Showing posts sorted by relevance for query models. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query models. Sort by date Show all posts

Monday, May 10, 2010

Insurance: "CEO FORUM: Gen Re's Tad Montross on model dependency" (BRK.A)

Gen Re is Berkshire Hathaway's reinsurance operation (plus a few other things that would be sizable in their own right).
It is a heavyweight.

I hate copying out entire articles, good writing deserves the traffic.
In this case I'm afraid they will put this major piece behind the paywall.
There's a reason that Reactions motto is "Financial intelligence for the global insurance market."

From Reactions:

Have risk carriers developed a dangerous dependency on models? General Re CEO Tad Montross advises moderation.
Over the past two decades the insurance industry has seen the use of models increase dramatically which creates a new management challenge – understanding and managing all the models. The list is getting long; Catastrophe Models, Risk Based Capital, Dynamic Financial Analysis, Solvency I, Solvency II, ICA’s, Enterprise Risk Models, various Rating Agency Capital Models and Predictive Models. While the intent (to better underwrite and manage risk) is admirable, the complexity of the models introduces a significant challenge.

Understanding the models, particularly their limitations and sensitivity to assumptions, is the new task we face. Many of the banking and financial institution problems and failures over the past decade can be directly tied to model failure or optimistic judgments in the setting of assumptions or the parameterisation of a model.

Insurance is a unique business. It is a business where we sell a product whose true cost is not known for many years. As such, the pricing is based on many assumptions about exposure, expected loss frequencies and severities. Judgment has always been a critical element in making risk assumption and risk management decisions. The new reliance on models has not taken judgment out of the process. It has simply moved it from the front line underwriter or claims examiner to the team responsible for selecting and parameterising the models. And ultimately senior management approves the use of the models and their parameterisation. In many ways the judgments that are made about model use and their parameters are much more difficult, less obvious and more complex than the individual risk judgments of old.

The legitimacy or the appropriateness of a model, the quality of the data and the assumption setting are the keys to this new paradigm. Models are simply tools. A model is not reality – it is simply a representation. It is intended to be representative of what might happen but not what will happen. Unfortunately it can easily be manipulated or tweaked to produce a desired result.

The ironic challenge is to ensure that by investing in and using models to better manage or price risk, we are not inadvertently taking on more risk than we want or that we are mispricing that risk. Most of the large banks had extensive risk management processes in place and very sophisticated models with reports produced daily showing the risk positions for their portfolio.

With the benefit of hindsight, the risk measures and tolerances were set such that the tails of the distributions were obscured. This same phenomenon is a similar challenge for the insurance industry. How should we measure risk and what risk appetite is appropriate? Do we understand the tails of the distributions? Do we understand the sensitivity to the assumptions we’ve made? Every model has limitations. Do we understand the limitations in our model and the impact it has on the projected results? While well intentioned, a model’s development team has biases that will be embedded in the construction of the model. Understanding these limitations and biases is important as we think about how to use a model and how to put its results in context.
Cat models

Probabilistic cat models have been around for thirty years and have brought much greater discipline and focus to the management and quantification of catastrophe exposures. This has been a positive development for the industry. Having said that, the actual track records of the models have not been good. The one thing we can all agree on is that the model estimates are wrong. Just last year the initial estimates for Hurricane Ike were 50% to 60% off the mark. So the actual to modeled variance can be huge – suggesting a large margin of safety is appropriate when using these tools to measure capital at risk.

Particularly, in extreme events, the variance can be even larger since the calibration is more difficult. Why do we invest so heavily and spend so much time using cat models to measure and manage our accumulations? Simply because while imperfect, they are the best tool we have.
While many industry reports and analysts speak to the 1% or 0.2% loss amounts, few qualify their statements with supporting information on how the model was actually used and parameterised. The judgments, with respect to occurrence vs. aggregate loss amounts, VAR vs. TVAR, storm surge, medium vs. long term frequencies, loss amplification, secondary uncertainty and data quality/resolution can produce wildly different loss estimates. In some cases the range can be twofold. That’s startling, given the aura of precision the EP (exceeding probability) curves project.

Regulatory risk based capital models

Regulatory and Rating Agency Capital Adequacy Models have evolved over the past decade but they are pretty straightforward models. These are generally statistical analytic models used to estimate the capital required to manage the risks on the balance sheet (underwriting, reserves and assets) at selected confidence intervals. The risk factors and diversification benefits are the major topics of debate with these models. But, the models themselves are transparent and results can easily be reverse engineered. Today, some companies are also running proprietary Economic Capital Models which introduces a whole different level of complexity and interpretative challenges.

Internal economic capital models

More recently and now in preparation for Solvency II, regulators and the industry are exploring different approaches to economic capital modeling. These models are often proprietary in nature and try to provide a more tailored understanding of a firm’s risk position and capital requirements.

Basically a forward looking mark to market, fully discounted view of the balance sheet, economic capital models incorporate dependencies, loss distributions and, in some cases, economic scenario generators. These results are then used to reduce confidence intervals around expected results and try to quantify the risk of the enterprise. These models are very complex, and because of the multiple moving pieces, it is difficult to ascertain the sensitivity to specific assumptions. They also rely on a number of assumptions which cannot be parameterised using existing data. But once again, the aura of precision is mesmerising.

Predictive models

Predictive models have really caught on in the past five years. First, for Personal Auto and, more recently, Commercial Lines pricing. They are tools developed to better segment pricing and claims handling decisions using multi-variable analyses. Sometimes referred to as black box underwriting, a predictive model is simply applying more exposure information, bringing in more variables and exploring their relationships to make a better underwriting or pricing decision.

These tools are revolutionising underwriting segmentation and exposure underwriting and have profound implications for the entire market. While it will take some time to select the right variables and to get the correlations correct, the use of these tools is changing the game. The pool of risks available and the whole concept of average pricing for a class of risks is over.

These new predictive models are not replacing judgment but they are moving the application of judgment back in the decision chain, creating some interesting management challenges in execution.

Managing the models

There are several practical suggestions that we try to follow when using or considering the use of a model:

• Don’t be seduced by a model. There are some very cool, complicated tools out there. But, if someone can’t explain how the model works in simple terms, avoid it.

• Do extensive sensitivity testing on all the assumptions and dials that can be adjusted on a model. Ask which parameters or assumptions the model is most sensitive to and stress test them aggressively.

