Note the 'may'. I don't know for a fact but there are observations that point in that direction.
First up, the New York Post, June 28:
Is Chinese President Xi Jinping on his way out?
Over the past few months, unprecedented developments point to the potential, and potentially imminent, fall of China’s “Chairman of Everything” Xi Jinping. Chinese Communist Party elders — including Hu Jintao, Xi’s immediate predecessor, whom Xi humiliated at the 20th Party Congress in 2022 — are now running things behind the scenes.
Xi is in poor health and likely to retire at the CCP Plenary Session this August or take a purely ceremonial position.
Xi’s downfall has been rumored before. But never have we seen the recent purges (and mysterious deaths) of dozens of People’s Liberation Army generals loyal to Xi; all replaced by non-Xi loyalists.
Zhang Youxia, with whom Xi had a major falling out after helping Xi secure an unprecedented third five-year term, is now the de facto leader of the PLA.
Also, the “un-naming” of Xi’s father’s mausoleum last month was unprecedented. The mausoleum, which Xi has built to honor his late father, was larger than the mausoleums of either Mao’s or Deng’s.
Meanwhile, Xi’s personal protective detail has recently been halved. What world leader cuts his own security?
There was no explanation for Xi’s disappearance for almost two weeks in late May and early June while foreign dignitaries were hosted in Beijing by other CCP Leaders. Xi has also been conspicuously missing from the pages of the People’s Daily, the CCP organ that until recently ran fawning front-page stories on Xi daily....
....MUCH MORE
From the Jamestown Foundation, June 24:
PLA Purges Provide Opening for Xi’s Rivals
Executive Summary:
- New evidence suggests that a faction within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aligned with former president Hu Jintao and former premier Wen Jiabao could be exerting influence on the direction of the Party.
- Three party elders—all of whom were Hu Jintao allies—reportedly criticized General Secretary Xi Jinping at Beidaihe in August 2023, while subsequent purges have eroded Xi’s base of support in the military.
- More recently, signs that Xi’s erstwhile successor Hu Chunhua is regaining prominence following a demotion from the Politburo in 2022 could indicate that this “Tuanpai” faction is gaining ground. These signs include Hu leading an overseas delegation and visiting the Vietnamese embassy to convey his condolences for the passing of its former president—a role usually reserved for a politburo member.
- Xi also recently made a speech referring to “scientific, democratic, and law-based policymaking,” a key phrase associated with his predecessor, Hu Jintao. This could be interpreted as a concession to the Tuanpai faction.
New evidence suggests that a faction within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aligned with former president Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) and former premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) could be exerting influence on the direction of the Party. Earlier this year, we speculated that CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s power was being curtailed following purges that eroded his bases of support in the military (China Brief, March 15). Now, the return to prominence of Hu Chunhua (胡春华), alongside reporting about events that took place at the leadership’s summer retreat in Beidaihe in August 2023, could indicate that the “Hu-Wen faction” is resisting Xi Jinping to some degree.
The Fall of the Hu-Wen Faction
When Xi became paramount leader of the PRC in 2012, he blunted the power of Hu Jintao’s supporters. Hu’s base of support within the Party was known as the Communist Youth League or “Tuanpai” (团派) faction—also referred to as the “Hu-Wen” faction to reflect the involvement of Wen Jiabao, who was never a part of the Youth League (Brookings, April 29, 2009). On ascending to power, Xi had officials aligned with the Tuanpai faction arrested, like Ling Jihua (令计划), or sidelined, like Li Keqiang (李克强) (New York Times, August 4, 2016; Reuters, October 26, 2022). Xi also stymied the rise of Hu Chunhua, who was Hu and Wen’s preferred candidate to succeed him, by demoting Hu Chunhua from the Politburo in 2022 (Xinhua, December 18, 2012, accessed June 17). [1] In so doing, Xi rejected a soft norm known as “skipping a generation to designate a successor” (隔代指定接班人), whereby each former leader selects the leadership candidates who will follow their own successor (DW, July 28, 2017). [2]
The final blow to the Tuanpai appeared to come in the form of public spectacle, when Hu Jintao was unceremoniously removed from the closing ceremony of the 20th CCP National Congress (Reuters, October 26, 2022). During the ceremony, Hu Jintao attempted to confirm a rumor that Hu Chunhua was missing from the Politburo list but was stopped and dragged away (VOA, October 31, 2022; Radio France Internationale, November 10, 2022). Xi also appeared to break precedent by allowing Wang Huning (王沪宁) to remain on the Standing Committee while Li Keqiang and Wang Yang (汪洋) had to step down. This violated another soft norm—that of “seven up, eight down” (七上八下), whereby cadres aged 68 or more are expected to step down (Liberty Times, October 23, 2022, [1], [2]; China Brief, January 17). Since then, the Tuanpai have been largely impotent as a faction within CCP politics.
The Hu-Wen Faction Returns?
Hu Chunhua, Xi’s erstwhile successor, recently has regained a degree of prominence. In April, he led a delegation of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), of which he is a senior official, to West Africa (Xinhua, April 17). This was his first such mission since his demotion. The following month, Hu was again tapped to represent the PRC, visiting the Vietnamese embassy to convey his condolences for the passing of former President Trần Đức Lương (Báo Quốc Tế, May 25). Vietnam, a fellow socialist state, is an important partner for the PRC (China Brief, July26, 2024). The significance of this visit is underscored by the PRC’s “funeral diplomacy” (葬礼外交) norms, whereby representatives attending the mourning of a former head of state are usually at least a deputy national-level official and a Politburo member (The Paper, April 6, 2015). Hu’s attendance, especially in a country like Vietnam with close Party ties, signifies a subtle increase in his stature within the CCP. [3]....
....MUCH MORE
