.

In the civilian sector, Taiwan’s Bureau of Standards, Metrology, and Inspection inspects over 1,065 electronic goods across all industries to ensure that they abide by the International Electro-technical Commission’s (IEC) EMP protection standards. The IEC advises that electronic devices should withstand electric fast transient and lightning-induced transient pulses, which are approximately 30 decibels strong. This level of protection is half that of the military standard of 80 decibels, so it would not defend well against high-intensity EMPs from either HEMPs or HPMs. 

Energy Grid Reform

As a highly modernized society, Taiwan relies deeply on electricity to sustain its critical infrastructures, including water supply, communications, healthcare, and transportation. Therefore, EMP strikes targeting the island’s energy generation and transmission systems could trigger widespread blackouts and system paralysis, severely undermining national stability. In response, Taiwan’s efforts to enhance grid resilience through energy grid reforms are crucial in mitigating the strategic risks of EMP attacks....

....MUCH MORE

Combine the EMP with the spies and fifth columnists already embedded into all sectors of Taiwanese government, military and industry there is a real chance that China wouldn't even have to invade, at least not in the form of a frontal assault, just cripple the society until it begs for mercy. 

Here's our post from the first round of internet concern regarding the monster machines, January 14, 2025:

"China building monster barges to overrun Taiwan’s shores"
Make them big enough and you have a mobile causeway.
(okay, maybe not 120 miles or whatever the Taiwan Strait is.)

Meanwhile China's outward-focused propaganda organ, Global Times, responds:

Foreign, Taiwan island media hype on alleged Chinese mainland construction of landing barges exposes anxiety over growing PLA capabilities: expert

This of course reminded me of something, in this case some other really big Chinese machines.

For some reason I found myself thinking of Admiral Zheng He and his Treasure Ships:

Scale models of Zheng He's ship compared to Columbus's vessel.

However, see also Cambridge's Dr. Sally Church: "Zheng He: An Investigation into the Plausibility of 450-ft Treasure Ships"