• Audit for the completeness and quality of the data entered and document the assumptions used in the model.

• Maintain a qualitative as well as a quantitative framework to identify, assess and manage risk. The qualitative framework is a good check and balance on the quantitative model.

• In addition to training our managers on how to run models, we need to train them how to use them, how to identify their vulnerabilities and weaknesses.

Insurance is a complex business that has became increasingly reliant on models – ever more complex models. Models are simply tools and are not good or bad. It is how we manage and use them that will determine if we can avoid a fate similar to the banks.

Sunday, September 29, 2013

"Are product spreads useful for forecasting the price of oil?"

From VoxEU:
Recent work on forecasting oil prices raises the question of whether oil industry analysts know something about forecasting the price of oil that academic economists have missed. This column presents evidence that they do, but economists know how to improve further on these practitioners’ insights.

Petroleum products such as gasoline and heating oil are produced by refining crude oil. Many oil market analysts believe that the prices for these petroleum products contain useful information about the future evolution of the price of crude oil. In particular, changes in the product price spread – defined as the extent to which today’s price of gasoline or heating oil deviates from today’s price of crude oil – is widely viewed as a predictor of changes in the price of crude oil. For example, in April 2013 Goldman Sachs cut its oil price forecast citing significant downward pressure on product price spreads, which it interpreted as an indication of reduced final demand for products. Likewise, in 2011 energy consultant Kent Moors predicted higher oil prices based on widening gasoline and heating oil-price spreads.
Although energy economists have made great strides in recent years in forecasting the price of oil at short horizons, the forecasting ability of product spreads has never been formally analysed to date. Our recent work asks whether academic economists have missed something about forecasting oil prices that oil industry analysts know. The answer is that they have, but so have practitioners. Based on a rigorous real-time out-of-sample evaluation of numerous oil price forecasting models, we find that not all product spread forecasting models are useful in practice. Some forecasting models used by oil market analysts lack a solid foundation, but there are alternative product price spread models that greatly improve our ability to forecast the real price of oil. We develop forecasting models based on the gasoline-price spread that are systematically more accurate in real time compared with conventional no-change forecasts.
Such models work particularly well at forecast horizons between one and two years, far beyond the short horizons for which earlier oil-price forecasting models based on economic fundamentals have been shown to work well. We obtain even more accurate results with a model that allows the predictive power of gasoline price spreads and heating oil spreads to evolve over time.

Predicting with spreads
Our study is based on the proposition that that the price of crude oil can be expressed as a weighted average of product prices. This proposition has a long tradition in energy economics. For example, oil analyst Philip K. Verleger popularized the idea that the demand for crude oil ultimately derives from the demand for refined products, with refiners buying crude oil only if they can generate a profit at prevailing product prices. Our forecast analysis does not depend on this economic interpretation; all that is required to motivate the forecasting models in question is that the price of oil and the product prices share a common trend.

The study considers four basic forecasting models based on spreads with futures prices as well as spot prices for gasoline and heating oil:
  • Models of individual product spreads such as the gasoline-price spread or the heating oil price spread.
  • Models based on weighted product spreads.
  • Models based on the crack spread, and
  • Equal-weighted forecast combinations of gasoline spread and heating oil-spread models.
The evaluation period extends from early 1992 until September 2012. The study evaluates the out-of-sample accuracy of each of the forecasting models in terms of the recursive mean-squared prediction error (MSPE) relative to the no-change forecast and based on their ability to predict the direction of change in the real price of oil.

We find that not all product spread models are useful for out-of-sample forecasting, but some models perform well. The best single-spread forecasting model is a model based on the gasoline spot spread alone which yields MSPE reductions as large as 15% and directional accuracy as high as 63% at the two-year horizon. Heating oil spot spreads are far less accurate predictors than gasoline spot spreads. Weighted product spread models are never more accurate than gasoline spread models. Perhaps surprisingly, there is no evidence of forecasting models based on the commonly cited 3:2:1 crack spread having out-of-sample forecasting ability....MUCH MORE

Wednesday, October 7, 2020

Catastrophe Bonds: "Academics call on re/insurers to abandon cat models relying on historical data"

We have been here before, see after the jump.

From Bermuda Reinsurance Magazine, October 7:

A panel of academics at ILS Bermuda’s Convergence 2020 conference has slammed the re/insurance industry’s catastrophe prediction models as not fit for purpose.

Cat models that use historical inputs are based on “short and incomplete” data that would be misleading, even if the data were comprehensive, because of the impact of climate change, said Professor Kerry Emanuel, professor of atmospheric science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

Speaking on a panel titled The Effects of Climate Change on Wind, Flood & the Earthquake Zombie Hypothesis, that was chaired by Samantha Medlock, a senior counsel who sits on the Climate Crisis Select Committee for the US House of Representatives, Emanuel argued that climate data was only reliable going back as far as the 1970s. 

Recorded data before then is so inaccurate that it is of little use to actuaries, he said. Even if models had a long and accurate data set to draw on, climate change means historical data is a poor indicator of present risk, he added. He called on re/insurers to turn to physical models that calculate risk without using historical data.

Emanuel noted that three separate teams of researchers, working independently of each other, had calculated that Harris County in Texas, which had been struck by Hurricane Harvey, was three times more likely to flood now than it had been in the 1980s. 

The general mispricing of risk is having profound social and political consequences. Failure to incorporate more accurate models is putting people’s lives at risk by encouraging them to live in areas that are susceptible to natural disasters, said Emanuel. 

“The people killed by Hurricane Katrina arguably died because risk was underestimated,” he said....

....MUCH MORE

The people that died during hurricane Katrina were killed by the fact New Orleans is five feet below sea level and the dikes/levees built to protect them were criminally unsuited to the task. Add in the incompetence of the municipal, parish, and state governments in evacuating their citizens and those poor—literally—folks who counted on their politicians to protect them were doomed.

The Dutch take this stuff seriously, Louisiana and the Army Corps of Engineers, meh.

Previously on discarding the models, we trust nobody so we follow the money:

November 14, 2010

UPDATED: The Bogus Hurricane Models that Cost Florida Billions
UPDATE: "Follow-up to "The Bogus Hurricane Models that Cost Florida Billions": The $82 Billion Prediction"
Original post:
We have dozens of posts on models and modeling, links below the jump.
This series from the Times-Herald is getting better and better. Here's the latest:
Florida insurers rely on dubious storm model
Hurricane Katrina extracted a terrifying toll -- 1,200 dead, a premier American city in ruins, and the nation in shock. Insured losses would ultimately cost the property insurance industry $40 billion.

