He does have some academic cred regarding this stuff.
This is the first of two essays. It deals with the reasons why civil
war is likely to dominate the military and strategic affairs of the West
in the coming years, contrary to the typical expectations of the future
war literature, and generally the strategic logic which shall underpin
such wars. The next essay will address specifically the actions and
strategies which existing military forces might pursue before and during
these conflicts.
Europe is a garden.
We have built a garden. Everything works. It is the best combination of
political freedom, economic prosperity and social cohesion that the
humankind has been able to build—the three things together … Most of the
rest of the world is a jungle…[i]
So said EU Foreign Affairs
chief Josep Borrell in Bruges in October 2022. Future dictionaries will
use it as an example of the definition of hubris.
That is because
the major threat to the security and prosperity of the West today
emanates from its own dire social instability, structural and economic
decline, cultural desiccation and, in my view, elite pusillanimity. Some
academics have begun to sound the alarm, notably Barbara Walter’s How Civil Wars Start—and How to Stop Them,
which is concerned primarily with the dwindling domestic stability of
the United States.[ii] To judge from President Biden’s September 2022
speech in which he declared ‘MAGA Republicans represent an extremism
that threatens the very foundations of our republic’ governments are
beginning to take heed, albeit cautiously and awkwardly.[iii]
The
field of strategic studies, however, is largely silent on the issue,
which is strange because it ought to be something of concern. Why is it
correct to perceive the increasing danger of violent internal conflict
erupting in the West? What are the strategies and tactics likely to be
employed in the civil wars to come in the West and by whom? These are
the questions which I shall address in this essay.
Causes
The
literature on civil wars is united on two points. Firstly, they are not
a concern of states that are rich and, secondly, nations which possess
governmental stability are largely free of the phenomenon. There are
degrees of equivocation on how much regime type matters, though most
agree that securely-perceived-to-be-legitimate democracies and strong
autocracies are stable. In the former, people do not rebel because they
trust the political system works justly overall. In the latter, they do
not because authorities identify and punish dissenters before they have a
chance.
Factionalisation is another main concern, but extremely
heterogeneous societies are not more prone to civil war than very
homogenous ones. This is put down to the high ‘coordination costs’
between communities that exist in the former, which mitigate against the
formation of mass movements. The most unstable are moderately
homogenous societies, particularly when there is a perceived change in
the status of a titular majority, or significant minority, which
possesses the wherewithal to revolt on its own. By contrast, in
societies comprised of many small minorities ‘divide and conquer’ can be
an effective mechanism of controlling a population.[iv]
In my
view, there is no good reason to fault the main thrust of extant theory
on civil war causation as described above. The question, rather, is
whether the assumption of the conditions which have traditionally placed
Western nations outside the frame of analysis of people concerned with
large-scale and persistent eruptions of violent civil discord are still
valid.
The evidence strongly suggests that they are not. Indeed,
as far back as the end of the Cold War some perceived that the culture
which ‘won’ that conflict was itself beginning to fragment and
degenerate. In 1991, Arthur Schlesinger argued in The Disuniting of America that the ‘cult of ethnicity’ increasingly endangered the unity of that society.[v] This was prescient.
Consider the striking findings of the Edelman Trust Barometer
over the last twenty years. ‘Distrust’, it concluded recently, ‘is now
society’s default emotion.’[vi] The situation in America, as shown in
related research is acutely bad. As of 2019, even before the contested
Biden election and the Covid-epidemic, 68 per cent of Americans agreed
it was urgently necessary to repair levels of ‘confidence’ in society in
government, with half averring that a ‘cultural sickness’ is what
fading trust represented.[vii]
In sociological terms, what this
collapse of trust reflects is a plunge in the stock of ‘social capital’,
which is both a kind of ‘superglue’, a factor of societal cohesion, as
well as a ‘lubricant’ that allows otherwise disparate groups in society
to get along.[viii] That it is in decline is disputed by no one, and
neither is anyone seriously unclear on the unhappy consequences.
