Interesting throughout beginning immediately at the summary which appears to contemplate a negotiated settlement sooner, rather than later:
A longer, more violent war would have long-term and likely irreversible adverse consequences for U.S. interests. For example, a longer war would have negative economic effects on the United States, its allies, and Ukraine, regardless of postwar U.S. strategy
And some land-for-peace or whatever you wish to call it:
Washington can also encourage Kyiv to adopt a military posture optimized for defense rather than continuing to focus on capabilities for retaking Russian-held territory. Doing so could limit Kyiv’s ability to liberate occupied areas but would make it harder for Russia to take more territory, increasing Kyiv’s ability to deter Moscow from restarting the war.....
Those are both on page vi. Continuing on page vii:
....Closer Russia-China ties may be irreversible. Before the war, Beijing and Moscow’s ties were driven by a shared concern about U.S. power and foreign policy; relations have deepened further during the war. In the postwar setting, a hardline U.S. policy toward Russia could create more incentives for greater Russia-China cooperation. A moderately less hardline approach, such as the one we consider, would avoid creating such additional incentives; but it would be unlikely to alter the underlying suspicions of the United States that sustain the relationship.
Emphasis in the original. A quick search of the document yields 169 uses of the word territory.
From RAND, February 9, 2024:
Planning for the Aftermath
Assessing Options for U.S. Strategy Toward Russia After the Ukraine War
U.S. policy choices made at the conclusions of past wars have had enduring consequences. Although there is no end in sight to the Russia-Ukraine war at the time of this writing in late 2023, U.S. policymakers should begin considering postwar Russia strategy now.
The authors of this report address this issue through an alternative futures analysis. Planning for after the war is complicated by significant uncertainty: Neither the conflict's trajectory nor the international climate at the war's end can be predicted with confidence. Given this uncertainty, the implications of U.S. strategic choices must be explored in different contexts. The authors develop two ideal-type postwar worlds, as defined by the outcome of the war and the character of the broader international environment: a less favorable world and a more favorable world. They also propose two ideal-type options for postwar U.S. strategy toward Russia, a hardline approach and a less hardline approach. Then, they consider how each strategy would play out in each world over the course of the decade after the war ends, yielding four alternative futures. They draw on the history of U.S.-Russia relations and the literatures on rivalries, interstate conflict, and alliances to assess the implications of each future for U.S. interests.
Key Findings
Wartime choices could shape the postwar world
Not taking these longer-term factors into consideration could lead to missed opportunities to shape the postwar environment.The choices that will have to be made in the immediate aftermath of the war can have ripple effects on many long-term U.S. interests
These effects are not straightforward. Policymakers thus need time — long before the war ends — to consider these choices.The United States may be able to influence the conflict outcome to promote its long-term postwar interests
The United States cannot determine the outcome of the war on its own; its decisions will never have the same impact as those of the two combatants. But Washington does have policy options to try to affect the trajectory of the conflict.A longer, more violent war would lock in adverse consequences for U.S. interests
For example, a longer war could significantly undermine Ukraine's postwar recovery.U.S. policy during and after the war can reduce the risk of Russia-Ukraine conflict recurrence
The United States has instruments to increase the likelihood that any peace endures.Ramping up military pressure on Russia in Europe after the war could pose more risks than benefits
The war has weakened Russia and shown that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has a strong deterrent against Russian attacks on allies. Further forward deployments and other measures are likely unnecessary to deter opportunistic Russian aggression, but may make war by misperception about U.S. intentions more likely....
....MORE, additional reports, report download page (upper right, eBook, 153 pages)