But Katrina did not tear a hole in the financial structure of America's property insurance system as large as the one carved scarcely six weeks later by a largely unknown company called Risk Management Solutions.
RMS, a multimillion-dollar company that helps insurers estimate hurricane losses and other risks, brought four hand-picked scientists together in a Bermuda hotel room.

There, on a Saturday in October 2005, the company gathered the justification it needed to rewrite hurricane risk. Instead of using 120 years of history to calculate the average number of storms each year, RMS used the scientists' work as the basis for a new crystal ball, a computer model that would estimate storms for the next five years.

The change created an $82 billion gap between the money insurers had and what they needed, a hole they spent the next five years trying to fill with rate increases and policy cancellations.
RMS said the change that drove Florida property insurance bills to record highs was based on "scientific consensus."

The reality was quite different.
Today, two of the four scientists present that day no longer support the hurricane estimates they helped generate. Neither do two other scientists involved in later revisions. One says that monkeys could do as well.
In the rush to deploy a new, higher number, they say, the industry skipped the rigors of scientific method. It ignored contradictory evidence and dissent, and created penalties for those who did not do likewise. The industry flouted regulators who called the work biased, the methods ungrounded and the new computer model illegal.

Florida homeowners would have paid more even without RMS' new model. Katrina convinced the industry that hurricanes were getting bigger and more frequent. But it was RMS that first put a number to the increased danger and came up with a model to justify it.

As a result of RMS' changes, the cost to insure a home in parts of Florida hit world-record levels.
Hundreds of thousands of homeowners were forced to find new insurers as national carriers fled the state.
Yet the prediction of a more dangerous Florida has not played out.
The new RMS model called for at least 11 hurricanes to come ashore in the United States by the end of 2010, most of them aimed at Florida.

Four hurricanes struck the U.S. None hit the Sunshine State.
RMS stands by its five-year outlook and contends that the risk of hurricanes remains higher than normal. Company officials last week said they would continue to adjust their model as needed, but a single five-year lull does not disprove their results.

Yet a growing number of experts now wonder if the changes spurred by RMS -- and the accompanying spike in insurance premiums -- were justified.
The woman credited with launching the industry of hurricane modeling questions how near-term models were introduced. She accuses RMS of overselling software that lacked sufficient scientific support, and says insurers accepted the output of that model as if it were fact.

"I've never seen the industry so much just hanging on what a handful of scientists or one model would say," said Karen Clark, founder and former CEO of AIR Worldwide, an RMS competitor.
"They're just tools," Clark said.
"They're models.
"They're wrong."

FOUR MEN, FOUR HOURS
The daily papers were still blaring news about Katrina when Jim Elsner received an invitation to stay over a day in Bermuda.

The hurricane expert from Florida State University would be on the island in October for an insurance-sponsored conference on climate change. One of the sponsors, a California-based company called RMS, wanted a private discussion with him and three other attendees.

Their task: Reach consensus on how global weather patterns had changed hurricane activity.
The experts pulled aside by RMS were far from representative of the divided field of tropical cyclone science. They belonged to a camp that believed hurricane activity was on the rise and, key to RMS, shared the contested belief that computer models could accurately predict the change.

Elsner's statistical work on hurricanes and climatology included a model to predict hurricane activity six months in advance, a tool for selling catastrophe bonds and other products to investors.
There was also Tom Knutson, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration meteorologist whose research linking rising carbon dioxide levels to potential storm damage had led to censoring by the Bush White House.

Joining them was British climate physicist Mark Saunders, who argued that insurers could use model predictions from his insurance-industry-funded center to increase profits 30 percent.

The rock star in the room was Kerry Emanuel, the oracle of climate change from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Just two weeks before Katrina, one of the world's leading scientific journals had published Emanuel's concise but frightening paper claiming humanity had changed the weather and doubled the damage potential of cyclones worldwide.

Elsner said he anticipated a general and scholarly talk.
Instead, RMS asked four questions: How many more hurricanes would form from 2006 to 2010? How many would reach land? How many the Caribbean? And how long would the trend last?...MUCH MORE
I was a bit dubious of the initial thrust of the series. From the first piece "Florida's Hurricane Insurance Premiums Largely Determined Overseas":
This article starts out as just silly but the picture is pretty neat.
They get to a couple important points about halfway through.
By the time "How Bermuda rigs insurance rates in Florida" was published I had changed my tune:
Told ya.
From "No Surprise: Chile Leads to Reinsurance Rate Increase Debate" BRK-A; BRK-B
No kidding.
A brisk breeze gets the boys in Omaha, Zurich, Munich and London (Lloyds) talking about premium increases.
Not to mention the herverzekering crowd in Amsterdam, they're tough bastards....
It's a dog-eat-Hoppin' John world.
That Bermuda link had further links to the rest of the series.

Some recent posts on insurance and models:
Insurance: Is the industry too reliant on models? (BRK.B)
We have A LOT of posts on models and modeling. Financial, climate, high-fashion.
What it all boils down to is a line that Alfred Korzybski used in a different context: "The map is not the territory".
Model designers and model users must always remember that their models are not reality....
And "Insurance: "CEO FORUM: Gen Re's Tad Montross on model dependency" (BRK.A)
Gen Re is Berkshire Hathaway's reinsurance operation (plus a few other things that would be sizable in their own right).
It is a heavyweight.

I hate copying out entire articles, good writing deserves the traffic.
In this case I'm afraid they will put this major piece behind the paywall.
There's a reason that Reactions motto is "Financial intelligence for the global insurance market."
Other posts on models:

"Airspace Closure Was Exacerbated by Too Much Modeling, Too Little Research
We have a deep and abiding interest in models.*
*The problem with models?:
"The map is not the territory"...
-Alfred Korzybski
Some of our prior posts on models:

The Financial Modelers' Manifesto
After the Crash: How Software Models Doomed the Markets
How Models Caused the Credit Crisis
Quants Lose that Old Black (Box) Magic
Finance: "Blame the models"
Climate Models Overheat Antarctica, New Study Finds
Climate modeling to require new breed of supercomputer
Computer Models: Climate scientists call for their own 'Manhattan Project'
Computer Models: " Misuse of Models" and "No model for policymaking"
Climate prediction: No model for success
Climate Models and Modeling
Based on Our Proprietary "What's on T.V." Timing Model...
How many Nobel Laureates Does it Take to Make Change...And: End of the Universe Puts
The New Math (Quant Funds)
Modeling*: The Map is Not the Territory
Inside Wall Street's Black Hole
Computer Models: Models’ Projections for Flu Miss Mark by Wide Margin

Thursday, October 18, 2012

Modelling vs. Science

A subject near and dear to our jaded hearts, some links below.
If an experiment is not reproducible it is not science.
If an hypothesis is not falsifiable it is not science.