There
is dispute over its causation, however. Chancellor Angela Merkel once
pointed the finger directly at multiculturalism, declaring that in
Germany it had ‘utterly failed’, an idea that was echoed six months
later by then Prime Minister David Cameron in Britain. He elaborated
that ‘It ghettoises people into minority and majority groups with no
common identity.’[ix] Such statements by leaders, both noteworthy
centrists, of large, ostensibly politically stable, Western states
cannot easily be dismissed as populist demagoguery.[x]
Additionally,
‘political polarisation’ has been enhanced by social media and identity
politics, on which more below. Digital connectivity tends to drive
societies towards greater depth and frequency of feelings of isolation
in more tightly drawn affinity groups. Each of these is guarded by
so-called ‘filter bubbles’, carefully constructed membranes of
ideological disbelief that are constantly reinforced by active and
passive curation of media consumption.[xi]
What might be described
as ‘intertribal conflict’ is by no means confined to the virtual spaces
of the Internet; rather, it manifests also in physical fighting in a
self-reinforcing feedback cycle. Many examples of this from recent
headlines might be given. A good one though, is the city of Leicester in
Britain, which over the last year has witnessed recurring violence
between the local Hindu and Muslim populations, both sides animated by
intercommunal tensions in distant south Asia. A Hindu mob marched
through the Muslim part of town chanting ‘Death to Pakistan’.[xii]
What
this reflects above all is the considerable irrelevance of Britishness
as an aspect of the pre-political loyalty of significant fraction of two
of the largest minorities in Britain. Who wants to fight whom and over
what? The answer in this case to this good strategic question has very
little to do with the nominal nationality of the people who have
observably already begun to fight.
Finally, to this volatile
social mix must be added the economic dimension, which can only be
described as extremely worrisome. By common estimation, the West has
already started another economic downturn, a long overdue recurrence of
the 2008 financial crisis, combined with the fallout of the
deindustrialisation of Western economies, a notable by-product of which
is the progressive de-dollarisation of global trade that has been
turbocharged by sanctions on Russia, which has also induced a ballistic
rise in the costs of basic goods such as energy, food, and
housing.[xiii]
In terms of economic financialization, debt
issuance, and consumption, the West has reached the end of the line,
which means that a gigantic gap in expectation of well-being is opening.
If there is one other thing that the literature on revolution agrees
upon it is that expectation gaps are dangerous.[xiv] Again, simply put, a
time-honoured means of controlling the rise of incipient mobs is the
provision by the ruling powers of ‘bread and circuses’, in other words
basic consumption and cheap entertainment—the efficacy of both of which
is rapidly attenuating in the present day.
To conclude this
section, it can be said that a generation ago all Western countries
could still be described as to a large degree cohesive nations, each
with a greater or lesser sense of common identity and heritage. By
contrast, all now are incohesive political entities, jigsaw puzzles of
competing identity-based tribes, living in large part in virtually
segregated ‘communities’ competing over diminishing societal resources
increasingly obviously and violently. Moreover, their economies are
mired in a structural malaise leading, inevitably in the view of several
knowledgeable observers to systemic collapse.[xv]
Conduct
The intimacy of civil war, its political intensity, and its fundamentally social quality, plus the acute accessibility to attack on all sides of everyone’s weak points can make them particularly savage and miasmic. The Russian Civil War which followed the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 is a particularly good example. It is a form of war in which people suffer raw cruelty and fanaticism not for what they have done but for what they are.[xvi]Perhaps civil wars in the West can be contained to
the level of loathsomeness of those of Central America of the 1970s and
1980s. In which case ‘normal’ life will remain possible for the fraction
of the population that is rich enough to insulate itself from the
larger milieu of political assassinations, death squads and
intercommunal reprisals, plus thriving criminal predation which typify a
society in the process of tearing itself apart.[xvii]
The trouble is that the urge to fight, indeed the wish to accelerate
towards conflict, is not confined to just one group—as one might gather
from the recent alarm over far-Right populism—but is of a rather more
general character, with radicalism increasingly visible in all sorts of
communities.[xviii] Consider, for instance, the following lines from a
French leftist tract published in 2007:
It’s
well known that the streets teem with incivilities. The technical
infrastructure of the metropolis is vulnerable… Its flows amount to more
than the transportation of people and commodities. Information and
energy circulate via wire networks, fibres and channels, and these can
be attacked. In our time of utter decadence, the only thing imposing
about temples is the dismal truth that they are already ruins.[xix]
At
this point in the history of conflict, it hardly seems necessary to
explain the techniques of taking existing social divisions in society
and tearing them into chasms because they have been widely studied.[xx]
The defence establishments of the West are very familiar with such
matters as they have presented themselves in the varied foreign theatres
in which they have been embroiled as part of the so-called War on
Terror.
