Highlighting by climateer investing.
From Asia Times, March 23:
Anti-sanctions law can stop Li Ka-shing fom selling Panama ports but it will hit many other Hong Kong firms
A media mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party has suggested using
China’s anti-sanctions mechanism to deal with Hong Kong tycoon Li
Ka-shing’s proposed selling of his global ports, including two at the
Panama Canal, to BlackRock.
In its latest article
titled “Stop the transaction, avoid losing a lot to save a little,” Ta
Kung Pao, a pro-Beijing newspaper, urges Li to scrap his ports deal.
Since its first attack on Li on March 13, the newspaper has published
more than 10 commentaries and news articles on the topic. While
previous ones called Li a “traitor” and an unpatriotic businessman, its
latest opinion piece mentions a concrete legal tool – the anti-sanctions
law – for the first time.
“Both at the national and Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region levels, our legal system is quite
complete,” writes Wan Yunping. (The name may be a pseudonym as the
author has no title and has not published any article before.)
“In
response to the United States and Western sanctions in recent years,
our country has accumulated rich experience in anti-sanctions and formed
an effective response mechanism,” Wan says. “Both the state and the SAR
have legal mechanisms to deal with so-called ‘legal transactions’ that
harm national interests.”
He says those who have stressed that Li’s proposed deal is a
“legitimate transaction” under the principle of freedom of contract are
“too naive and senile.”
“From the operational level of commercial
mergers and acquisitions, I advise relevant companies and individuals to
stop delivery, avoid miscalculations and avoid losing a lot to save a
little,” Wan says.
The author also says Li’s deal violates the principle of Hong Kong’s National Security Ordinance,
which states that “the highest principle of the policy of ‘one country,
two systems’ is to safeguard national sovereignty, security and
development interests.” The Legislative Council passed the ordinance,
drafted on the basis of Article 23 of the Basic Law, in March 2024.
“This transaction directly violates this highest principle as it will
hurt China’s national security and development interests,” he says.
“Violating the principle of the law is also a violation of the law.”
“Throughout
the legal system, not every legal provision directly states the
consequences of violation,” he adds. “However, the lack of written legal
consequences does not mean the law has no legal effect.”....
....MUCH MORE
The Chinese are going bust-up the Panama ports deal. It is one of their all-star choke point positioning plays.
If interested see: "Chinese
EV battery makers are building huge factories in Morocco to cash in on
U.S. electric vehicle subsidies" (and China is now camped at most of the
world's chokepoints)"
Here are a collection of previous post snippets addressing exactly these laws as they are playing out between Beijing, Hong Kong, and Panama under the January 2025 headline "DeepSeek and Chinese Security Laws: There Are No Secrets":
....Some years ago China implemented a series of laws that require Chinese
companies to work with the state security organs and not just in China
but around the world - universal jurisdiction.
Some of our posts from that time:
July 2019
"How the state runs business in China"
.... The author rather blithely skips over the National Security Law.
Here via China Law Translate:
There is not a lot of wiggle room in Article 7
Article 7: All organizations and citizens shall
support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts in
accordance with law, and shall protect national intelligence work
secrets they are aware of.
The State protects individuals and organizations that support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts.
All means all, including foreign companies operating in China.
Ditto articles 14:
Article 14: National intelligence work institutions
lawfully carrying out intelligence efforts may request that relevant
organs, organizations, and citizens provide necessary support,
assistance, and cooperation.
And 16:
Article 16: When national intelligence work
institutions staff lawfully perform their tasks in accordance with
relevant national provisions, with approvals and upon the presentation
of relevant identification, they may enter relevant restricted areas and
venues; may learn from and question relevant institutions,
organizations, and individuals; and may read or collect relevant files,
materials or items.
And then there's
The Cybersecurity Law
and the Foreign NGO Law (2016) and the Counter-espionage Law (2014)
and
all worded vaguely enough that the laws can mean whatever the Party and
the authorities want them to mean.****
July 2020 claiming universal jurisdiction for an ostensibly Hong Kong focused law:
....The law also applies to everyone everywhere in the world. This
means if one were to be seen by Beijing as breaking this new
legislation in another country and then enter Hong Kong, or transit
through it, or even fly in a vehicle registered in Hong Kong, then one
would be at risk. Possibly this could even apply to residing in a
country with an extradition treaty with Hong Kong (or one day China?). In short, it is a very large, sharp Sword of Damocles....