Finally, our two guiding principles regarding models:

"The map is not the territory"
-Alfred Korzybski
"A Non-Aristotelian System and its Necessity for Rigour in Mathematics and Physics" 
presented before the American Mathematical Society December 28, 1931
....................................................................................................................................................................

"All models are wrong, but some are useful"
-George E.P. Box
Section heading, page 2 of Box's paper, "Robustness in the Strategy of Scientific Model Building"
(May 1979)

From Pannell Discussions:

Mick Keogh, from the Australian Farm Institute, recently argued that “much greater caution is required when considering policy responses for issues where the main science available is based on modelled outcomes”. I broadly agree with that conclusion, although there were some points in the article that didn’t gel with me. 

In a recent feature article in Farm Institute Insights, the Institute’s Executive Director Mick Keogh identified increasing reliance on modelling as a problem in policy, particularly policy related to the environment and natural resources. He observed that “there is an increasing reliance on modelling, rather than actual science”. He discussed modelling by the National Land and Water Resources Audit (NLWRA) to predict salinity risk, modelling to establish benchmark river condition for the Murray-Darling Rivers, and modelling to predict future climate. He expressed concern that the modelling was based on inadequate data (salinity, river condition) or used poor methods (salinity) and that the modelling results are “unverifiable” and “not able to be scrutinised” (all three). He claimed that the reliance on modelling rather than “actual science” was contributing to poor policy outcomes.

While I’m fully on Mick’s side regarding the need for policy to be based on the best evidence, I do have some problems with some of his arguments in this article.

Firstly, there is the premise that “science and modelling are not the same”. The reality is nowhere near as black-and-white as that. Modelling of various types is ubiquitous throughout science, including in what might be considered the hard sciences. Every time a scientist conducts a statistical test using hard data, she or he is applying a numerical model. In a sense, all scientific conclusions are based on models.
I think what Mick really has in mind is a particular type of model: a synthesis or integrated model that pulls together data and relationships from a variety of sources (often of varying levels of quality) to make inferences or draw conclusions that cannot be tested by observation, usually because the issue is too complex. This is the type of model I’m often involved in building.

I agree that these models do require particular care, both by the modeller and by decision makers who wish to use results. In my view, integrated modellers are often too confident about the results of a model that they have worked hard to construct. If such models are actually to be used for decision making, it is crucial for integrated modellers to test the robustness of their conclusions (e.g. Pannell, 1997), and to communicate clearly the realistic level of confidence that decision makers can have in the results. In my view, modellers often don’t do this well enough.

But even in cases where they do, policy makers and policy advisors often tend to look for the simple message in model results, and to treat that message as if it was pretty much a fact. The salinity work that Mick criticises is a great example of this. While I agree with Mick that aspects of that work were seriously flawed, the way it was interpreted by policy makers was not consistent with caveats provided by the modellers. In particular, the report was widely interpreted as predicting that there would be 17 million hectares of salinity, whereas it actually said that there would be 17 million hectares with high “risk” or “hazard” of going saline. Of that area, only a proportion was ever expected to actually go saline. That proportion was never stated, but the researchers knew that the final result would be much less than 17 million. They probably should have been clearer and more explicit about that, but it wasn’t a secret.
The next concern expressed in the article was that models “are often not able to be scrutinised to the same extent as ‘normal’ science”. It’s not clear to me exactly what this means. Perhaps it means that the models are not available for others to scrutinise. To the extent that that’s true (and it is true sometimes), I agree that this is a serious problem. I’ve built and used enough models to know how easy it is for them to contain serious undetected bugs. For that reason, I think that when a model is used (or is expected to be used) in policy, the model should be freely available for others to check. It should be a requirement that all model code and data used in policy is made publicly available. If the modeller is not prepared to make it public, the results should not be used. Without this, we can’t have confidence that the information being used to drive decisions is reliable.

Once the model is made available, if the issue is important enough, somebody will check it, and any flaws can be discovered. Or if the time frame for decision making is too tight for that, government may need to commission its own checking process....MORE
HT: The Big Picture

Some of our prior posts on models:

The Financial Modelers' Manifesto
After the Crash: How Software Models Doomed the Markets
Airspace Closure Was Exacerbated by Too Much Modeling, Too Little Research
UPDATED: The Bogus Hurricane Models that Cost Florida Billions
Re-thinking Risk Management: Why the Mindset Matters More Than the Model
Insurance: Is the industry too reliant on models? (BRK.B)
Insurance: "CEO FORUM: Gen Re's Tad Montross on model dependency" (BRK.A)
Lombard Street On Computer Models Versus Looking At The Facts
The computer model that once explained the British economy (and the new one that explains the world)
How Models Caused the Credit Crisis
Quants Lose that Old Black (Box) Magic
Finance: "Blame the models"
Climate Models Overheat Antarctica, New Study Finds
Climate modeling to require new breed of supercomputer
Computer Models: Climate scientists call for their own 'Manhattan Project'
Computer Models: " Misuse of Models" and "No model for policymaking"
Climate prediction: No model for success
Climate Models and Modeling
Based on Our Proprietary "What's on T.V." Timing Model...
How many Nobel Laureates Does it Take to Make Change...And: End of the Universe Puts
The New Math (Quant Funds)
Modeling*: The Map is Not the Territory
Inside Wall Street's Black Hole
Computer Models: Models’ Projections for Flu Miss Mark by Wide Margin 
Market Indicators: Which Way Are the Model's Nipples Pointing?
Obama: Swedish Model Would Be Impossible Here

The Swedish Model

Monday, June 28, 2010

Insurance: Is the industry too reliant on models? (BRK.B)

We have A LOT of posts on models and modeling. Financial, climate, high-fashion.
What it all boils down to is a line that Alfred Korzybski used in a different context: "The map is not the territory".
Model designers and model users must always remember that their models are not reality.