Is it a complete wonder that those lessons and ideas should have found their way back home? The Citizen’s Guide to Fifth Generation Warfare
co-written by MGEN Michael Flynn, former head of the Defence
Intelligence Agency and President Trump’s initial National Security
Advisor, is a well-designed handbook and explicit in its aim, which is
to educate people in the West about revolt. In his own words, he wrote
it because ‘I never dreamed the greatest battles to be waged would be
right here in our homeland against subversive elements of our own
government.’[xxi]
Over the last thirty years the West has
preoccupied itself thanklessly in an expeditionary capacity in the
invertebrate civil wars of others. It ought to have learned that it is
impossible to maintain an integrated multi-valent society once
neighbours start kidnapping each other’s children and murdering them
with hand drills, blowing up each other’s cultural events, slaying each
other’s teachers and religious leaders, and tearing down their icons. It
is soberingly worth noting, moreover, that plenty of instances of all
those things have occurred already in the West and all of them have occurred in France alone in the last five years.[xxii]
Scenarios,
mostly focused on the United States, of what civil wars in the West
would look like exist in the literature.[xxiii] They tend to share one
thing in common particularly, which is the expectation as expressed by
Peter Mansoor, professor of military history at Ohio State University,
that they will,
…not be like the first
[American] civil war, with armies manoeuvring on the battlefield [but]
would very much be a free-for-all, neighbour-on-neighbour, based on
beliefs and skin colour and religion. And it would be horrific.[xxiv]
Approximately
75 per cent of post-Cold War civil conflicts have been fought by ethnic
factions.[xxv] Therefore, that civil war in the West will be likewise
is unexceptional. The nature of the belief that Mansoor invokes
as being important is, however, worth dwelling upon. I would suggest
that the belief in question is the acceptance by all groups in society of the precepts of ‘identity politics’.
Identity
politics may be defined as politics in which people having a particular
racial, religious, ethnic, social, or cultural identity tend to promote
their own specific interests or concerns without regard to the
interests or concerns of any larger political group. It is overtly
post-national. It is this above all that makes civil conflict in the
West not merely likely but practically inevitable, in my view.
The
peculiarity of contemporary Western multiculturalism, relative to
examples of other heterogenous societies, is threefold. Firstly, it is
in the ‘sweet spot’ with respect to theories of civil war causation,
specifically the supposed problem of coordination costs is diminished in
a situation where White majorities (trending rapidly toward large
minority status in some cases) live alongside multiple smaller
minorities.
Secondly, thus far what has been practiced is a sort
of ‘asymmetric multiculturalism’ in which in-group preference, ethnic
pride, and group solidarity—notably in voting—are acceptable for all
groups except Whites for whom such things are considered to represent
supremacist attitudes that are anathematic to social order.
Thirdly,
because of the above what has emerged is a perception that the status
quo is invidiously unbalanced, which provides an argument for revolt on
the part of the White majority (or large minority) that is rooted in
stirring language of justice. From a strategic communications
perspective, a morally inflected narrative which has a clearly
articulated grievance, a plausible and urgent remedy, and a receptive
conscience community is powerful.[xxvi]....
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