With the success of both the Ukrainian "Spiderweb" and the Israeli drone operations it is probably a good idea to keep an eye on the sky. And watch out for semi-trailer trucks and shipping containers.
In fact, don't go out at all for a few months. Which of course implies buying Amazon or other delivery company stock.
From the RAND Corporation, June 2:
In 2016, during coalition operations against the Islamic State, defense leaders started characterizing drones, especially small-unmanned aircraft systems, as a threat to U.S. military personnel and installations. Since then, drones have proliferated and increasingly threaten military personnel and bases, both at home and abroad.
In March 2025, more than 100 participants from more than two dozen federal agencies participated in a tabletop exercise exploring aspects of counter-drone operations. This was the sixth event in a series of tabletop exercises exploring various aspects of counter-drone operations, capabilities, authorities, and threats. The most recent event was designed to explore a key research question in the homeland—how can the Joint Force and Interagency support Northern Command's synchronization of counter-drone operations to defend military bases in the homeland?
The Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO) partnered with RAND in designing hypothetical but realistic drone incursion scenarios that attempted to fulfill stakeholders' interests without priming them to think and respond in certain ways. The scenarios drew insights from recent drone incursions at U.S. military installations. Two different sites, Fort Bliss in Texas and Joint Base Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, informed the tabletop exercise. This allowed the exercise team to vary conditions that, when considered in combination with one another, approximated the complexity of drone incursions at military bases. These included various drones flying at different bearings, altitudes, and ranges from military bases; multiple modes of transportation, from which participants could adjudicate the merits—and limits—of applying counterpositioning, navigation, and timing capabilities; and, a litany of federal, state, and local authorities, in addition to military units.
The JCO/RAND team explored the implications of these “treatments” in terms of three questions. First, what triggers Northern Command's synchronization of counter-drone operations at military bases? Second, how can the Joint Force and Interagency, synchronized by Northern Command, maximize data-sharing to enhance situational awareness of drone incursions at military bases? Third, what conditions encourage the use of counterpositioning, navigation, and timing capabilities, as well as other exquisite technologies, to mitigate the effects of drone incursions at military bases? Participants addressed these questions over multiple phases of the two scenarios, and their analyses were facilitated by experts from the JCO and RAND.
The scenarios followed an “action,” “reaction,” and “counteraction” phasing, wherein the drone incursion encouraged participants' response that further shaped crisis escalation. This approach provided for a dynamic, flexible, and responsive simulation. While the sample of participants was broadly cross-sectional, reflecting relevant stakeholders across the Joint Force and Interagency, it was not fully representative of the federal government, military services, and local law enforcement. Rather, it is what political scientists call a convenience sample.
Participants volunteered to attend the tabletop exercise, potentially introducing selection bias. Thus, we are unable to draw broad generalizations about the way officials understand the use of counter-drone operations in the homeland. Yet the sample of participants was comprised of informed and knowledgeable stakeholders from the community of interest. This implies that we are afforded rare insights into how decisionmakers think about mitigating drone incursions in the homeland. To further manage bias, the tabletop exercise used free play. Experts from JCO and RAND managed participants' discussions to inform their decisions about triggers, domain awareness, and escalation, and captured feedback using questionnaires, move sheets, and rapporteurs.
The tabletop exercise resulted in three key findings. Together, these outcomes could allow Northern Command to adopt a proactive approach to defend military bases against drone incursions....
....MUCH MORE
Very related, April 17, 2025:
Islamic Terrorists Are Now Attacking With Drones In Nigeria
And November 2019:
"Omniviolence Is Coming and the World Isn’t Ready"
From Nautil.us:
In The Future of Violence, Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum discuss a disturbing hypothetical scenario. A lone actor in Nigeria, “home to a great deal of spamming and online fraud activity,” tricks women and teenage girls into downloading malware that enables him to monitor and record their activity, for the purposes of blackmail. The real story involved a California man who the FBI eventually caught and sent to prison for six years, but if he had been elsewhere in the world he might have gotten away with it. Many countries, as Wittes and Blum note, “have neither the will nor the means to monitor cybercrime, prosecute offenders, or extradite suspects to the United States.”
Technology is, in other words, enabling criminals to target anyone anywhere and, due to democratization, increasingly at scale. Emerging bio-, nano-, and cyber-technologies are becoming more and more accessible. The political scientist Daniel Deudney has a word for what can result: “omniviolence.” The ratio of killers to killed, or “K/K ratio,” is falling. For example, computer scientist Stuart Russell has vividly described how a small group of malicious agents might engage in omniviolence: “A very, very small quadcopter, one inch in diameter can carry a one-or two-gram shaped charge,” he says.“You can order them from a drone manufacturer in China. You can program the code to say: ‘Here are thousands of photographs of the kinds of things I want to target.’ A one-gram shaped charge can punch a hole in nine millimeters of steel, so presumably you can also punch a hole in someone’s head. You can fit about three million of those in a semi-tractor-trailer. You can drive up I-95 with three trucks and have 10 million weapons attacking New York City. They don’t have to be very effective, only 5 or 10% of them have to find the target.” Manufacturers will be producing millions of these drones, available for purchase just as with guns now, Russell points out, “except millions of guns don’t matter unless you have a million soldiers. You need only three guys to write the program and launch.” In this scenario, the K/K ratio could be perhaps 3/1,000,000, assuming a 10-percent accuracy and only a single one-gram shaped charge per drone.
Will emerging technologies make the state system obsolete? It’s hard to see why not.That’s completely—and horrifyingly—unprecedented. The terrorist or psychopath of the future, however, will have not just the Internet or drones—called “slaughterbots” in this video from the Future of Life Institute—but also synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and advanced AI systems at their disposal. These tools make wreaking havoc across international borders trivial, which raises the question: Will emerging technologies make the state system obsolete? It’s hard to see why not. What justifies the existence of the state, English philosopher Thomas Hobbes argued, is a “social contract.” People give up certain freedoms in exchange for state-provided security, whereby the state acts as a neutral “referee” that can intervene when people get into disputes, punish people who steal and murder, and enforce contracts signed by parties with competing interests....MORE
It gets worse.
"Meet the future weapon of mass destruction, the drone swarm"
From The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists....
"Autonomous 'Slaughterbot' Drones Reportedly Attack Libyans Using Facial Recognition Tech"