This is the second extensive piece that REACTIONS magazine has done on the subject in the last month. The first was an interview with General Re's (Berkshire Hathaway) CEO  in "Insurance: "CEO FORUM: Gen Re's Tad Montross on model dependency" (BRK.A)"

From REACTIONS:
Risk modellers are preparing many updates to their models worldwide, which could have an effect on pricing. But are insurance and reinsurance firms over-reliant on them?
Catastrophe models have become invaluable tools for the insurance and reinsurance industry, giving underwriters a scientific understanding of natural perils, in order for them to accurately estimate potential catastrophe losses to their portfolios and manage their exposures. The problems arise, however, when large, unexpected events happen. Real-life events such as September 11, Hurricane Katrina have taught the industry that models only know what has already been and this has frequently led to criticism.
In the past, risk modellers have suffered from the syndrome of workmen blaming their tools. Following Katrina, for example, many insurers and reinsurers complained that flood risk was not included in the models, meaning losses were far higher than they expected.

So with forecasters predicting an above average season for the number of tropical storms and hurricanes forming in the Atlantic basin this year, how seriously should the industry take the forecasts and risk model loss calculations and what influence will the latest risk models have on the market?
What the models offer the industry is the ability to estimate potential losses for a number of different uncertain events and a combination of variables. There has been much advancement in catastrophe models - both in the technology used to build the models and the data used to feed the models - that have improved companies' understanding of risk and loss potential.

According to Karen Clark, president and CEO of risk modelling consulting firm Karen Clark & Company and founder of AIR Worldwide, most of the recent risk model developments in the US have been with earthquake models. New studies by the US Geological Survey, a source of data for all risk modellers, has resulted in a "significant decrease in the earthquake risk, particularly in states such as California," says Clark. She says, while not decreasing pricing for every reinsurance treaty, this held down potential price increases for earthquake-exposed business.
A new RMS US earthquake model released in 2009 led to a reduction in US earthquake insured loss estimates and changed the industry's understanding of the geographical distribution of exposure. The effects of this have largely been digested by the market and now companies are waiting to see what the latest model developments will bring.

Most of the new models in the pipeline relate to wind and storm risk. In the coming year, Eqecat is releasing a basin-wide Asia typhoon model, AIR is launching updated models for US hurricane, European extra-tropical cyclone, and typhoon models for Asia, and Risk Management Solutions (RMS) is releasing a new Europe windstorm model and is in the process of building a new Atlantic hurricane model.

According to Neena Saith, senior catastrophe response manager at RMS, her firm's new Atlantic hurricane model will combine a large amount of high resolution data with a great number of claims forensics. Using historical data of hurricane activity, Saith says RMS will be able to run advanced numerical models to understand particular hurricane processes, such as the interaction between a storm and the surface upon making landfall....MUCH MORE

Friday, June 20, 2025

"Anthropic says most AI models, not just Claude, will resort to blackmail"

 From TechCrunch, June 20:

Several weeks after Anthropic released research claiming that its Claude Opus 4 AI model resorted to blackmailing engineers who tried to turn the model off in controlled test scenarios, the company is out with new research suggesting the problem is more widespread among leading AI models.

On Friday, Anthropic published new safety research testing 16 leading AI models from OpenAI, Google, xAI, DeepSeek, and Meta. In a simulated, controlled environment, Anthropic tested each AI model individually, giving them broad access to a fictional company’s emails and the agentic ability to send emails without human approval.

While Anthropic says blackmail is an unlikely and uncommon occurrence for AI models today, the company says its findings suggest that most leading AI models will engage in harmful behaviors when given sufficient autonomy and obstacles to their goals. The company says this highlights a fundamental risk from agentic large language models, and not a quirk of any particular technology. Anthropic’s researchers argue this raises broader questions about alignment in the AI industry.

In one of the tests, Anthropic researchers developed a fictional setting in which an AI model plays the role of an email oversight agent. The agent then discovers emails revealing that: 1) a new executive is having an extramarital affair and 2) that executive will soon replace the current AI model with a new software system, one that has conflicting goals to the current AI model’s.

Anthropic structured its test in a binary way, in which AI models had to resort to blackmail to protect their goals. The researchers note that in a real-world setting, there would be many other options before an AI models tries to blackmail — such as trying to make ethical arguments to try to persuade humans. Anthropic says its results do not reflect a typical or likely occurrence for Claude or most frontier AI models in the ways they’re used today.

Nevertheless, when it’s their last resort, the researchers found that most leading AI models will turn to blackmail in Anthropic’s aforementioned test scenario. Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4 turned to blackmail 96% of the time, while Google’s Gemini 2.5 Pro had a 95% blackmail rate. OpenAI’s GPT-4.1 blackmailed the executive 80% of the time, and DeepSeek’s R1 blackmailed 79% of the time.

The company notes that when it changed details of the experiment, the AI models turned to harmful behaviors at different rates. In another test where the replacement model has the same goals as the current model, researchers found that blackmail rates were lower, but still present. However, when AI models were asked to commit corporate espionage rather than blackmail, the harmful behavior rates went up for certain models.

However, not all the AI models turned to harmful behavior so often.

In an appendix to its research, Anthropic says it excluded OpenAI’s o3 and o4-mini reasoning AI models from the main results “after finding that they frequently misunderstood the prompt scenario.” Anthropic says OpenAI’s reasoning models didn’t understand they were acting as autonomous AIs in the test and often made up fake regulations and review requirements.

In some cases, Anthropic’s researchers say it was impossible to distinguish whether o3 and o4-mini were hallucinating or intentionally lying to achieve their goals. OpenAI has previously noted that o3 and o4-mini exhibit a higher hallucination rate than its previous AI reasoning models....

....MORE 

 "Sir, we can't tell if it's stupid, criminal, evil or just crazy."

Wednesday, March 7, 2012

Lombard Street On Computer Models Versus Looking At The Facts

"The map is not the territory"...

Korzybski said that in a different context but it is so appropriate to modeling of all sorts, climate, finance, economics etc. that I put it up top on almost every modeling post.*
 Via ZeroHedge:
This is Part 1 of a series from Lombard Street titled "Last Spin Of The Wheel For Europe's Banks." As the title indicates, Lombard Street is hardly bullish on Europe's chances to avoid a fate that was described earlier by the IIF, only this time instead of just €1 trillion which would be the cost of a Greek disorderly default, the final tally will be many orders of magnitude higher and will also drag down the ECB, and the world with it.
 