From The China Collection, June 30:
It’s not the substantive crimes and their definitions
that count; it’s the institutions that will investigate, prosecute, and
judge them that count. Language matters only if there are institutions
that will make it matter. This whole law is about avoiding the
involvement of such institutions.
Everyone is doing their hot take on the new Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (the “Nat Sec Law” or the “Law”) [Chinese | English], just revealed to the public and made effective today (consultation? schmonsultation!), so why not me?
Two things first:
- As these are just quick notes, I’m going to comment on the various
parts of the law pretty much in the order they appear instead of in a
more organized way.
- An important point: I’m not going to talk much about the substantive
offenses and their definitions. There’s a reason for that. If mainland
practice to date is any guide—and it is—then the definitions don’t
matter that much. Anything can be stretched as necessary to cover
something done by the person being targeted. As the old cliché goes,
欲加之罪何患无辞 (roughly, “if you are determined to convict, you needn’t worry
about the lack of grounds”). The key is in the institutions and
procedures the law establishes and empowers. Who has power to do what?
What are the procedures under which they operate? Who appoints and pays
for them? To whom are they responsible? Etc.
All right, let’s begin.
Article 2 begins with a weird provision stating that nobody may
violate the rules of Article 1 and Article 12 of the Hong Kong Basic
Law. But Article 1 and Article 12 of the Basic Law aren’t rules about
anything. Article 1 states a proposition, not a rule: “The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region is an inalienable part of the People’s
Republic of China.” How could one “violate” that statement? Article 12
is grammatically the same: ” The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
shall be a local administrative region of the People’s Republic of
China, which shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy and come directly
under the Central People’s Government.” Again, how does one “violate” a
proposition?
Article 4 says that Hong Kong should protect rights under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Given
the rest of the law, whether this will happen seems unlikely.
Article 5 states that all persons shall be considered innocent until
declared guilty by a judicial organ. As we shall see, this is
contradicted by the bail provisions in Article 42.
Article 6 says that protecting the country’s sovereignty, unity, and
territorial integrity is the common duty of all the people (renmin 人民) of China. This seems an odd formulation to me. Why not say all the citizens (gongmin
公民) of China? “People” in PRC officialese has a special meaning: it is a
subset of the citizenry, and consists of those who are allies of the
Communist Party at any given moment. It would be odd to say that
reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries, who are not part of the
people, get a pass on this duty.
Article 12 calls for the establishment of a Committee for
Safeguarding National Security (the “National Security Committee” or the
“Committee”), said to be under the supervision of and accountable to
the Central People’s Government (the “CPG”), i.e., the State Council and
the Premier.
It’s not quite clear how this accountability is to work in
practice, since the membership is prescribed by law: the Chief
Secretary for Administration, the Financial Secretary, the Secretary for
Justice, the Secretary for Security, the Commissioner of Police, the
head of the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong
Kong Police Force established under Article 16 of this Law (the “Nat Sec
Head”), the Director of Immigration, the Commissioner of Customs and
Excise, and the Director of the Chief Executive’s Office. (To understand
where all these fit within Hong Kong’s administrative structure, check
out this handy chart.
I’ll just note here that they are not all of equal rank. The Nat Sec
Head, for example, is under the Commissioner of Police, who is under the
Secretary for Security, who is under the Chief Secretary for
Administration.) The Committee is to be chaired by the Chief Executive.....MUCH MORE
Finally, more on that universal jurisdiction (tweet disappeared but she was right):
THREAD
Here's Bethany:
Head of China investigations @aspi_cts. Was @axios @foreignpolicy @yale
@HopkinsNanjing. Author BEIJING RULES, FT Best Books 2023. bethanyallen AT aspi org au
https://x.com/BethanyAllenEbr/