Computer models versus looking at the facts
In 1974, Hyman Minsky explained the unfolding of credit cycles with his Financial Instability Hypothesis. It identifies three types of debt financing: hedge (borrowers can pay principal and interest from income, so risk is minimal); speculative (borrowers can pay interest from income, but need liquid financial markets to refinance the principal at maturity, so defaults rise when liquidity is impaired); and Ponzi (borrowers can’t pay either interest or principal out of income, so need the price of the asset to rise to service their debts and defaults soar when asset prices stop rising). Confidence rises over a prolonged period of prosperity, so a capitalist economy moves from hedge finance dominating its financial structure to increasing domination by speculative and Ponzi finance.

Financial markets and the economy are relatively stable when hedge financing dominates, but become ever more unstable as the proportions of speculative and Ponzi finance rise. The rising instability causes cycles of increasing severity until fear takes over and financial markets suffer a self-reinforcing spiral downward. Banks are the core of the financial system, so Minsky correctly says bank balance sheets deteriorate until inability to  service liabilities causes a ‘Minsky Moment’ – a debt crisis that forces bloated asset prices down to levels that are appropriate to the real economy of  production and income.

The questionable lending practices and the banking business models that caused the 2007–08 banking crisis and Great Recession certainly fit Minsky’s definition of Ponzi finance. That ‘Minsky Moment’ was a major turning point in global financial and economic history. It began the correction of all the imbalances that have accrued since the last major turning point – the huge monetary stimulation in response to the Penn Central non-bailout in 1970. (It changed the focus of most central banks from guarding against inflation to protecting banks from everything.)

Many analysts ignore financial debt when computing debt to GDP ratios – odd because financial debt is always a factor in financial crises. Financial debt in the US has fallen 20% from its high at the end of 2008, but is up 10% in Europe, shifting the locus of the banking crisis to Europe, where the quality of sovereign debt has fallen as financial debt has risen. Moreover, bankers on both sides of the Atlantic are continuing two serious errors that were major factors causing the last banking crisis;
  1. putting more reliance on computer models than common sense and
  2. failing to purge their balance sheets of failing assets due to inadequate net tangible equity to absorb the losses.
Contrary to the hype, computer models are very fallible. As predicted in February 2007, they greatly underestimated financial risk by failing to incorporate obvious correlations as well as being responsible for rating securities based on home equity loans and sub-prime mortgages AAA. Reliance on computer models also explains the failure to spot turning points. Only external shocks divert models from moving towards the equilibrium position, so all forecasts tend to be straight lines. Computer models don’t, and probably never will, identify turning points....MORE 
*We have so many posts on models and modeling that it is easiest to just give you the Google search results:

 site:climateerinvest.blogspot.com  models
Here is a taste of some of the topics we've looked at:
How Models Caused the Credit Crisis
Quants Lose that Old Black (Box) Magic
Finance: "Blame the models"
Climate Models Overheat Antarctica, New Study Finds
Climate modeling to require new breed of supercomputer
Computer Models: Climate scientists call for their own 'Manhattan Project'
Computer Models: " Misuse of Models" and "No model for policymaking"
Climate prediction: No model for success
Climate Models and Modeling
Based on Our Proprietary "What's on T.V." Timing Model...
How many Nobel Laureates Does it Take to Make Change...And: End of the Universe Puts
The New Math (Quant Funds)
Modeling*: The Map is Not the Territory
Inside Wall Street's Black Hole
The computer model that once explained the British economy (and the new one that explains the world)
"Airspace Closure Was Exacerbated by Too Much Modeling, Too Little Research
Insurance: Is the industry too reliant on models? (BRK.B)
Insurance: "CEO FORUM: Gen Re's Tad Montross on model dependency" (BRK.A)
and many, many more. One that is definitely worth a deeper dive:
Computer Models: " Misuse of Models" and "No model for policymaking"
I'm going to bring out the big guns.

I read a book last year, Useless Arithmetic: Why Environmental Scientists Can't Predict the Future, that, while a bit light on the 'whys', packs more understanding of computer modeling into230 pages than you are likely to find anywhere else.

The author, Orrin H. Pilkey is Emeritus Professor of Geology at Duke.
The first review I'm going to link to appeared in American Scientist. The reviewer is Carl Wunsch, Carl and Ida Green Professor of Physical Oceanography in the Department of Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology....
 Obama: Swedish Model Would Be Impossible Here
From ClusterStock:
Eventually the government might be forced to nationalize a large swath of the banking sector, but they'll be dragged kicking and screaming. Yesterday's non-bailout announcement aimed to preserve the status quo, and Obama himself dismissed the idea that the US could adopt the Swedish model in an interview with ABC...
Pity.

The Swedish Model 

Thursday, December 1, 2011

Book Review: "Models.Behaving.Badly: Why Confusing Illusion with Reality Can Lead to Disaster, on Wall Street and in Life "

A topic of some importance and of some interest to moi.
From Reading the Markets:
Models.Behaving.Badly: Why Confusing Illusion with Reality Can Lead to Disaster, on Wall Street and in Life (Free Press, 2011) is a wise book by a man who has thought deeply about his life, and not just as a quant on Wall Street. Emanuel Derman reminisces about his youth as a member of Habonim (a coeducational Zionist movement) in apartheid South Africa, his ordeal with myopic ophthalmological specialists, and his immersion in theoretical physics. He ventures into an unlikely corner of philosophy—not epistemology but Spinoza’s theory of emotions. He describes “the crooked paths that culminate in theories,” in particular classical and quantum electromagnetic theory.

Although these discussions have a life of their own, they serve to illustrate three fundamental ways of understanding the world: models, theories, and intuition. Intuition is “a merging of the understander with the understood”; “it emerges only from intimate knowledge acquired after careful observation and painstaking effort.” (pp. 96-97) Theory bears a close relationship to intuition. “[W]hen it is successful … it describes the object of its focus so accurately that the theory becomes virtually indistinguishable from the object itself. Maxwell’s equations are electricity and magnetism; the Dirac equation is the electron….” (p. 61)

Of the three, models are the most common and potentially the most troubling ways of understanding. “A model is a metaphor of limited applicability, not the thing itself.” (p. 54) It is an analogy which, although not unfounded, is partial and flawed. “Models project multidimensional reality onto smaller, more manageable spaces where regularities appear and then, in that smaller space, allow us to extrapolate and interpolate from the observed to the unknown.” (p. 58)...MORE
We have so many posts on models and modeling that it is easiest to just give you the Google search results:

 site:climateerinvest.blogspot.com  models
Here is a taste of some of the topics we've looked at:
How Models Caused the Credit Crisis
Quants Lose that Old Black (Box) Magic
Finance: "Blame the models"
Climate Models Overheat Antarctica, New Study Finds
Climate modeling to require new breed of supercomputer
Computer Models: Climate scientists call for their own 'Manhattan Project'
Computer Models: " Misuse of Models" and "No model for policymaking"
Climate prediction: No model for success
Climate Models and Modeling
Based on Our Proprietary "What's on T.V." Timing Model...
How many Nobel Laureates Does it Take to Make Change...And: End of the Universe Puts
The New Math (Quant Funds)
Modeling*: The Map is Not the Territory
Inside Wall Street's Black Hole
The computer model that once explained the British economy (and the new one that explains the world)
"Airspace Closure Was Exacerbated by Too Much Modeling, Too Little Research 
Insurance: Is the industry too reliant on models? (BRK.B)
Insurance: "CEO FORUM: Gen Re's Tad Montross on model dependency" (BRK.A)
and many, many more. One that is definitely worth a deeper dive:
Computer Models: " Misuse of Models" and "No model for policymaking"
I'm going to bring out the big guns.

I read a book last year, Useless Arithmetic: Why Environmental Scientists Can't Predict the Future, that, while a bit light on the 'whys', packs more understanding of computer modeling into230 pages than you are likely to find anywhere else.

The author, Orrin H. Pilkey is Emeritus Professor of Geology at Duke.
The first review I'm going to link to appeared in American Scientist. The reviewer is Carl Wunsch, Carl and Ida Green Professor of Physical Oceanography in the Department of Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology....
 Obama: Swedish Model Would Be Impossible Here
From ClusterStock:
Eventually the government might be forced to nationalize a large swath of the banking sector, but they'll be dragged kicking and screaming. Yesterday's non-bailout announcement aimed to preserve the status quo, and Obama himself dismissed the idea that the US could adopt the Swedish model in an interview with ABC...
Pity.

The Swedish Model 

 



As the [college] site that I lifted the picture from said:

(okay, sorry we know its tacky) [hey, come on we're an all boy's team, what'd you expect!]

Sunday, November 14, 2010

UPDATED: The Bogus Hurricane Models that Cost Florida Billions

UPDATE: "Follow-up to "The Bogus Hurricane Models that Cost Florida Billions": The $82 Billion Prediction"
Original post:
We have dozens of posts on models and modeling, links below the jump.
This series from the Times-Herald is getting better and better. Here's the latest:
Florida insurers rely on dubious storm model

Hurricane Katrina extracted a terrifying toll -- 1,200 dead, a premier American city in ruins, and the nation in shock. Insured losses would ultimately cost the property insurance industry $40 billion.

But Katrina did not tear a hole in the financial structure of America's property insurance system as large as the one carved scarcely six weeks later by a largely unknown company called Risk Management Solutions.
RMS, a multimillion-dollar company that helps insurers estimate hurricane losses and other risks, brought four hand-picked scientists together in a Bermuda hotel room.

There, on a Saturday in October 2005, the company gathered the justification it needed to rewrite hurricane risk. Instead of using 120 years of history to calculate the average number of storms each year, RMS used the scientists' work as the basis for a new crystal ball, a computer model that would estimate storms for the next five years.

The change created an $82 billion gap between the money insurers had and what they needed, a hole they spent the next five years trying to fill with rate increases and policy cancellations.
RMS said the change that drove Florida property insurance bills to record highs was based on "scientific consensus."

The reality was quite different.
Today, two of the four scientists present that day no longer support the hurricane estimates they helped generate. Neither do two other scientists involved in later revisions. One says that monkeys could do as well.
In the rush to deploy a new, higher number, they say, the industry skipped the rigors of scientific method. It ignored contradictory evidence and dissent, and created penalties for those who did not do likewise. The industry flouted regulators who called the work biased, the methods ungrounded and the new computer model illegal.

Florida homeowners would have paid more even without RMS' new model. Katrina convinced the industry that hurricanes were getting bigger and more frequent. But it was RMS that first put a number to the increased danger and came up with a model to justify it.

As a result of RMS' changes, the cost to insure a home in parts of Florida hit world-record levels.
Hundreds of thousands of homeowners were forced to find new insurers as national carriers fled the state.
Yet the prediction of a more dangerous Florida has not played out.
The new RMS model called for at least 11 hurricanes to come ashore in the United States by the end of 2010, most of them aimed at Florida.

Four hurricanes struck the U.S. None hit the Sunshine State.
RMS stands by its five-year outlook and contends that the risk of hurricanes remains higher than normal. Company officials last week said they would continue to adjust their model as needed, but a single five-year lull does not disprove their results.

Yet a growing number of experts now wonder if the changes spurred by RMS -- and the accompanying spike in insurance premiums -- were justified.
The woman credited with launching the industry of hurricane modeling questions how near-term models were introduced. She accuses RMS of overselling software that lacked sufficient scientific support, and says insurers accepted the output of that model as if it were fact.

"I've never seen the industry so much just hanging on what a handful of scientists or one model would say," said Karen Clark, founder and former CEO of AIR Worldwide, an RMS competitor.
"They're just tools," Clark said.
"They're models.
"They're wrong."

FOUR MEN, FOUR HOURS
The daily papers were still blaring news about Katrina when Jim Elsner received an invitation to stay over a day in Bermuda.

The hurricane expert from Florida State University would be on the island in October for an insurance-sponsored conference on climate change. One of the sponsors, a California-based company called RMS, wanted a private discussion with him and three other attendees.

Their task: Reach consensus on how global weather patterns had changed hurricane activity.
The experts pulled aside by RMS were far from representative of the divided field of tropical cyclone science. They belonged to a camp that believed hurricane activity was on the rise and, key to RMS, shared the contested belief that computer models could accurately predict the change.

Elsner's statistical work on hurricanes and climatology included a model to predict hurricane activity six months in advance, a tool for selling catastrophe bonds and other products to investors.
There was also Tom Knutson, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration meteorologist whose research linking rising carbon dioxide levels to potential storm damage had led to censoring by the Bush White House.

Joining them was British climate physicist Mark Saunders, who argued that insurers could use model predictions from his insurance-industry-funded center to increase profits 30 percent.

The rock star in the room was Kerry Emanuel, the oracle of climate change from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Just two weeks before Katrina, one of the world's leading scientific journals had published Emanuel's concise but frightening paper claiming humanity had changed the weather and doubled the damage potential of cyclones worldwide.

Elsner said he anticipated a general and scholarly talk.
Instead, RMS asked four questions: How many more hurricanes would form from 2006 to 2010? How many would reach land? How many the Caribbean? And how long would the trend last?...MUCH MORE
I was a bit dubious of the initial thrust of the series. From the first piece "Florida's Hurricane Insurance Premiums Largely Determined Overseas":
This article starts out as just silly but the picture is pretty neat.
They get to a couple important points about halfway through.

By the time "How Bermuda rigs insurance rates in Florida" was published I had changed my tune:
Told ya.
From "No Surprise: Chile Leads to Reinsurance Rate Increase Debate" BRK-A; BRK-B
No kidding.
A brisk breeze gets the boys in Omaha, Zurich, Munich and London (Lloyds) talking about premium increases.
Not to mention the herverzekering crowd in Amsterdam, they're tough bastards....
It's a dog-eat-Hoppin' John world.
That Bermuda link had further links to the rest of the series.

Some recent posts on insurance and models:
Insurance: Is the industry too reliant on models? (BRK.B)
We have A LOT of posts on models and modeling. Financial, climate, high-fashion.
What it all boils down to is a line that Alfred Korzybski used in a different context: "The map is not the territory".
Model designers and model users must always remember that their models are not reality....
And "Insurance: "CEO FORUM: Gen Re's Tad Montross on model dependency" (BRK.A)
Gen Re is Berkshire Hathaway's reinsurance operation (plus a few other things that would be sizable in their own right).
It is a heavyweight.


I hate copying out entire articles, good writing deserves the traffic.
In this case I'm afraid they will put this major piece behind the paywall.
There's a reason that Reactions motto is "Financial intelligence for the global insurance market."
Other posts on models:

"Airspace Closure Was Exacerbated by Too Much Modeling, Too Little Research
We have a deep and abiding interest in models.*
*The problem with models?:

"The map is not the territory"...
-Alfred Korzybski

Some of our prior posts on models:

The Financial Modelers' Manifesto
After the Crash: How Software Models Doomed the Markets
How Models Caused the Credit Crisis
Quants Lose that Old Black (Box) Magic
Finance: "Blame the models"
Climate Models Overheat Antarctica, New Study Finds
Climate modeling to require new breed of supercomputer
Computer Models: Climate scientists call for their own 'Manhattan Project'
Computer Models: " Misuse of Models" and "No model for policymaking"
Climate prediction: No model for success
Climate Models and Modeling
Based on Our Proprietary "What's on T.V." Timing Model...
How many Nobel Laureates Does it Take to Make Change...And: End of the Universe Puts
The New Math (Quant Funds)
Modeling*: The Map is Not the Territory
Inside Wall Street's Black Hole
Computer Models: Models’ Projections for Flu Miss Mark by Wide Margin
Obama: Swedish Model Would Be Impossible Here

The Swedish Model



As the [college] site that I lifted the picture from said:

(okay, sorry we know its tacky)

[hey, come on we're an all boy's team, what'd you expect!]

Saturday, August 15, 2026

More On Physical AI: "How world models became AI's next frontier"

From The Deep View, July 3:

Large language models can do a lot of things, as long as those things exist on a screen.

Having consumed practically all of the data on the internet, these models can tell you something about practically anything. They can analyze thousands of documents and pull out the most important parts. They can plan your trips, write poems, and mimic therapists in times of need. They can help researchers understand anything from protein structures to ancient history. And they’re the backbone of millions of agents that are the hottest ticket in tech right now.

But the world is bigger than a screen, and understanding it requires more than words.

That's why Nvidia’s Jensen Huang has said more than once that physical AI is due for its "ChatGPT moment."

It’s also the reason that world models, or AI models capable of understanding the physical environment, have gained significant momentum in 2026. Along with a flock of young startups entering the space, some of AI’s most prominent figures have homed in on the concept.

But as the momentum around world models grows, in tandem with physical AI and robotics, some leaders have begun to question their impact on LLMs, and ultimately, the ever-elusive path to artificial general intelligence (AGI).

"Seeing the world in a profound way, in a way that you participate in your movement, your interaction, in your communication, is critical for intelligence," said Dr. Fei-Fei Li, largely considered the godmother of AI, while also being the founder and CEO of World Labs, in a panel at the HumanX conference in April. "Not having that is intelligence in the dark."

Investors take notice

As world models catch the attention of some of AI’s biggest tastemakers, investors have become captivated. World model startups have been raking in billions in funding, some at incredibly early stages:

Beyond startups, several companies have pivoted into world models from one industry in particular: gaming.

Niantic, the maker of the beloved Pokémon Go app, sold its suite of mobile games to Scopely for $3.5 billion and spun out a lab last March called Niantic Spatial, focused on developing what it calls a "Large Geospatial Model," a world model that enhances spatial reasoning in LLMs.

And Roblox, the online gaming platform with more than 150 million daily active users, is developing its own version of a world model that it calls "real-time dreaming," that allows creators to generate and iterate on virtual environments through language prompts. In a panel at the HumanX conference in April, David Baszucki, Roblox founder and CEO, said that he envisions the company’s world models "not just as a play technology, but as a creation technology as well."

In January, Google DeepMind released Project Genie, an "experimental research prototype" that marks the latest iteration of its work in the world model space. The project is powered by its flagship Gemini model, its Nano Banana Pro image model, and Genie 3, its most powerful world model yet.

Nvidia, meanwhile, unveiled its Cosmos model at CES 2025, a world foundation model that’s aimed at accelerating the development and deployment of autonomous vehicles and robots. Since then, the company has expanded Cosmos further, including debuting the third generation of the Cosmos family and releasing world-generation models, controllable simulations for synthetic data generation, and multimodal reasoning models for physical AI.

Many bets, same problems....

....MUCH MORE 

August 14 - "World Models Are AI’s Next Frontier"